Julius Hogan v. Susanne B. Miller by unknown
Record No. 918 
JULIUS HOGAN 
v. 
SUSANNE B. MILLER 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF TilE CITY OF LYNCHBURG, VA. 
''The briefs shall be printed in type not less in size than 
small pica, and shall be nine inches in length and six inche& 
in width, so as to conform in dimensions to the printed 
records along with which they are to be bound, in accord-
ance with Act of Assembly, approved March 1, 1903; and 
the clerks of this court are directed not to receive or :file a 
brief not conforming in all respects to the aforementioned 
requirements.'' 
The foregoing is printed in small pica type for the infor-
mation of counsel. 
H. STEvVART JONES, Clerk. 
IN THE 




SUSANNE B. MILLER. 
PETITION E"'OR WRIT OF ERROR. 
To the Hono'rable Justices of the S~tp1·ente Court of Appeals 
of Virginia: 
Y o~r petitioner, J ulins Hogan, respectfully shows that lie 
is aggrieved by the Rulings and Judgment of the -Circuit 
Court for the City of Lynchburg, Virginia, rendered in the 
action at law wherein Susanne B. 1\Hller was Plaintiff and 
your Petitioner was Defendant, and especially by the judg-
- ment of said .court, rendered on the 9th day of October, 1929, 
against your Petitioner for the sum of $10,000.00 and costs. 
Your petitioner prays that a Writ of Error be awarded 
and that the verdict of the jury and said judgment against 
your Petitioner may be set aside and reversed and that final 
judgment may be entered for your petitioner, with costs. A 
transcript of the record in said case is hereto attached as a· 
part of this. Petition. 
THE FACTS. 
The jury having found for the Plaintiff the reasonable facts 
must of necessity be taken in the most favorable light to the 
Plaintiff. In large part there is no conflict. A fair state-
ment- of facts is as follows: 
~:. --
-~------ ·---------..------
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Mrs. Susanne B. Miller sued Petitioner for damages, al-
leged to have resulted from an automobile ·Collision at Eighth 
and ·Clay Streets, L;ynchburg, Virginia, on December 9th, 
1928. Petitioner was the owner of a certain automobile with 
license to operate the same as a ''Car for Hire'' for the 
transportation of passengers, and which at the time was being 
operated by one L. ~I. vVebber, who had been driving a car 
for twelve years, and for the past fifteen months had been 
driving a public or for-hire car, and 'during which time he 
11ad never had an accident of any moment before (Rec., p. 
122). 
On the day in question the Plaintiff, en route to Roanoke, 
'Tirginia, arrived at Lynchburg on a Southern Railway train 
and found that she would have to transfer across town from 
the Southern Station to the Union or Norfolk & Western Sta-
tion, with apparently only a short time to make the connec-
tion. 
When she came out of the .Southern Station, being unfa~ 
miliar with the City, she selected the car of petitioner from a 
numl)er of taxis and for hire cars there with their drivers, all 
of whom were soliciting patrons. 
Webber, petitioner's driver, started out with his passen-
ger to go to the other station. He knew that Mrs. Miller 
wished to catch the train for Roanoke and had only a short 
time to do so, though he also knew that the train would be 
held for ample time for transfer of passeng·ers from the 
·Southern train, as they ahvays did (Rec., p. 130). 
The automobile of petitioner 'vas a four-cylinder car and 
while called a Chrysler, was in fact a Maxwell car with a 
Chrysler radiator~ was three years old and had been driven 
about 42,000 miles (Rec., p. 146). It was not a speedy car at 
the time, but was practically worn out (Rec., pp. 146 and 
147). The uncontradicted evidence of Webber is that it was 
at the time ''a very slow car'' and ''couldn't make over 15 
or 18 miles an hour in second g·ear-even on level" (Rec., p. 
)24). . 
Webber drove up Park A venue and turned into Eighth 
Street in a northeasterly direction. On reaching :Madison 
Street, he had to stop, to let a car from his right on ~Iadison 
Street, pass. From lviadison Street to Clay Street, where the 
accident happened, is two blocks, with a pavement of rough 
cobblestones, and with an up grade of 10% (Rec., p. 17) which, 
as Engineer Garland testified, is considered a steep grade 
( Rec., p. 19). 
After stopping- at ~{adison .Street, Webber put the car in 
low gear and started forward up Eighth Street. Before reach-
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ing Clay S.treet he changed to second gear, in which he was 
driving at the time of the accident (Roo., p. 123). He could 
not have changed to high gear coming up that hill (Rec., p. 
125). 
As the car approached Clay Street, the view to the left 
(west corner) was cut off by a church built up to the street 
line on both Eighth and Clay Streets. To his right there was 
a stone wall on Eighth Street, varying from 12 inches high 
at the corner to "a foot or two"' as it went back down the 
)1i1l. (This of necessity to some extent cut off the view to 
the right as the car came up the hill.) 
As Webber approached the intersection he looked to the 
right to see if any cars 'vere approaching (if any it would 
have the right of 'vay) and sa'v none, and so started across 
the intersection. When he got into the intersection he looked 
to the left and saw, as he says, a car approaching down Clay 
Street..:...._a.bout 25 or 30 feet back. At this time he was al-
most a car length into the intersection (Rec., p. 134). He 
kept on across and after the rear of his car had gotten across 
the center of Clay Street, it was struck on the left rear fen-
rler and wheel by the car driven and owned by A. T. Lanh~m. 
There is no dispute. as to this fact which was testified to by 
Webber, by Policeman 1'Iiles who examined into the accident 
and noticed the marks on the street, and practically by every 
witness who testified on the subject. Petitioner's car was 
knocked over against the curbing and against a two-inch iron 
pipe sign post, bending the post nearly double, was turned 
over and the plaintiff riding therein sustained a severe con-
<-nssion and other injuries which will be discussed later. 
At the point in question, Clay Street is 60 feet wide, in-
cluding sidewalks, while the drive,vay is 30 feet wide. Eighth 
Street is 30 feet \vide, including sidewalks, with a driveway 
of 18 feet (see plat filed with evidence). Thus as the front 
of petitioner's car entered the intersection, in order to have 
the rear pass over the center of Clay Street, it had to go 30 
feet plus the length of the car-a total distance of from 4~ . 
to 42 feet. · · 
The Lanham car, a Star car of about the same weight as 
petitioner's car, approached Eighth Street going in a south-
east direction, and was thus approaching from the left to 
petitioner's car, thus entitling the latter to the right of \Vay 
if they entered or approached the intersection at approxi-
mately the same time. 
Clay Street is a. smooth paved ·street, and as Lanham ap-
proached he was going down a 6% grade. Eig·hth Street be-
- .. '"""711 
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ing only 30 feet wide, in order for the front of the Lanham 
car to get from the near line of Eighth Street just over the . 
center of Eighth Street, where the impact occurred, t.he 
·straight line distance would only be about 18 or 20 feet 
against 40 or 42 feet for petitioner's car from the near line 
of .Clay Street to the point of impact. Lanham testified that 
his brakes had just been relined and were in first class con-
dition (Rec., p. 22). There were six people in his car, his 
wife and child, two other ladies and a man. Mr. and Mrs. 
Lanham and a Miss Mason 'vere on the front seat (Rec., p. 
22). 
There is much disagreement in estimate about the exact 
speed of the two cars, but the uncontradicted physical facts 
are that Webber was driving up a 10% grade, in a three-
year old car nearly worn out, over cobblestones, and in .second 
gear, while Lanham was on a smooth street, coming down a _ 
6% grade, with two ladies on the front seat with him. Police-
man Miles, a disinterested witnes~, who arrived just after 
the accident happened for the purpose of police investiga-
tion, stated that the marks on the ground showed that the 
I~anham car skidded for twenty feet before reaching Eighth 
Street, the marks showing that the car was nearer ·the center 
of the street than the right hand curb (Rec., pp. 112 and 
113). Miles stepped off the distance of the skid marks 
(Rec., p. 119). It is also undisputed that the rear of Peti-
tioner's car l1ad passed over the center of Clay Street before 
the impact occurred. 
Furthe-r, Dr. Rawlings stated that the plaintiff herself told 
him "that the driver of the taxicab impressed her as being 
a very careful driver" (Rec., p. 108). Mrs. Miller did not 
deny this statement. 
S'PEE·D. 
There were various opinions expressed as to the speed of 
the two cars involved in the accident. The question of any 
possihle rapid speed of petitioner's car was entirely imma-
terial in any event, as it could not have been the proximate 
cause of the accident or even a contributing cause. In fact, 
in argument before the jury, the attorneys for plaintiff based 
their claim on the c.ontention that the driver of petitioner's 
car should have put on his brakes and stopped, or else should 
have turned his car, to avoid the accident and. was negligent 
in not so doing. 
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RlGHT OF W .AY . 
.As already set out above-petitioner's car was approaching 
from the right of the Lanham car and so was entitled to the 
right of way. .As also shown above there is no question ·about 
the fact that, when the collision occurred, the rear of petition-
er's car had crossed over the center line of Clay Street and 
the Lanham car was over on its left side of Clay Street. Con-
sidering the width of the Street and the distance from the 
street line to the point of accident, and even allowing for 
variation in speed, it appears that petitioner's car must neces-
sarily have entered the intersection, not merely approximately 
at the same time as the Lanham car (which would still en-
title petitioner's car to the rig~t of ·way) but in fact consid-
erably ahead of the Lanham car. There could be no ques-
tion that petitioner's car had the right of way, as was in fact 
admitted in argument ·by plaintiff's attorneys. This follows· 
from the physical facts and also from the testimony of every 
witness for both plaintiff and defendant with the sole excep-
tion of Lanham himself. . 
F. A. Carroll, plaintiff witness, says that the cab was in the 
intersection when the Lanham car was approaching-"right 
at the intersection'.' (Rec., p. 47) and again that he could not 
say which entered first as both got there· about the same time 
( R·ec., p. 48). 
Thos. E. J\Htchell, a plaintiff :witness, said the cars 'vere 
very close but thinks that the car on Clay Street (Lanham. 
car) "was a foot or so" closer to the intersection (Rec., p. 
55), but being so close he would not be positive (Rec., p. 
58). , 
· J\1:rs. Lanham said she did not know which was in the inter-
section first (R.ec., p. 41), while ~Irs. Grant did not testify 
on the subject. 
Webber, for the defendant, was positive that he was well 
in the intersection as the Lanham car approached it and his 
-statement is borne out ·by the physical facts. 
Thus, under any reasonable- view of the ·evidence, peti-
tioner's car was actually in the intersection first and at worst 
for defendant the car ''entered or approached the intersec-
tion at approximately the same time" and petitioner's car 
being on the right had under the statute the right of way. 
As stated this was not denied or contradicted in the argu-
ment before the jury but ·was in fact admitted. 
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ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE. 
As stated above, plaintiff's attorneys in argument claimed 
that petitioner, being- a common carrier and held to the high 
degree of care required of such, was guilty of negligence in 
failing to observe the Lanham car, in failing to put on brakes 
or stop and in failing to turn down Clay Street. 
Webber himself testified that he did not put on brakes or 
turn and that if he had turned down Clay Street the accident 
would not have happened. crhis evidence and the question 
soliciting it was objected to and will be discused later.) Web-
ber stated that he did J?.Ot look to the right until he was in 
the intersection-about a car length in. A reference to the 
plat '"ill show that the sidewalk on Clay Street to his left is 
15 feet wide so that he thus looked to the left before he started 
across the driveway of Clay Street. He said he 'vas going 
about 15 miles and could have stopped in 5 or 6 feet or he 
could have turned to his rig·ht down ·Clay Street but he fur-
ther says that \vhen he looked to the left the Lanham car 
was 25 or 30 feet away and he thought he had plenty of time 
to get across. Further he had the right of way and was 
entitled to proceed on the assumption that Lanham would 
grant it. Thus there is no testimony that Webber failed 
to keep. a lookout nor any contradiction of his statement that 
he did look and actually saw the Lanham car. 
As to his failure to put on brakes or stop-the situation 
was such that had he done so he 'vould have stopped directly 
in the path of the approaching car, as it was apparently com-
ing. Had Lanham not pulled to the left and gone on his left 
side of Clay Street, on which he 'vas driving but instead had 
kept straight on the right side of Clay, as he was supposed 
to do, unquestionably there would have been no accident. This 
necessarily follows. Webber stated tha.t, he had the right 
of way and also thoug·ht that he had time to pass ahead of · 
the approaching· car. Results proved that he in fact did have 
such time for the rear of his car had passed beyond the cen-
ter line of Clay Street when the front of the Lanham car hit 
it on the rear wheel and fender. 
There is no possible basis for any claim on account of any 
undue speed of petitioner's car. Had the car been going a 
Iittle slower it 'vould have been hit at the front part instead 
of at the rear. In fact if it had been going faster the ac-
cident would not have happened as Lanham just struck the 
rear part as it was going across ;Clay Street. Just a little 
more speed and petitioner's car would have gotten by clear 
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of Lanham's car, despite the fact that the latter drove out to 
the wrong (left) side of the street. 
DA~fAGES. 
The verdict was for $10,000.00, the total amount sued for. 
The evidence is undisputed that lVIrs. 1\filler suffered a severe 
concussion of the brain with complete amnesia for three· or 
four hours and then partially for twenty-four hours, after 
which the amnesia passed off. There was no intercranial 
pressure or hemorrhages. .Sbe suffered severe pains in her 
head and dizziness for several days and which thereafter de-
creased, nervousness and some nausea. Her symptoms im-
proved steadily until she left the hospital five days after the 
accident. She had some bruises aud signs of a severe blow 
on the side of the head, some slight eu ts anu her left arm and 
left leg were bruised to some extent. The bruises and cuts 
'vere of no consequence ( Rec., pp. 93 and 94.) 
After leaving the hospital in Lynchburg she continued to 
suffer from di~ziness, headaches, nervousness and sleepless-
ness. She had previously been normal in this respect. On 
December 18, 1928, she consulted Dr. Whitman of Roanoke 
and on the 20th entered the hospital there. There she began 
to complain of abdominal pains which progressed until De-
c.ember 25th when she had an abortion or miscarriage. On 
January 24th or 25th following she was dismissed frQm the 
l1ospit.al though still nervous, having headaches· and had 
trouble sleeping. She went to Washington to resume work 
a.t a hospital there (being a trained nurse) on light work 
hut after a short time had to give it up. 1\frs. Miller at the 
trial stated that her condition is improving though not yet 
.back to normal. (Rec., p. 72.) Dr. Rawlings, who attenclecl 
her in Lynchburg, said her concussion was gradually clearing 
up and in view of her symptoms her progress when she left 
him ''would have been very favorable for ultimate recovery. 
I sa'v no reason why she should not entirely recover'' (Rec., 
p. 10). 
Dr. "Whitman, w·ho attended her in Roanoke and had been 
her family physician, says that ''Those cases ultimately re-
cover and come back to normal, though sometimes it is over 
a prolonged period of many months" (Roo., pp~ 84 and 85) 
and that ''my prognosis when she left the hospital was fa-
vorable" (Rec., p. 94) and that the fact the headaches are 
occurring with less and less frequency is an encouraging sign 
that there will be an ultimate .recovery (Rec., pp. 93 and 94). 
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The question of the abortion, its cause and results, and 
which from the amount of the verdict must have had a con-
trolling influence with the jury, will be taken up and dis-
cussed later. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERR.OR. 
Your petitioner sites forth the following .. Assignments of 
Error to the Actions of the Court : 
(1) In overruling defendant's motion that A. T. Lanham 
be made a party defendant to the action along with peti-
tioner. 
(2) In overruling petitioner's objections to evidence as · 
set out in Bill of Exceptions No. 1 (Rec., p. 92, and Rec., p. 
133). 
(3) In giving Instruction No. 1 (Rec., p. 155), as set out 
in Bill of Exceptions No. 2. 
(4) In refusing to give Instruction "B" as offeted for 
defendant and striking from the end thereof the words ''and 
it was riot negligence on the part of the driver of the Hogan 
car to continue across the intersection'' as set out in Bill of 
Exceptions No. 3 (Rec., p. 161). 
(5) In refusing to give Instructions '' 0" and "F" as of-
fered for petitioner as set out in Bill of Exceptions No. 3 
(Rec., pp. 162 and 163). 
( 6) In refusing to set aside the verdict of the jury as be-
ing contrary to the la"T and the evidence, for excessive dam-
age awarded and for error in the admission of evidence and 
in granting, refusing and amending of Instructions, and in 
entering judgment on said verdict, as set out in Bill of Ex-
ceptions No. 1 (R.ec., p. 154). 
ARGU~1:ENT. 
(1) Cou,rts Error in Overrulni.g Defendant's Premilinary 
Motion to 'make A. T. Lanhan~ a. Party Defendant. 
As appears from the statement of facts heretofore set out, 
the plaintiff, a passenger in petitioner's automobile, was hurt 
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when the same was run into ·by a car owned and opera ted by 
one A. T. Lanham. It was the contention of petitioner 
throughout the trial that his driver was guilty of no neg·li-
gence at all, and that the accident was caused solely by the 
negligence of Lanham; that even if it could be shown that he 
was guilty of any negligence, it would be at worst 0nly slight 
negligence concurring with the gross negligence of Lanham. 
Petitioner, therefore, took the position that Lanham was a 
necessary party whom the plaintiff. had failed to join anq 
thereupon proceded by motion and affidavit as provided for 
under Sec. 6102 of the .Code, for non-joinder (Rec., pp. 8 
and 9), which motion the Court overruled and "Nhich is here 
assigned a~ error (Rec., p. 7). This assignment of error pre-
sents for the first time in Virginia the question of the ap-
-plication of Section 6102 to a tort claim . 
.Section 6102 of the Code referred to provides as follows: 
"Effect of ~on-joinder or misjoinder.-N o action or suit 
shall abate or be defeated by the non-joinder or misjoinder 
of parties, plaintiff or defendant, but whenever such non-
joinder or misjoinder shall be made to appear by affidavit 
or otherwise, new parties may be added and parties mis-
joined may be dropped ·by order of the court at any stage 
of the cause as the ends of justice may require, but such new 
party shall not be added unless it shall be made to appear 
that he is a resident of this State and the place of such resi-
dence be stated with convenient certainty, nor .shall he be 
added if it shall appear that by reason of chapter two hun-
dred and thirty-eight, the action could not be maintained 
against him.'' 
Petitioner filed his written motion (Rec., pp. 8 and 9) and 
affidavit which was asked to be treated as a part thereof, set-
ting out the facts as aforesaid, and asking that plaintiff be 
required to amend her notice of motion to include said Lan-
ham. · 
Section 5779 of Code of 1919 provides ''Contribution among 
wrongdoers may be enforced where the wrong is a mere act 
of negligence, and involves no moral turpitude''. The de-
fendant contended that since, as was admitted, this wrong 
as c.omplained of was a me.re act of negligence and that there-
fore in event judgment went against him he could have con-
tribution, and in addition thereto could perhaps exculpate 
himself from liability by sho·wing that the accident 'vas caused 
10 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
by Lanham, he was thus entitled to have Lanham made a party 
defendant. At common law he would of course have had no 
standing, since there 'vas no contribution among tort feasors. 
Palrner v. Showalter, 126 Va. 306, 101 S. E. 136. See also 47 
c. J. 129. 
· The statute (Sec. 6102) which was new with the revision of 
the Code of 1919, was suggested by the New Jersey Practice 
Act of 1912, Section 9, p. 378. Burks Pleading and Practice 
(2nd Ed.), p. 63, n. 87; Revisors Note to Code of 1919. 
The purpose of such statutes as Sec. 6102 has often been 
stated: 
''The purpose * * * is to avoid circuity and multiplicity 
of actions and to facilitate the dispatch of business in the 
courts by fun1ishing a method of trial of all issues between 
several parties interested in the subject of the litigation; if 
it can be done without serious prejudice to the rights of any 
party." Greenho~tse v. Rochester Taxicab Co., 218 N. Y. S. 
167. 
The general rule is well stated in 47 C. J. 129. 
''Under the statutory provisions allowing the bringing in 
of proper or necessary parties, particularly under a statute 
which expressly provides for bringing in a person who is or 
will be liable, either wholly or in part, for the claim made 
ag·ainst sueh party, a person against whom defendam,t will 
have a right of action over for contribu.tion or inden~nity, in 
case judgment is rendered against him, may be brought in 
as a party defendant upon defendant's application on mo-
tion, and this rule applies whether the action is on contract, 
or whether it is an action i1~ tort." (Italics ours.) 
It might be helpful to examine a few of the cases from 
states with statutory provisions similar to ours. 
The New York Practice Act, Seetions 192 and 193 ''pro-
vide in brief that new parties ma.y be added or parties may 
be dropped at any stage of the case as the ends of justice 
may require, and to enable the eourt to make a complete 
determination of the controversy; a third person not then a 
party may be brought in, if it appears that sueb person is or 
may; be liable to a party wholly or in part for the claim made 
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against such party in the action, and the latter makes ap-
plication for such order.'' Greenhouse v. Rochester Taxi 
Co., supra. 
In Hailfi'i~rger v. Mayer, 212 N.Y . .S. 746, the court held that 
an owner of premises sued for injuries to a pedestrian, who 
fell into an open sidewalk manhole, is entitled to have an in-
dependent contractor, who removed the cover, brought in on 
motion as co-defendant under Civil Practice Act, Sec. 193, 
Subdiv. 2, supra. 
The court says in part: 
''Whether or not the work being done by this independent 
contractor, including the removal of the manhold cover as a 
part thereof, cause a dangerous situation to an extent and of 
a character such as to render the contractor liable to this 
plaintiff may not be a matter of easy determination. At any 
rate plaintiff had the option of suing both this defendant and 
the independent contractor, or either of them, in case of 
recovery ag·ainst the owner as sole defendant he might re-
cover over against the independent contractor. * "' * Inas-
much as this independent contractor may later be made liable 
to the owner defenqant as an indemnitor, the 'motion of the 
owner should prevail." 
Bowman v. City of Gt·eensboro, 190 N. C. 611, 130 S. E. 
502, is directly in point. The plaintiff sued the city for per-
sonal injuries received from a falling limb of a; tree. The 
city set up in its pleading· that the property owner was re-
sponsible, and that even if the city was liable it was only 
secondarily liable therefor; and that therefore the property 
owner should be made a party defendant. The property 
owner contended (1} that there was no contribution between 
joint tort feasors and that they could be sued separately and 
(2) that since tl1e plaintiff had not elected to sue him, the 
plaintiff could not now ·be made to do so. 
The upper court in reversing the lower, after concluding 
that in North Carolina there wa.s contribution in a case of 
this character said : 
"Wright (the property owner) contended with E:ome force 
of reasoning-, that plaintiff does not sue him and refus~s to 
make any complaint against him; that there is neither in the 
complaint nor answer of defendant any allegations of negli-
- ----------------
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gence against him; that plaintiff refuses to charge Wright 
with negligen~e. • • • 
''The complaint of plaintiff is for actionable negligence 
against the City of Greensboro. The answer denies liability, 
bttt says if it is liable that Wright is primarily liable; that 
the City's negligence was secondary.and Wright's primary. 
This makes Wright related with plaintiff's claim and comes 
within the cross action rule. ·Wright cannot be heard, under 
such facts and circu1nstances, to take advantage of plaintiff's 
refusal to 1nulct him. The City has the right to demand that 
the primary and secondary liabi1ity be settled in this action. 
The City becomes the movant; its claim is founded, related 
and connected with the subject matter between the plaintiff 
and the City and Wrig·ht. This is the foundation of the cross 
action. If Wright, fro'ln the cmnplai'ltt and an.swer is not 
sufficiently informed as to the details he can ~tnder C. S. 5534 
· ask for a bill of particulars. (Italics ours.) 
And at another point: 
"Courts, under the "liberal practice to avoid multiplicity 
of actions, and where the rights of parties are not prejudiced 
and where substantial justice can be done between the par-
ties hold this should be done in one and the same action.'' 
.s'ee also: Wait v. Pierce {Wis.), 210 N. W. 822; Fisher v. 
Milw®kee Electric Ry. and Light Co. (Wis.), 180 N. W. 269. 
In the instant case the Io·wer court in deciding adversely 
to petitioner took the position that since Sec. 6264 of the 
-Code provides (in part) that an "injured party rnay bring 
separate actions against the 'vrongdoers and proceed to judg-
ment in each'' ; that having so proceeded the plaintiff was 
completely within her rights and that she could not be com-
pelled to bring her suit against more than she chose to. It 
is respectfully submitted that the court was in obvious error 
in this opinion. 
At the outset Sec. 6264 'vas passed for one purpose and 
one alone, namely, to abrogate the c.ommon la'v rule ns de-
clared in Pett-icolos v. Rich1nond, 95 Va. 456, 28 .S. E. 566, that 
a judgment against one of several wrongdoers, 'vith or with-
out satisfaction, wa.s ·a bar to any action against the others. 
See Burks' Address on Code 1919, 5 Va. Law Reg. (N. S.) 97, 
--------- --- --~ 
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129; Revisors Note; Fitzgerald v. Campbell, 131 Va. 486, 109 
S. E. 308. Certainly this statute could not be so construed 
as to preclude the court from bringing in a necessary 11arty. 
If such reasoning as this is upheld it could be applied also· 
to contract cases since 8 ec. 6265 has the identical provision 
with regard to "joint contt·acts". The nonjoinder statute 
( 6102) would thereby be rendered nugatory, ·since should a 
plaintiff elect to proceed against one of several possible de-
fendants in an action either ex contractu or ex delicto, re-
gardless of whether the other possible defendants were neces-
sary parties within the meaning of the statute or not, and the 
single defendant undertake to join the other necessary par-
ties, he would be met with the statement that since the plain-
tiff had by statute a right to sue any one or all, and he bad 
sued one, that one could not complain. 
·Counsel for petitioner contended in the lower court that 
the word "rn.ay" in the statute (6102) meant "shall", and 
that therefore when the defendant, as he did in this ·case, 
fully complied with the terms of the statute, nothing remained 
for the court to do but require the plaintiff to amend her 
notice of motion to include Lanham. We now respectfully 
submit that such is the correct interpretation of the statute 
as settled by Lee v. Mutual, etc., Life Ass'n., 97 Va. 160, 33 . 
S. E. 556. 
In tl1e Lee case the court in dealing with· the statute said: 
''.By the "express terms of the Act of Assembly approved ' 
February 27, 1894 (Acts 1893-4, p. 489) as amended and re-
enacted by Act approved February 26, 1896 (Acts 1895-6, 
Ch. 423, p. 453) it is provided that whenever it shall appear 
in any action at law or suit in equity, heretofore or here-
after instituted by pleading or otherwise, that there has been 
· a misjoinder of parties, plaintiff or defendant, the court m.ay 
order the action or ·suit to abate as to any party improperly 
joined and to proceed hy or against the others as if such mis-
joinder had not been made. The wor(l 'may i1~ a stat·ttte of 
this kind which is in f'z~rtherance of ju,stice m.eans· the .same 
as shall.'' (Italics ours.) 
The present statute is the same as the above except it also 
provides for non-joinder. 
The prejudicial effect of the lower court's ruling is we 
think, apparent. Had Lanham been made a party, petitioner 
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would have had its right established to contribution by IJan-
ham by this one action. Counsel for petitioner could have 
undertaken to exculpate him completely and have the jury 
find against Lanham. Counsel for defendant was precluded 
from arguing to the jury that plaintiff would have her right 
against Lanham should they find for defendant in the instant 
case, because Lanham was not a party to the action. As 
clearly held in Bowman v. City of Greensboro, supra, such a 
refusal to make a necessary party a party defendant consti-
tutes reversible error. 
If the statute in question is to be given any of the effect 
obviously intended for it by its drafters; if the modern ten-
dency and aim of courts to giYe a litigant one fair trial where 
all related matters can be fairly determined, and circuity of 
action avoided, is to be of any persuasive weight, it is re-
spectfully submitted that the lower court erred in denying 
defm1dant 's motion to join Lanham as a necessary party. 
(2) Erro.r in Overruling Petitioner's Objections to Evi-
dence. 
(a) Dr. Whitman, a physician, testifying for Mrs. Miller, 
was asked the following hypothetical question: 
''A patient is injured with concussion more or less severe, 
which produces several hours, I don't }{now how. many, any-
where from two to twenty-four hours unconsciousness, I don't 
kno"r just how much it was, and then that patient after being 
discharged from your treatment comes back and continues 
to complain of those headaches. What is your prognosiR of 
those cases?'' 
The question was objected to on the ground that it did not 
state ''all the facts for a hypothetical question. It does not 
state that those headaches occur with less a.nd less frequency". 
The objection was overruled, to which petitioner excepted, 
and the 'vitness answered: 
"The prognosis is not good. As I have stated before, 
there is no classifications that give the physician more dif-
ficulty in bringing them back to a normal state.'' (Rec., p. 
92.) 
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The rule for sueh question is succinctly stated in Leste14 v. 
Simpkins, 117 Va. 55, 68, as follows : 
\ 
"It is a well settled rule that a hypothetical question 
to an expert must embody all the mate.rial facts which the 
evidence tends to prove, affecting the questions upon which 
the expert is asked to express an opinion.'' 
( 
Mrs. Miller had stated expressly that the the headaches oc-
curred with less and less frequency That such was a ma-
terial factor cannot be doubted. In fact that it was a ma-
terial factor and would have changed the answer appeai·s from 
the fact that while Dr. ·Whitman had stated that his prog-
nosis for ~irs .. ~£iller was favorable, yet his answer to the 
question was just the opposite. Dr. Whitman himself recog-
nized the effect of leaving out an essential factor when on 
cross examination his attention was called to the difference 
between his specific prognosis expressed in regard to 1\frs. 
~filler and his answer to the question under discussion and 
he answered: 
''I was answering a hypothetical question.'' 
The rule for such questions is not ·based on technicalities 
but is a rule based on reason, with the object of preventing 
confusion and the injection of unfounded ideas and impres-
sions in the minds of the jury. 
In the instant case it tended to create before the jury an 
idea and impression that the prognosis for ~irs. Miller was 
"not good" when in fact the direct evidence was that it is 
"favorable", and further that hers would be a very hard 
c.ase to bring· back to normal when the actual :;ituation does 
not justify such a conclusion. 
Lt is submitted that the question was improper and should 
not have been allowed and that the answer thereto was highly 
prejudicial to petitioner. 
(b) Petitioner's driver, Webber, was on cross examination 
by attorney for ~Irs. ~Iiller, asked the following question: 
''If you wanted to turn, if you had turned into Clay Street, 
there would ha.ve ·been no collision, would there 1 
The question was objected to on the ground' 'that there was 
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no obligation on him to turn in there", which objection was 
overruled and petitioner excepted. The witness answered: 
"No, sir." 
It is respectfully submitted that the question was improper· 
and should not have been allowed. As shown above "\V ebber 
was in the intersection first and was to the right of the ap-
proaching Lanham car and so was unquestionably entitled 
to the ·right of way. Further he had stated that he thought 
·he had time enough to pass and as results showed did in fact 
have it. He was thus entitled to proceed and to rely on Lan- , 
ham to grant the right of way. There was nothing .in the 
evidence to put any other duty on him than .to proceed and 
,certainly he could not be called on to anticipate that Lanham 
would fail to grant the right of way or that he would pull 
over to the left side of the street and jam into the car of the 
petitioner after it had passed over the center line of Clay 
Street and entirely over the proper line of travel of the Lan-
h~c~ · 
So far as any obligation on Webber was concerned he 
might have as well been asked· whether he could not have 
turned down another street than Eighth Street and so the 
collision would not have occurred. In either case he could 
not be negligent in failing to do something else or go in some 
other direction where there was no such obligation on him. 
That the question and answer were prejudicial was well 
shown when it was pressed on the jury that Webber admitted 
that he could have avoided the collision if he had turned 
down Clay Street, coupling this so-called ''admission'' with 
an exposition of the high degree of care required of him as a 
common carrier for hire, and that, regardless of negligence 
on the part of Lanham, petitioner was liable if the slightest 
negligence of his driver contributed in any way to the acci-
dent. 
It is submitted that the question was improper and should 
not have been allowed and that it resulted to the great preju-
dice of petitioner. 
(3) Er·ror in Giving lnstr~wtion No. 1. 
This instruction will be found on page 155 of the record 
.and need not be copied here. It was a general instruction 
·setting out the duty petitioner, as a common carrier, owed to 
his passenger of ''the utmost care, diligence and foresight'' 
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and in general terms that if the jury believed from the evi-
dence that the driver ''failed in any respect to manage and 
operate the same with the utmost care, diligence and fore-
Sight and that such failure proximately contributed to the 
accident'' then they must find for the plaintiff. 
'This instruction was objected to on the ground that there 
was no evidence to support it, in that there was nothing to 
show that the driver had failed in any respect to exercise 
the care, etc., required of him. The objection was overruled 
and exception duly taken (Rec., p. 160). 
The argument on this instruction will necessarily be in-
cluded in the discussion of assignment No. 6 (Motion to set 
aside the verdict) and so need not be set out here. 
(4) En·or in Refusing to Give Instruction." B" as Offe1·ed 
OJJUl Striking therefrom, the lY ords "And it was not negli-
gence on the part of the Drivet· of the Hogan car to continue 
across the intersection". 
Instruction "B" as g·iven is set out on page 157 of the 
Record. It set out the statutory rights and duties of vehicles 
which approach or enter an intersection at approximately the 
same time, making it the duty of the vehicle on the left ''to 
yield the right of way to the driver of the vehicle on the 
right", that being the language of Code Sec. 2145 subsec. 19 
( 1926), ai1d instructed the jury that if they believed from the 
evidence that the Hogan car had entered the intersection prior 
to the time the Lanham car entered, or that they approached 
the intersection at approximately the same time, and that the 
Hogan car was to the right of the Lanham car, and was pro-
ceeding in a lawful manner, then the Hogan car had the right 
of way. The Court struck out from the instruction as offered 
the concluding words as quoted above. Exception to the rul-
ing, 'vith reason therefor, was duly taken. 
The words refused were based on the plain principal that a 
driver has a legal right to rely on rights given him by statute 
and to assume that other drivers will comply with the la'v 
and g-rant such rights. There was no evidence of any fa~ts 
to put him on notice that Lanham would not comply With 
the law. It has already been shown that the driver of the 
Hoo-an car unquestionably had the right of way. Certainly 
he ~ould not be held to the duty of foreseeing or assuming 
· that Lanham was going to violate the law, but was entitled 
to proceed on the theory that Lanham would comply with the 
law and grant the right of way and, if so, he could not be 
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negligent in acting on that basis and petitioner was entitled 
to have the jury so instructed, and yet the Court refused to do 
so. 
We refer the Court to the authorities as the right of a 
driver to rely on his right of way and act on the assumption 
that an approac.hing driver will comply with the law, as set 
out below in the discussion of Assignment No. 5, dealing with 
Instruction ''·C", which involves to a great extent the same 
question. 
The objection here mig·ht not be so important but for the 
refusal of the Court to give lnstruction "C". The two ac-
tions together in effect constituted a ruling by the court that 
a driver may be proceeding in a lawful manner, have the right 
of way, with a statute requiring the otl1er party yield it, with 
no circumstance or testimony to show why he should not avail 
of his rights and yet be neglig·ent. Petitioner submits that 
such is not the law and that he was entitled to have the jury 
instructed that the action of his driver under the recited cir-
~umstances would not be negligence. See cases cited 37 A. 
L. R .. 517-520. In this connection it is to be borne in mind 
that the physical facts show that petitioner's driver had in 
fact time to clear the near side of Clay street and get out of 
the path of the Lanham car and no collision would have oc-
curred but for the fact that Lanham cut to the left side of 
the street. 
(5) Error of the Court in Refusing Defendant's Instnw-
tion "C". 
(a) Instruction "C" as offered by Defendant and refused 
'Yas as follows (Rec., 161-2): 
"The Court instructs the jury that if you believe from the 
evidence that the Hogan car in which 1\irs. Miller was riding 
at the time of the accident involved in this case had entered 
the intersection prior and ahead of the time that the auto-
mobile driven by A. T. Lanham entered said intersection, and 
that said Hogan car was approaching from the right of said 
automobile, then it was the duty of the said Lanham to grant 
the right of way to the said Hogan car and to check, or stop 
his car, if necessary, in order that the said Hogan car might 
cross the said intersection, and the dri.ver of ·the said Hogan 
car ~vas en,titled to rely on said Lanham to ,qrant said right 
of 'Way. If you believe from the evidence that the accident 
was proximately caused by the failure of the said Lanham to 
----,.1 
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grant sucl1 right of way after the said Hogan car had en-
tered said intersection, and that said Hogan ear was proceed-
ing in a lawful manner then you must find for the defendant.'' 
(Italics ours.) . 
The lower court in refusing- the above instruction was of 
the opinion that the jury had been fully instructed on the re-
spective rights of the parties at the intersection. It is ear-
nestly submitted that in this opinion the court erred, and 
that the court's refusal to give this instruction constituted a 
predominant error and worked, as will hereafter been seen, 
serious harm to petitioner. 
Counsel for petitioner in offering this instruction took the 
position that in presenting the defendant's theory of the case 
to the jury they were entitled to an instruction which told 
the jury in effect that the defendant had the right to assume 
that Lunham would obey the law and grant him the right of 
way or as the instruction puts it he "was entitled to rely on 
said Lanham to grant said right of way", and that in addition 
thereto there was no evidence of any circumstances to put 
any other duty on him. 
This phase of the defendant's theory of the case (which is 
perhaps the most important phas~ at all) having been .stricken 
out of Instruction '' B'' is not covered, nor even intimated 
in any other instruction. (See Instructions "B" and "G", 
Record, 157 and 158, which are the only ones which even pur-
port to pass on the respective rights at the intersection.) 
The Highly Preju,dicial Effect of Courts' Ruling. 
The defendant's theory of the case was that Hogan's driver 
in the absence of circumstances to put any other duty on him, 
was entitled to pass on through the intersection (provided 
he was traveling- in a lawful manner, as the instruction set 
out) in full reliance on the rights accorded him by law. The 
plaintiff undertook and did pr_ove over the objection of de-
fendant that the driver of .the defendant's car could have 
turned into Clay Street and avoided the accident. (Rec., p. 
133.) The Court's action in this particular ha.s been treated 
elsewhere in a separate assignment of error. However, when 
've consider the Court's refusal of this instruction setting out 
petitioner's rig·ht to rely on Lanham to grant him the right 
of way and in addition thereto permitting the above evidence 
to go in, thereby laying the foundation, for the arg11ment to 
the jury (which was fully and vigorously argued) that since 
by defendant's own statement, he could have avoided the ac-
20 Sup~eme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
cident by simply turning to his right, the plaintiff obviously 
· should recover, the highly prejudicial effect of the Court's 
action in refusing the instruction becomes at once apparent. 
Had defendant been given this instruction, a complete answer 
could have been made to such a fallacious argument, namely, 
that while it was true defendant could have avoided the ac-
cident (as he could likewise have avoided the same by not 
having come up that street at all) by turning into Clay Street, 
the Court had plainly stated that there was no duty on hint 
to so turn: 
We respectfully submit that the highly prejudicial effect 
of the Court's ruling in refusing the instruction is not open 
to question. 
The Instruction States The Real Law A pplica.ble a;nd Fixes 
the Respective Rights of the Parties. 
While the rule of law asked, which is, in short, that one 
party in determining a course of conduct does not have to as-
sume that another will be negligent haS' been frequently in-
voked in Virginia., it has no.t been specifically applied to an 
automobile case involving "right of way". 
In vie'v of the flood of litigation in Virginia and elsewhere 
occasioned by automobile intersection accidents, and there-
fore the consequent importance of determining once for all 
the respective rights and duties of drivers at intersections, 
counsel for d~fendant will examine the case law applicable 
with considerable care. 
The Virginia Cases. 
-
In Virginia the rule of law asked for in the instruction un-
der consideration has only so far been applied in raihvay ac-
cidents. See Roanoke R. d!; E. Co. v. Loving, 137 Va. 331; 
Virginia Ry. d!; P. Co. v. Oliver, 133 Va. 342, 112 S. E. 841; 
Rich1nond Traction Co. v. Clarke, 101 Va. 388; 43 Va. 618. 
Perhaps the Loving case, S'UtJra, is the best example of the 
law as laid down by our courts. 
The plaintiff's intestate 'vas injured when he undertook to 
make a left hand turn across a street car track of the defend-
ant. It appeared that the car 'vhich struck deceased was 50 
feet away when he reached the west track (the track on which 
he was stniCk) and that had it observed the speed limit the 
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plaintiff in his automobile would have had ample time to ~lear . 
the track in safety The defendant contended that deceased 
was guilty of contributory negligence, in crossing the track, 
which barred a recovery. 
The trial court gave the following instruction, which was 
approved: 
"that the deceased had a right to presume that the defendant 
in operating its cars would give proper signals, not propel 
its cars. at an excessive rate of speed, but w·ould exercise or-
dinary and re·asonable care for the safety of the public using 
the street, and co1nply with the provision.s of the traffic ordi-
namce regulating the operation of its cars." (Italics ours.) 
Certainly the defendant in the instant case was entitled to 
have the jury told that in judging his course of conduct he 
had a right to assume that Lanham. would comply with the 
provisions of the state law~ regulating the operation of his 
car. This is true particularly in view of the court's action in 
allowing, over objection, the testimony, to the effect that 
he could have turned to the right and have avoided the ned-
dent, to go to the jury. 
THE LAW IN O'fHER JURISDICTIONS. 
The rule in other jurisdictions is thoroughly in accord with 
the instruction asked and has been applied to cases very 
closely similar to the one a.t bar. 
Blashfield, Cyclopedia of 1\utomobile Law, Sec. 2:!, states 
the rule 'veil : 
'' • * * The fact that the driver of a motor vehicle has 
the right of way over a machine with 'vhich he collides a.t a 
street intersection is an important consideration in determin-
ing whether such driver is negligent. He approaches the 
crossing, expectin.Q, and entitled to ex.pect, that one approach-
ing from the left or on a disfavored street will recognize h·is 
right, and his conduct is to be ju.dged in ·view of that c·ircum,-
stance. (Italics ours.) 
As illustrating the rule in the same section: 
"Thus, where hvo ca.rs approach each other on intersecting 
streets at righ.t angles to each other, and, when the drivers of 
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the respective ca.rs observe each other, they are about equal 
distances from the intersection, and are proceeding at about· 
the same rate of speed, the driver of the car coming .from 
the right can assume that the driver of the other car will 
observe the provisions of the statute and give him the right 
of 'vay. So a motorist who, on approaching an intersection, 
sees a car approaching from the left on tl1e intersec.ting 
street, apparently at a speed of 25 mjles an hour and some 
40 feet from the intersection of their respective paths, hav-
ing the right of way, may reasonably assume that by speeding 
up he can pass the point of intersection in safety, and, al-
though an automobile driver arriving at an intersection ob-
serves a motor vehicle approaching on an intersecting street 
at the rate of 15 or 20 miles an hour. he is entitled to assume 
that the approaching vehicle a.t that rate can be stopped 
before a collision 'vill occur, and that its driver will slacken 
speed or change his course to give him the priority of right 
of way to 'vhich he is entitled. 
Ber.ry, Automobiles (Sixth Ed.), §225, states the same rule 
thusly: 
''A person operating an automobile in a public highway, 
exercising reasonable care, may assume thnt others using the 
hig·hway will also act with reasonable care, a.nd he is not neg-
ligent in acting accordingly.'' 
The right to rely on others to obey the law and use due 
care is the subject of an able and exhaustive annotation in 21 
R. L. R .. 992, which is supplemented in 37 A. L. R. 517 and 
47 A. L. R. 622, which cite a multitude of cases supporting 
our contention. The Courts especial attention is invited to 
these excellent annotations and a fe"r of the most pertinent 
autho1ities there quoted will be examined. 21 A. L. R. 992: 
JtUcld v. Webster (Cal.), 195 Pac. 929, the plaintiff at the 
time he approached the intersection was held to have a right 
to assume that the defendant would obey the law, and yield 
the right of way given by stat'u,te to vehicles approaching 
.from the right. 
In lltcCa:ffey v. A~ttomobile Liability Co. (Wis.), 186 N.· 
\V. 585, it 'vas held that the driver of a car 'vhich had the 
right of way over an automobile coming from an intersecting 
street had the right to assume tha.t the au,tomobile coming 
from the other street would comply with the nues of the road 
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as provided for by the statute and yield to him the right of 
way. 
37 A. L. R. 517. 
"The driver of an automobile proceeding east and having, 
under a. municipal by-la-w, the right of way over an automobile 
proceeding south, ma.y assume that the driver of the latter 
vehicle w'ill make wa.y for him, and it is not negligence for 
l1im to act upon such assumption. Turnbull v. Graham (1918), 
14 Alberta. L. R. 125 (1918), 3 West Week. Rep. 1033, 44 D. 
L. R. 632. '' 
''The driver of an automobile having the right of way at 
a street intersection, under a statute, providing that vehicles 
traveling upon public highways shall give the right of way to 
other vehicles approaching along intersecting highways from 
the right and shall have the right of way over those ap-
proaching from the left, while not relieved of the duty to use 
due care, is entitled to assume that the driver of an automo-
bile not having the right of way will observe the law and yield 
to him the right of way; and to act upon such assumption is 
not contributory negligence. Partridge v. Ebersteitl! (1922), 
225 Ill. App. 209." 
And see Sliter v. Clark (1923), 127 Wash. 406, 220 Pac. 785, 
Quoted at 37 A. L. R. 519: 
"As ''re have shown, it is the statutory duty of a driver of 
a motor vehicle when approaching a road intersection to look 
out for and give 'va.y to vehicles simultaneously approaching 
on his right. No S'li:Oh duty is imposed upon ai driver as to 
·'Vehicles approaching on his left. The. driver of such a vehi-
cle. if he is traveling within the speed limit and on the right 
l1and side of the highway, may proceed on his course withou,t 
being guilty of a cha.rge of negligence." (Italics supplied.) 
~ 
. 47 A. L. R. 622: 
''Automobilist appro~ching intersection from the right, and 
having the statutory right of way, has the right to presume 
that automobilist simultaneously approaching from the left 
·will observe the statute and yield the right of way to him. 
Roe v. Ku.rt.z (1926 Iowa.), 210 N. W. 550. 
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And see Davis v. American Ice ·Co. (Pa.), 13l.A.tl. 720, where 
. the court said: · 
''In other words, the driver of a ca.r is not required to 
anticipate, and guard against the WaJlt of ordinary care on 
the part of anothel.'l. '' 
It is an undisputed fact that the driver of Petitioner's car 
had the right of way, even if the physical facts be disregarded, 
since e-ven the plaintiff's 'vitnesses have the two vehicles ap~ 
proaching the intersection at approximately the same time. 
The refusal of the defendant's instruction under considera-
tion, coupled 'vith the admission of the highly prejudicial evi-
dence to the effect that the defendant's driver could have 
avoided the accident by turning to the left (Rec., p.133) neces-
sa'rily imputed 'negligence to the driver for relyi1~g on a. right 
accot·ded hirn by stat'ltte. Every accident that has ever hap-
pened could have been avoided in some way, if no more than 
by one of the· pa.rties not having been there at the time, but 
this, of course, has no bearing. If the law is, as the abundant 
authority cited shows it to be, the jury should have been so 
instructed. The Court's refusal so to instruct the jury 
coupled With the above mentioned admission of evidence does 
not merely constitute slight error but goes to the very heart 
of the case. This is undeniably true for the reasons that 
the other alleged negligence, speed ·and failure to stop, could 
not have been ma.terial as been shown; speed because it has 
been shown that it could not have contributed to the accident 
and failu_re to stop because as here contended there was no_ 
duty on the driver so to do. The plaintiff virtually aban-
doned any other claim of negligence, and went to the jury on 
the proposition that since· the defendant was a common car-
rier and therefore bound to exercise a high 'degree of care, 
and that by his own driver's statement he could have avoided 
the accident by turning to the left that, therefore, the defend-
an was liable. Had defendant been given the instruction 
asked he 'vould have bad an all sufficient answer to this fallfl.-
cious argument, namely, that although he could have stopped, 
and· although he could have avoided the accident by turning 
to the left, yet the court had stated that there 'vas no duty 
on him to turn as he could rely on Lanha1n to grant him a 
right given hi1n by .law. · . 
It is therefore earnestly submitted that" the court erred in 
refusing defendant's inst~ction "C' ". 
(b) Instruction '' F '' Refused. 
-~ ~- - ~-~- ---~ 
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Instruction "FH as offered and refused was as follows: 
''The court instructs the jury that where the paths of two 
approaching vehicle cross at intersections of public streets, 
the driver at the left must give way, unless so far in ad-
vance of the other as to afford reasonable time to clear the 
crossing. It is he duty of the driver of the car on the left 
to have his car under such control that it can be promptly 
stopped, if necessary, to avoid contact with the car crossing 
his line of travel on the right, and he has no right to proceed 
over the intersection unless the car at the right is so far 
away that the driver of the car at the left would have been 
justified in believing that he could pass over the intersection 
ahead of the other car.'' (Rec., p. 162-3.) 
The purpose of ·that instruction was to explain and clarify 
to the jury the effect of the Virginia. statute giving the right 
of way to the car 01.1 the right where they "enter or approach 
an intersection approximately a.t the same time·'' and requir-
ing the driver on the left to g-rant the right of way. (Code, 
Sec. 2145 (20), Sec. 19. Amended Acts 1926. p. 773, 774.) 
Among the lower cour'ts of Virginia the situation is some-
what chaotic as to just the meaning of our statute and we r~n 
find no official ruling of this court. The instruction in ques-
tion was taken from Pennsylvania cases which will be refPITed 
to below and to our minds given a clear, logical and effective 
constru~tion to the !i;tatnte in effect identical with the Vir-
ginia statute so far as the question involved is concerned. 
The only differenee is that the Pennsylvania statute does not 
contain the word "Approximately". The construction how-
ever gives it the effect of having that word in. 
Some of our lo,ver courts hold in effect the same as the 
a1bove instruction, some l1old that the statute does not cl!ange 
t11e common law rule that the car first in the intersection has 
the right of way. Some hpld, as we are informed, tl1at if the 
·car at the left is in tlte intersection as the car at the right ap-
proaches, this defe-ats the right of wa.y of the car to the right .. 
It is submitted that this instruction "F" following the 
Pennsylvania ruling is the only possible construction which 
gives a. workable rule and puts the matter on any defnitely 
understandable basis. Any other construction merely causes 
confusion by indefiniteness and uncertainty, so that no one 
lmows just what his rights are and causes a hurrying and 
jockeying for position and is productive of accidents and bick-
erings and unlimited estimates of a few put ·one way or the. 
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othe·r to ascertain who had the right of way. Under the in-
struc.tion asked the n1le is simple of comprehension and 
readily workable; in effect that the driver on the left must 
keep his car under control to protect it from cars approaching 
from the right. Under this construction there can rightfully 
be no racing and jockeying for position, no right to claim a 
foot or so prior enterance in an intersection and there is a 
certain, definite and understandable rule. 
In the ~,ase of We1)er v Greenebawrn, 270 Pa. 382, 113 Atl. 
413. the driver at the left 'vas far in advance of the one at the 
right (about 125 feet) and was held to have the right of way. 
'rhe court laid down the rule under the statute giving the 
right of wa.y to the car a.t the right where they arrive at the 
intersection at the same time, a.s followrs: 
'·'Where the paths of tw'o vehicles cross at the intersection 
of public streets, the driver at the left must give wa.y, unless • 
so far in advance· of the other as to afford reasonable time 
to clear the crossing, and. thus in all probability avoid ·a col-
lision.'' 
In Kurtz v. General Bakin,q Co., 87 Pa. Sup. Ct. 297, the 
rule laid down in the Greenbaum ease was quoted 'vith ap-
proval and applied. The court further said: 
''Where the cars arrive at the interse·ction at practically 
the same time, the driver approaching from the left is re-
quired to have his car under such control that it can be 
promptly stopped, if neeessary~ to avoid contact with a car 
crossing his line of travel, and he cannot take the choice of 
crossing in front of a car at his right, unless it is reasonably 
clear that l1is path is open. The statute ~vas intended to 1'e.Qu-
late traffic a.t crossings in a tJractical way, and to prevent 
a run for first place. ~ • • 
"The driver at the left has a.n affirmative duty in approach-
ing a. crossing against intersecting traffic, and unless the car 
at the right is so far a.way that the driver at the left, in the 
exercise of reasonable c.:'l.re and prudence, would have been 
justified in believing that he eould pass over the intersection 
ahead of the otller car at the right, it is his duty to retard the 
speed of his ear, or stop if necessary, to permit the car at the 
right to pass.'' (Ialics supplied.) 
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It will be noted that the language of this Instruction '' F'' 
as offered was taken from the t"ro cases last above quoted. 
The two cases of Wiebe ·v. Powers, 86 Pa. Sup.· Ct. 398, 
and Powers v. JiViebe, 86 Pa. Sup. Ct 392, involved the 
same accident. 
The court applied the same rule as above and, in Wiebe·~-· 
v. Powers, further said: ,,. 
''The statute thus regulates traffic at crossings and, by the 
method stated, attempts to prevent such accidents as we are 
now considering. It is not in contemplation of the law makers 
that there should be a nice ascertainment of the exact position 
of the cars approaching the crossing. The rule adopted was 
intended to be a workable one and to be reasonably applied. 
Two cars may approach a. crossing or inter~ecting line, and 
one be so far in advance of the other, that the driver thus in 
advance, may reasonably conclude that he can pass the in-
tersection point before the other car arrives. The driver at 
the left must control his car to permit that at the right to make 
the passing, unless the car at the left is so far in advance 
of the other, as to give a reasonable assurance of safety . 
in maldng the crossing. Where the cars arrive a.t the intersec-
tion at practically the same time, the driver approaching from 
the left, is not permitted to take the dangerous chance of 
crossing in front of the car approaching from the right un-
less it is 1·easonably clear tha,t his passage is open, and in 
every case, it is his duty to have his car under such control 
that it ~an he promptly stopped. if necesary, to prevent con~ 
tact with a car crossing his line of travel." (Italics supplied.) 
In the Powers v. Wiebe, the court applying the same rule, 
says: 
''That the cars arrived a.t the intersection at substantially 
the Aame .time, is not open to controversy and in that state of 
facts, it was the duty of the driver at the left to give the 
driver a.t the right an unobstructed passage.'' 
Of course the right of the car at the right is still stronger 
·where it reaches the intersection before the car at the left. 
See Da.vis v. A'merican lee Co., 285 Pa. 177 (1926), 131 Atl. 
720. 
The same rule was adopted by the New York Court in the 
28 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
ease of Slvwnw;n v. Hall et ux, 246 N. Y. 51, 158 N. 1!~. lti, iu 
which the facts were very similar to the case at bar. 'fhere the 
view of the drivers of the cars approaching on intersecting 
roads was cut off by trees and shrubs while here it was cut 
off by the church building. The court said: 
''If the two vehicles are so near the intersecting point that 
there is a chance of a collision if both keep to the same 
speed, then the statute says the v~hicle approaching from the 
right may take precedence. This is no fine spun distinction 
* *' *. The vehicle having the subordinate right must not 
take chances, make close calculations, try to slip by a on a 
chance. It must give way to the vehicle on the right when it is 
anywhere near the crossing.. Only in this 'vay can serious 
accidents be avoided.'" 
It is submitted that Instruction "F'' as offered gives as 
said by the Pennsylvania Court ''a workable 1·ule'' and one 
that clarifies the law·, makes effective the "right of 'vay" 
provided for' hy statute, enables drivers to understand and 
know their respective rights and obligations and is so produc-
tive of safety while any other construction is practically un-
workable in practice, beclouds the law·, makes it impossible 
in many cases to know just where the right of w.ay exists aud 
when not, causes fruitless efforts at nice ascertainment of 
the exact positions of two moving ·vehicles and is productive 
of racing for positions, thus promoting danger instead of 
-safety. . 
We believe that it is of great public importance for this 
court to pass on this question and establish a definite inter-
pretation of the right of 'va.y statute of daily importance 
to the lives and property of most of the citizens of Virg·inia, 
in order that rights and duties may be definitely known, 
safety promoted and that there may be a uniform rule to ap-
ply over the state. We further submit that the Pennsyl-
vania construction gives the sanest, most logical and most 
workable rule; ·that Instruction "F'" was thus a proper in-
terpretation of the law, and that it should have been given. 
(~) Er1·or in Re/'ltsing to Set Aside the Vet·dict. 
A. Contrary to the law and the evidence. 
It is respectfully submitted that there was ·no evidence of 
any negligence on the part of the driver of Petitio1~er 's car 
and the verdict of the jury should have been set aside. 
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On this question we call the attention of the Court to the 
following summary of facts to be borne in mind. 
(a) Petitioner's car was unquestionably entitled to the right 
of ";ay at the intersection in question. · 
(b) At the time of the collision, Petitioner's car had passed 
o\rer the center line of Clay Street and out of the path of the 
approaching c.ar of Lanham 'vho, by cutting· to the left and 
coming on his left side of the street, ran into the rear part 
of Petitioner'~ ca.r. · 
_ (c) Any rapid speed of Petitioner's car 'vas immaterial in 
any event, though in fact fr.om the condition of the car, the 
cobble.stone street and the grade it could not have been go- · 
ing otherwise than at a. moderate speed. 
(d) ~:frs. Miller herself made no charge of any negligence 
in her testimony and did not deny that she stated that Peti-
tioner's driver impressed her as a careful driver. 
(e) But for the fact that Lanham cut to the left and ca.me 
on the 'vrong side of the street instead of proceeding straight 
ahead as he was travel1ing there would have been no accident. 
(f) Tha.t Lanham, who was not sued, was obviously negli-
gent in failing to grant the right of wa.y,_ in coming over to 
. his left side of the street and, despite testimony to the con-
trary, driving at least at a fairly rapid rate of speed as shown 
by the absolute physical facts, viz-skidding 20 feet before 
reaching thejntersection, then going, while cutting to the left 
an additional distance of 18 or 20 feet and still striking a car 
of equal "reight with sueh force as to upset both cars, and 
knocked the other car against the curh and a.2 inch iron-pipe 
sign post so that the post 'vas bent nearly double. Such re-
sults could not happen with a. lo,v rate of speed on the part 
of the Lanham car. His negligence is obvious. 
(g) That Petitioner's driver is a careful driver (the ex-
pressed impression of 1\frs. Miller) is shown by the fact that 
he has been driving cars for 12 years, and for the last 15 
months a. public car and had never before had an accident of 
any moment. 
(h) There w·ere no circumstances shown or attempted to 
be shown 'vhicl?- could put Petitioner's driver on notice that 
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Lanham would fail to grant the right of way or that he would 
cut over to his left side of the street, or 'vhich would require 
Petitioner's driver to do otherwise than what he did do. 
Bearing the above points in mind it is earnestly insisted 
that there was no evidence of any negligence on 'vhich to base 
the verdict against Petitioner or on which Instruction No. 1 
could be based. 
Incidentally most of the points here involved have been 
to a greater or less degree mentioned and discussed in con-
nection with points presented above and there 'vill of necessity 
be some repetition. 
Let us consider the possible g-round of negligence as againts 
Petitioner. The only ones suggested either in pleadings or· 
· argument were: 
(a) That Petitioner's car 'vas speeding. 
(b) That it should have been stopped or checked. 
(c) That it should have been turned to the right into Clay 
Street. 
(d) That there was negligence in failing to keep a proper 
lookout. 
, (a) We- have already dealt fully with the question of Speed. 
A four year old taxi with a passenger, going up a 10% grade 
ove·r rough cobblestones and in second gear could not go fast 
-regardless of other facts. vVe have also called attention to 
the fact that any possible rapid speed of Petitioner'~ car was 
immaterial in any event since a less rate could not have 
avoided the accident and a more rapid one would have avoided 
it. Ii1 point of fact, attorneys for Plaintiff really abandoned 
any claim on account of speed in the argument of the case. 
~rhus. there is no basis for a verdict on any claim as to speed. 
See Greater Jfotor (Jorp v. lJtlet,ropolitan Tami Co. (Wash.), 
197 Pac. 327, 'vhich holds the speed of a. taxi, in the intersec-
tion and 'vith the right of 'vay had no causal connection with 
th'3 accident caused by the negligence of the driver of another 
car. 
(b) 1rhat Petitioner~s drive1· sho1tld ha-ve siopped or 
checked his car. As already sho·wn, and in fact admitted in 
argument, Petitioner's car had the right of way and had no 
reason to suppose that Lanham 'vould not grant it. Certainly 
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there was no obligation to anticipate negligence and a failure · 
to obey the law on the part of Lanham. Webber stated that he 
did not notice the speed of the Lanham car but saw it after he 
("\Vebbe·r) was in the intersection, where he had the right of 
way and thought he had "ample time to get across" (Rec., 
p. 135). It was shown that he did in fact have time since the · 
whole of his car had passed over the center of Clay Street 
before the Lanham car, coming over on the wrong side of the . 
street, ran into him. · 
Being about a car length in the intersection when he saw the 
Lanham ~ar approaching. Webber, by <3hecking or stopping, 
would have placed himself squarely in the proper path of the 
Lanham car. He had the right of way, the right to proceed, 
and the time to pass. Cau it be said he was negligent in pro-
ceeding under such circumstances? ·Had he checked his car 
or stopped it and Lanham had then come into him, negligence 
in this checking or stopping could well be charged. Lanham 
was the one charged with the duty of granting the right of 
'vay by checking or stopping-not Webber. 
Thus there wa.s no negligence of Petitioner"s driver in re-
gard to checking or stopping. 
(c) That the tam should have been turned into Clay Street. 
This raises the point already discussed to some extent in 
I 
nssignment No. 2. -
That W ehber could have turned into Clay Street and no ac· 
cident would have happened 'vas admitted by Webber in re-
sponse to a~ question w·hich was objected to for rea.sons here-
tofore set out. It might as well have been said that he could 
have a:\Toided the accident if he· had gone through some other 
street than Eighth. or if he had turned down Madison .Street, 
a block before reaching Clay Street. All accidents could be 
nvoicled if somebody had done something else, but that does 
not show negligence. There were no circumstances shown 
nr attempted to be sho'vn which would require Webber to 
give up his unquestioned right of 'vay and turn from his 
course in a. different direction. He had time, as he said and as 
eve-nts proved, to get across the nea.r half of Clay Street and 
out of the path of the Lanham car as it was coming. To cl1a.rge 
him with neglig·enee in failing to turn is not only to take from 
hi~ right to rely on LaJ1ham to obey the law'-gra.nt the right 
of w.ay and keep on the ~ight hand side of the street, but 
c·hnrge him with the obligation of anticipating that Lanham 
w·ould vi<Jlate the law in both respects. Such cannot be the 
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law 1 Clearly there wa.s no obligation on Webber to turn and 
he was thus not guilty of negligence in not doing so. 
(d) Failu,re to J(eep a Lookout. 
While this ground is charged in the notice of motion, .the·re 
is no evidence to support any verdict on this ground, nor in 
any event could such failure, if any, have proximately con-
tri_bnted to the aceident in any w~y. 
As Webbe·r came up Eight Street it was his :first duty to 
keep a lookout to the right and that he did .. To his left the 
view was cut off by a church building built right up to the 
street line. The sidewalk and parking on Clay is 15 feet wide. 
then~ after ente·ring the intersection, Webber had to go 15 
feet, before getting into the drivew·ay of Clay Street. His 
testimony is undisputed that when his car was nearly its 
length (10 or 12 feet) in the intersection he looked and saw 
the Lanham ca.r approaching from his left on Clay Street and 
about 25 or 30 feet off, and that he had the right of way and 
thought he had time to cross (Rec., pp. f25, 134 and 135). 
Webber kept on, as he was entitled to do, and "the next thing· · 
I knew he hit me and I 'vas under the car". It is not and 
cannot be denied that 'vhen the impact occurred the taxi had 
passed entirely beyond the center line of Clay .Street and the 
Lanham car had cut over to the wrong side of the street. 
Certainly there was no negligence in a failure to keep a look-
out when it is uncontradicted that Webber did look and acted 
on what he sa,v. Any earlier looking to the left would have 
been ineffective until the vie'v 'vas cleared and in any event 
would have disclosed nothing that Webber did not know as 
he started across the driveway of Clay Street-viz., that a 
car was a.pproac.hing from the left but that he (Webber) had 
the right of way and time to avail of it. Clearly there was no 
negligence in _this respect. 
GENERALLY. 
Having discussed tl1e four possible claims of neg·ligence we 
Will now deal with the verdict generally as being without 
a basis of negligence on which to rest. This will entail a more 
detailed discussion and review of the situation at the time and 
of the rights of Petitioner's driver already discussed under 
the argument dealing with Instructions "B" and "0". (As-
signments 4 and 5.) 
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tioner 's car took the most natural and what would ordinarily 
be the safest course and that he was entitled to act on the 
presumption that Lanham would obey the law by granting the 
1·ight of way and keeping to the right side of C1.ay Street. 
It appears to be true, beyond the shado'v of a doubt (since 
the taxi was entirely over the center of Clay Street when 
struck) that if Lanham had had his car under control tQ grant 
the right of way to a car approaching from his right, or if he 
had kept on the right side of Clay Street there would have. 
lJeen no collision. There ,vas over 15 feet of driveway on the 
right side of Clay Street and behind the taxi over which Lan-
ham could have passed. If Lanham had done as required by 
law to do and it was llatural to suppose he would do, then 
'Vebber 's course 'vould unquestionably have been the wise 
and prudent one. To charge him with negligence is to charge 
]Jim with the obligation of anticipating· unlawful, negligent 
m1d unexpected action on the part of Lanham. 
In the absence of any circumstances to charge him otherwise 
(and none such are shown or attempted) Webber had a right 
to rely on his right of way and to assume that Lanham would 
comply with the la,v. This proposition already discussed at 
some length in Assignment 4 and 5, is announced clearly and 
positively and supported with a multitude of authority. See 
Virginia cases. Assignment 5, above; Blashfield, Cyciopedia 
of Automobile Law (1927), Sec. 2~, p. 496; Berry, Automobiles 
(6th Ed.), §225; Note 21 A. L. R. 992; Note 37 A. L. R. 517; 
ancl Note 47 A. L. R. -622, and cases cited. We may refer to 
sonte of the cases specific.ally upholding the principle in ad-
dition to those referred to in Assignment of Error No. 5. 
In Olotz v. Kroeger Bros. (1919), "\Vis., 170 N. W. 934, it was 
held: 
"Tl1at one approaching a. crossng is entitled to expect that 
another approaching from the left 'vill yield the right of 
'vay. '' 
In 21 A. L. R. a.t p. 992, it is said: 
''A traveler who had reached a street crossing first is not 
bound, in determining wi1ether he can safely avail himself of 
his rig·hts to cross, to anticipate a sudden violation of tl~e 
rule of the road by another traveler approaching, which will 
involve a danger not apparent at the time." Citing cases. 
It would unduly prolong the discussion of this point to 
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quote from all the numerous cases supporting it. They are 
fully set out in the 'rexts and notes above referred to. 
I-Iowever, we "Tish to call attention especially to a similar 
case of TVagner v. La~rson (Wis.), 182 N. W. 336, where it 
was held that although the plaintiff sa'v the team approach-
ing, as he had the right of way, he 'vas under no obligation to 
yield it or to assume that the team would not stop and yield 
the right of wa.y. 
·There are some eases in which a driver with the right of 
·way has nevertheless been held guilty of negligence in not 
stopping or turning but, in all such, it "rill be found that there 
was specific evidence of circumstances w4ich should have put 
the driver on notice that he could not with safety exercise his 
right. We have found no case ·where there were no such cir-
cumstances proved (as here) in 'vhich a driver has been held 
negligent in relying on his rights and in assuming that the 
other party will drive lawfully and 'vill grant the legal right _ 
of way 
The rule in question is not au arbitrary one but one based 
on logic and en the necessities of modern tra.vel Why give 
the car on the right the rig·ht of way 1 Why change the old rule 
of first come first served? vV as it not for the very pur-
pose of expediting our ever increasing traffic, and would not 
that purpose be defeated unless the right of way is to mean 
the ''right to proceed'' and to rely on the other party to grant 
the legal right provid~d. If it does not mean this then it 
means 11othing and the only safe plan i~ to check up, go very 
_slowly always and if traffic be tied up as a. result it can't be 
helped. If you have no right to rely on your right to proceed 
then whenever the path of cars cross there must be a'' pardon 
me, are you going first'' procedure, an ''Alphonse and Gas-
ton'' act, which will be unbearable under modern rushed traf-
fic conditions. The law' gives the car on the right the right 
of way and specifically requires the driver on the left to yield. 
It means 'vha.t it sa.y.s and does not mean "we give you the 
right but you must get it if you can". Only by putting the duty 
on every driver to protect himself from traffic to the right by 
granting the rig·ht of way and giving a corresponding right to 
rely on others to do the same can the flow of traffic be safely 
and surely regulated and responsibility be fixed. 
It is respectfully submitted that .Petitioner's driver was 
guilty of no negligence whatsoever but acted as 'vas natural 
and a.s he 'vas entitled by law to act and that to hold otherwise 
is to charge him with the obligation of anticipating that Lan-
ham W'ould violate the law in failing· to grant the right or 
way and in ddving on the wrong side of the street. 
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In this connection we call attention again to the statement 
of Mrs. ~filler, who was a passenger in the car and in full pos-
session of her faculties up to the moment of the collision, that 
Webber "impressed her as being a very careful driver". She 
was present and she accuses him of no negligence in her tes-
mony. 
''No litigant ca.n successfully ask a court or jury to believe 
that he has not told the truth. His statement of fact and 
the necessary inferences therefrom are binding on hire. He 
cannot be heard to ask that his case be made stronger tp.an he 
makes it, where, as here, it depends upon facts within his 
own knowledge and as to which he has testified.'' 
Massie v. Firestone, 134 Va. 450, 462. 
Certainly Mrs. 1\Iiller has testified, in saying that Webber 
impressed l1er as a ''very careful driver'', that he was not neg-
ligent and unquestiona1bly that he was not speeding. Under 
the above authority she cannot make her case stronger than 
she herself makes it. 
To same effect see 
Davis Bakery 'V. Dozier, 139 Va. 628, 640. 
Bassett &; Co. v. TJlood, 146 Va. 654, 660. 
In view of the above it is respectfully submitted that the 
verdict of the jury is contrary to the law and the evidence 
and without evidence to support it and should be set aside and 
final judgment entered in this Court for Petitioner. 
(B) Error in admission of evidence and in giving, refusing 
and amending instructions. These points a.re covered in As-
signments 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
(C) Excessive damages. 
The Plaintiff in this case ·sued for $10,000.00 and the ver-
dict was for the full amount sued for. Knowing the practice 
to sue in tort cases, for much more than is anticipated in the 
verdict, we' venture the opinion that the shock of the amount 
of the verdict was hardly greater to the defendant's counsel 
than wa.s the surprise to the Plaintiff's counsel. 
· The large verdict for the full amount asked in the suit 
was of necessity dictated by elements which to our mind had 
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no place in the consideration of damages and indicates that 
the jury were mislead -and misunderstood the law. 
The Court gave for Petitioner Instruction "D'', which told 
the jury that defendant would be liable, if liable at all, only 
for damage actually caused by the accident and that it was 
not sufficient to prove that Plaintiff had suffered from causes 
"which may possibly" have resulted from the accident, but 
she can: only recover damages shown by the evidence "with 
rea,sonable certainty'' to be the direct result of the accident. 
Though giving this instruction the Court refused to set aside 
the verdict necessarily based on elements which were not 
shown with reasonable certainty to have resulted from the 
accident, as we shall endeavor to show. 
It was not disputed that Mrs. Miller sustained injuries. 
The direct injuries, however, were of little moment except 
the concussion of more or less severity, which resulted in com-
plete amnesia for several hours but which diminished and 
passed entriely off in 24 hours, dizziness, affection of the eye-
sight (photophobia.) for a short time, headaches, nervousness 
and trouble in sleeping. All passed off except the last three 
which were gradually improving. Both doctors testified that 
the prognosis for the case was good. Mrs. Miller had expenses 
of $297.53 (Rec., p. 71). She had a position in a Washington 
Hospital which paid her $80.00 per month, with board, room 
and laundry which she had to give up, and at the date of trial 
testified that, w~hile improving, she was still unable to work . 
.So far there is nothing to justify a verdict for $10,000.00-
no permanent injury and no great monetary loss. 
The more serious and more sympathy producing element 
brought in the case was the claim that she had suffered a mis-
carriage as a result of the accident and the fact of miscarriage 
would probably predispose her to subsequent like results. 
See testimony of Dr. Whitman (Rec., p. 91. ). Of course, the 
object of bringing out the fact of miscarriage and a predispo-
sition to a re<;mrra.nce was to increase damages. Attorneys 
for the plaintiff gave a good deal of time to these elements in 
the argument to the jury, alleging that Mrs. Miller had been 
denied the privilege of motherhood and would likely or prob-
ably be subject to a recurrance of a like result. The· effect of 
such an appeal to a jury can easily be appreciated and was 
obviously reflected in the verdict. Defendant's counsel, of 
course, argued .that such elements had not been shown with 
reasonable certainty to .have resulted from the accident but 
apparently the jury gave little consideration to this argu-
ment .. 
It is earnestly insisted that the question of miscarriage · 
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·and probable recurrance were not .proper to be considered by . 
the jury, not having been shown with any degree of certainty 
to have rest~.lted from the accident. For this question it is 
necessary to consider the evidence on the subject. 
Dr. Whitman, for the plaintiff, testified that Mrs. Miller, 
after coming to the hospital in Roanoke {she was admitted 
there on December 20th), began to complain of abdominal 
pains, which progressed until.she had an abortion on the night 
of the 25th (Rec., p. 82). This w:as sixteen days after the 
accident which happened on December .9th. When asked if 
the miscarriage was due to the accident or nervous shock he 
merely answered ''That was my belief that it w'as secondary 
to the accident'' and that he '' kne'v of no other cause''' ( Rec., 
p. 85). . 
He further testified that one abortion frequently predispo-
ses the patient to subsequent .abortions-that such is ''com-
monly true" (Rec., p. 91.} 
The cross examination of Dr. Whitman, on this subject, 
will be fond on pages 88-91 of the record and 'vill disclose 
that abortions may come from very trivial causes such as 
just an ordinary automobile ride {p. · 88), that it is possible 
that it may have come from some cause unlmow11 to the doctor, 
but "it is most logical to attribute it to some cause like trauma 
{p. 89); that no one could say positively,."! cannot say, I am 
simply giving my opinion" (p. 90); that there are "a great 
many causes" but "we attribute it to the most logical cause" 
(p. 91). 
In short, the evidence of Dr. Whitman, in the last analysis, 
shows his diag-uosis of the abortion as resulting from the ac-
cident is a mere opinion rather than a conclusion. A mere 
statement that he believes the accident caused the abortion 
since trauma can produce such re·sults and since he knew of 
no other cause~ but admitting that there may have been some 
other cause and that "I cannot say-I am simply giving my· 
opinion" and that "we attribute it to the most logical cause". 
On the other hand, Dr. Rawlings expresesd the clear opinion 
that the abortion did not result from the accident and gave his 
reasons·. Dr. Rawlings was for one year in a Woman's Hos.: 
pi tal in Boston and h\ro years in a. IYiaternity and Childrens' 
Hospital in New York, 'vhere he had a great deal of expe-
rience with maternity cases, beside a. good deal of experience 
in general practice at Lynchburg. He attended Mrs. 1\:liller 
a.t the Hospital in Lynchburg from December 9th to 14th, when 
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she left Lynchburg. On the fourth d,ay after the accident, 
Dr. Ra·wlings ascertained that Mrs. Mi.iller was pregnant and 
made a special and thorough examinatibn for ascertaining the 
situation with reference to this phase of the case. He testified 
that there 'vere no bruises around the ~bdomen (Rec., pp. 104 
and 105) and there was ''no evidence pf any miscarriage or 
of any symptom leading to a miscarriage'' ( Rec., p. 105). 
Dr. Rawlings states that miscarriages,: or symptoms thereof, 
·when caused by shock or injury usua~ly appear in a short 
time after the shock or injury occurs ~nd he thought it very 
improbable that an injury fourteen or fifteen days previously, 
without any previous symptoms could be the cause of the mis-
-carriage (Rec., p. 106). He thought that if this accident had 
caused the miscarriage he ''rould have !seen symptoms within 
five days, though he would not say i~ 'vas impossible. but 
thinks it improbable (Rec., pp. 108-9). ~In his experience and 
reading he did not recall any case in wfhich symptoms so late 
in showing up as is claimed in this ca.~e. (Rec., p. 110.) 
Thus in the last analysis Dr. R?wlings says the accident 
probably had no causal relation to t~e miscarriage, though 
possibly it might. Dr. Whitman says lie believes the accident 
caused the miscarriage, as that is the 1n~st probable cause, but 
admits tha.t he "cannot say" as it can come from any number 
of simple causes. As to the future the
1 
only statement is that 
of Dr. Whitman that one abortion frrequently predisposes 
another. . 11 
Is this such· certainty of proof as ·to bring this element 
within the rule of law. Is the defendant to be mulcted in dam-
ages for snch a bare tJrobability, at llest, as to the miscar-
riage and for such a bare possibilit~ as to future results. 
Yet such is the result of the verdict I in question. 
The rule of law applicable would seem clearly to prohibit 
such vague, uncertain and indefinite ~amages. 
The rule was properly expressed in instruction '' D '' given 
by the Court (Rec., p. 158), but most !obviously disregarded 
by the jury and also by the Court, aft~r the verdict was ren-
dered-the rule being that it is ''not ~ufficient to prove tha.t 
the plaintiff has suffered from causes 'vhich 'may possibly . 
have resulted from the accident, She can only recover * • * 
for damages which are shown with reaSonable certainly to be 
the direct result of the accident.'' I 
''Damages * «• * must be celjtain both in their na-
ture a.nd in respect to the cause from which they proceeded.,,. 
(Italics supplied.) j 
! 
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Western Union 1lelegraph Co. v. Reynolds Bros., 77 Va. ~t 
p. 186. 
The general rule is stated in 17 C. J. 764, as follows: 
''As the rule is generally stated, it is necessary that there 
exist a reasonable certai'J~ty tha.t the apprehended further con-
sequences will issue from the original injury.'' 
Citing cases from 23 jurisdictions with only Texas and Con-
necticut cited as h~:tving a different rule, viz.,-that the "re-
sult must be likely or 'reasonably probable". 
Again in 17 c~ J. 754. 
"Compensation cannot be found upon a. mere conjectural 
probability of loss·. So an a'vard for future disability cannot 
be bound upon mere conjections and possibilities. Where a 
plaintiff claims compensation for future consequences of an 
injury, he 'must prove with reasonable certainty that such con-
consequences will happen.'' 
''Where it cannot be shown with 1·easonable certainty that 
any dama.ge resulted from the act complained of, there can 
be no recovery.'' 
To same effect see Sec. 89, p. 755. 
Also at p. 756. 
''The mere fact tha.t a certain diseased condition might 
• consistenty arise from injury is insu,fjicie1~t to show that it 
'Was caused the'reby. '' 
The same rule is laid down n 8 R. 0. L.-Damages, .Sec 12, 
p. 438. as follows : 
"In General: The damage recoverable in a case must be 
susceptible of ascertainment with a reasonable degree of cer· 
tainty, or as the rule is sometimes stated, m~tSt be certain 
both in their naf1.we and in 'respect to the cOIUSe from which 
they proceed. Therefore, uncertain, contingent or speeula-
tive damage cannot be recovered either in actions excontracte 
or actions ex delicto." (Italics supplied.) 
And again in 8 ~. C. L., Sec. 93, p. 542. 
I 
. I 
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·"Of oourse to warr8Jlt a recovery for Jrospective damages 
they must be proved with reasonable cert~nty, and they must 
be such as the jury believes from the eVidence will actually 
result or are reasonably certain to result, to the plaintiff as 
. the proximate cause of the wrongful ac~ complained of.'' 
- It is respectfully submitted that neiJ.er the fact of mis-
cariage nor the possibility of a recurra.n~e are proven to the 
degree required by the above generally ~ccepted rules, as be-
ing damages resulting from the accident! in question, so that 
they could properly be included as elements in the verdict 
agai:nst Petitioner. That they were soh~ included cannot be 
doubte¢1. in view of the argument of cou sel and the amount 
of the verdict. I 
. For the above reasons the verdict is plainly unconscionably 
excessive when these elements are taken I out of consideration 
-as they should be-and should thus be set aside. 
Even ·with these elements considered :however the verdict 
would still be excessive under rules adopted by the court. 
I 
In Lorillard v. Clay, 137 Va. 734, this court adopted the 
comparative verdict doctrine, based on the average jud~ents 
of courts of last resort in the different istates. In that case 
a verdict for $15,000.00 was, after revie,ying verdicts of other 
courts in like cases, reduced to $10,000.P,O. 
·Very clearly the me.re possibility tha.t Mrs. :Miller might 
su;ffer another abortion is not a propet element to consider 
for reasons stated. Thus let us consider verdicts in other 
£ta.tes in abortion cases. I 
In 17 C. J., p. 1119, under the head 
''Particular awards for injuries caJsing miscarriage in 
connection with other consequences'' th~re is in note 25 a list 
of 31 verdicts approved by courts of last :resort. The ·aver-
age amount of these 31 verdicts is $4,080.00. These verdicts 
of course are only the larger ones 'vhich were attacked as 
excessive a.nd do not include the vast number of smaller ver-
dicts which were not so attacked. Thb avera.ge a.mount is 
thus the average of the larger verdicts! and tbis is only $4,-
080.00. Surely there are no aggravated circumstances con-
~ected with the case a.t ba.r, even if it lbe admitted that the 
miscarriage resulted directly from the 
1
accident, and yet the 
jury found a verdict for $10,000.00 every cent, asked for. 
In McCabe v. Briite (Mont.), a misca~riage ca,se-125 Pac. 
133, the verdict was reduced from $10;475.00 to $3,000.00. 
I 
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In Lakin v. Souih Side El. R. Co., 178 Ill. A 176, a remi.ttur 
of $31000.00 was required from the verdict of $7,000.00-leav-
ing $4,000.00. 
Thus when 've consider the verdict with all possible ele-
ments of damage in, it is still greatly excessive under the 
averag·e verdict rule and when we leave out the question of 
misearriage and possible future repetition, as they should 
be left out, the verdict at once appears so obviously excessive 
as to shock the conscience and. emphasize the misconception 
of the jury as to the proper elements of damage. 
Cle·arly the verdict was, in any fa.ir view of the evidence, 
excessive, and was subject to exception on that ground and 
should have been set aside. 
In conclusion, it is respectfully submitted that the lower 
Court erred in the respects above set out and that for said 
errors the judgment of the lo,ver Court should be reversed, 
the verdict should be set aside and that final judgment should 
be entered in this court in favor of Petitioner and to that end 
Petitionet prays that a. writ of error be a'varded to the judg-
ment of the Circuit Court for the City of Lynchburg. 
Petitioner desires to state orally the reasons for reversing 
the decision .complained of. A copy of this petition was de-
livered on the 6th day of· December, 1929, to ~Iessrs. Bar~s­
dale and Abbo"tt, of counsel in the trial court for :Nirs. Susanne 
B. Miller. 
Respectfully submitted, 
·CASI{IE, FROST & COLEMAN, 
Attorneys for Julius Hogan. 
The undersigned, attorneys at law, practicing in the Court 
of Appeals of Virginia, certify that, in our opinion, it is 
proper that the proc.eedings and rulings and judgment of the 
Circuit Court for the City of Lynchburg in the action of Sus-
anne B. Miller v. Julius Hogan should be reviewed by the 
Supreme ·Oourt of .Appeals of Virginia. 
Given under our,hands this 6th day of December, 1929. 
,JAS. R. CASI{IE, 
PAUL H. COLE1\IAN. 
Received Dec. 9, 1929. 
LOUIS S. EPES. 
"\Vrit of error awarded. Bond $1,000.00. ·January 20, 1930. 





Pleas before the Honorable Don P~ Halsey, Judge of the 
Circuit Court of the City of Lynchburg, at the court house 
thereof on Wednesday, the 9th day df October, A. D. 1929, 
and in the 154th year of the Commonwealth. . 
Be it remembered that heretofore, tLwit, on the 17th day 
of August, 1929·, Susanne B. ~filler, by Mess. Woods, Chit-
wood, Cox & Rogers, and Barksdale &I Abbot, her attorneys, 
caused to be returned to and filed in the clerk's office of the 
Circuit Court of the City of Lynchburg, her notice of motion 
for judgment for money against Julius Hogan, which notice 
having been duly served on said defdndant was returnable 
to the :first day of the September termJ 1929, of said court. 
I 
The said notice is in the words an~ figures following, to· 
wit: : 
. page 2} NOTICE. 
To Julius Hog·an: 
I 
_Please be advised that on the 1st day of the September 
Term, 1929, of the Circuit Court of the ·City. of Lynchburg, 
at the court house thereof, at ten o 'clbck A. M., or as soon 
thereafter as she may be heard, the hndersigned, who will 
hereinafter be referred to as "plaintiff!', will move said court 
for a judgment against you, who will ~ereinafter he referred 
to as ''defendant'', for the sum of $10,000.00, due the under-
signed on account of the following, to-wit: 
. I For that whereas, the said defendant. before and at the 
time of the making of his promise and uhdertaking hereinafter 
next mentioned was the ownec. and proprietor of a certain 
automobile or taxicab going and passh~g from and to certain 
places 'vithin the City of Lynchburg, to~wit, from the l(emper 
S'treet Station to the Union Depot for· the carriage and con-
veyance thereby of passengers for certain reasonable hire 
and reward to the said defendant in that behalf, and there-
upon, heretofore, to-wit, on the 9th d~y of December, 1928, 
at Lynchburg aforesaid, the said plaintiff, the wife of ...... . 
J.\Hller, who had been and was at that t~me and still is emnnci-
pated by her said husband, thereby beihg entitled to her time 
and earnings and who was by profess~on a. registered nurse,. 
and who was then and there in a deJicate condition, being 
some months gone.with child, and being at the Kemper Street 
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.Station in the City of Lynchburg as aforesaid, at the special 
. instance and request of the said defendant would 
page 3 ~ take and engag·e a place and seat in the said auto-
, mobile or taxicab of the said defendant, to be car-
ried and conveyed in and ·by the said automobile or taxicab 
from l{emper Street Station to the Union Depot, at and for 
a certain reasonable hire and reward, the sum of 75<r, to be 
paid by the said plaintiff to the said defendant in that behalf, 
he, the said defendant, in consideration thereof, then and 
there undertook and faithfull promised the said plaintiff to 
carry and convey her in or by the said automobile or taxicab 
from Kemper Street Station to the Union Depot as afore-
said and to use due care and diligence in and about so carry-
ing and conveying her as aforesaid. And the said plaintiff 
in fact sayeth that she, confiding in the promise and under-
taking of the said defendant, did afterwards, to-wit, on the 
day and year aforesaid at the J{emper Street Station as 
aforesaid, take and engage a place and seat in the said au-
tomobile or taxicab to be carried or conveyed in and by it as 
aforesaid, and then and there promised to pay the said de-
fendant the sum of money aforesaid, the same being a rea-
. sonable hire or reward for the carriage or conveyance. And 
although the said plaintiff, confiding in the sa.id promise and 
undertaking of the, said defendant, did afterwards, to-wit, on 
the day and year aforesaid, to-wit, at the l{emper .Street 
.Station aforesaid, become and was such passenger in and by 
the said automobile or taxicab to ·he carried and conveyed 
in and by the same from J{emper Street Station aforesaid to 
the Union Depot aforesaid. Yet, the said defendant, not re-
garding his said promise and undertaking so by him made 
in manner and form as aforesaid, but contriving and fraudu-
lently intending craftily and subtly to deceive and 
page 4 ~ defraud and injure the said plaintiff in this behalf, 
did not and would not use proper care, skill and 
diligence in and about the carrying and conveying of said 
plaintiff in and by said automobile or taxicab from· the !{em-
per Street Station to the Union Depot aforesaid, but then 
and there wholly neglected or refused so to do, and on the 
contrary thereof so carelessly, improperly and negligently 
and unskilfully drove and managed said automobile or taxi-
cab while operating the same on Eighth Street in a southerly 
direction just before reaching and at the intersection of Eighth 
and Clay Streets, in the following particulars, to-wit: 
(1} That the said defendant, through his agent and servant 
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then and three in charge of said automo~lle or taxicab, failed 
to keep the proper lookout. i · 
(2) That the said defendant, throughlhis agent and serv-
ant then and there being in charge of said automobile or taxi-
cab, operated the same at a rate of spe~d in excess of that 
permitted by law, to-wit, at a rate of speed of, to-wit, 35 or 
40 miles per hour; : 
(3) That the said defendant, through I his agent and serv-
ant then .and there being in charge of saitl automobile or taxi-
cab, failed to exercise the. highest degtee of practical care 
for the safety of the said plaintiff as a passenger therein by 
operating the same at a speed incompati,ble with the care re-
~~~; I 
( 4) That the said defendant, through Iiis agent and servant 
then and ther~ being in charge of said ahtomobile or taxicab, 
failed to have the ~ame under the prop~r control at the time 
and place aforesaid, so as to prevent da1~ger and injury to the 
plaintiff, a passenger therein; 1 
page 5 ~ "(5)·That the said defendant at the time afore-
said was operating the said ta)xicab with brakes in-
sufficient to· properly stop the same and avoid danger or in-
jury to the said plaintiff, a passenger therein; 
(6) That the said defendant did not elercise proper care in 
employing one G. 1\L Webber, his servant and agent then and 
there being in charge of and operating the aforesaid automo-
bile 01; taxicab for him; and I 
(7) That the said defendant failed tb exercise the proper 
care under the circumstances in instruqting and warning his 
agent or servant aforesaid so that the plaintiff would be . 
safely ca1•ried. By means of the afor~said negligence, and 
on account of which said negligence in the particulars above-
mentioned, or any or one of such particulars, on the day and 
year aforesaid, the satd automobile or tlixicab, at and near th<J 
intersection of Clay and Eighth Streets, was carelessly, neg-
ligently and unskilfully run and driven with great force 
and violence into an automobile then dnd there being oper-
ated by one A. T. Lanham from Severtth Street along Clay 
Street toward Ninth Street, by means of which the said plain-
tiff was then and there greatly hurt, bruised and wounded, 
and was sick, sore, lame and disordered~ and so remained and 
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continued for a long space of time, and suffered a concussion 
of the brain and .a severe shock to her nervous system, ana 
on account thereof suffered a miscarriage and was and has 
been since hitherto ·in gTeat bodily and mental pain and will 
continue so, and was and has been hindered and prevented 
from performing and transacting her necessary affairs and 
business as nurse as aforesaid, by means of which 
page 6 r she has been una1ble to earn $7.00 a day, which was 
the amount she charged and collected for her serv-
ices as such nurse and also thereby she, the said plaintiff, 
was forced and obliged to and did necessarily pay, lay out and 
expend a large sum of money, to-wit, $500.00, in and about en-
deavoring to be cured of the bruises, wounds, sickness, sore-
ness, lameness and disorder as aforesaid, occasioned as afore-
said, and has been damaged on account thereof in at least the 
sum of $10,000.00: 
Therefore, the said plaintiff will move the court as afore-· 
said. 
Respectfully, 
SUSANNE B. ~!ILLER., 
WOODS, OfiiT.WOOD, COX & ROGER.S, 
R.oanoke, Va. 
BARI{SDALE & ABBOT, 
Lynchburg, V a.; p. q. 
By Counsel. 
At which said first day of the September term, 1929, of 
said court, to-wit: At Lynchburg Circuit Court, September 
16th, 1929. 
This day came the parties by their attorneys, and on mo-
tion of the plaintiff it is ordered that this motion he docketed. 
page 7 ~ At another day, to-wit: At Lynchburg Circuit 
Court October 7th, 1929. 
On motion of defendant by counsel leave was given him t~ 
file his written motion to have A. T. Lanhan made a party de-
fendant as a necessary party to this action, and which said 
motion and affidavit thereto attached is accordingly filed. 
Thereupon came the parties by counsel and upon the con-
sideration of s!lid motion and affidavit and after hearing ar-
-~----~-
1 
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gument by counsel for plaintiff and def~ndant the Court doth 
overrule the said motion to ha.ve the said A. T, Lanhan made 
a party defendant, to which action ofi Court the defendant 
by counsel excepted. , 
The defendant's motion and af·fida~it referred to in the 
foregoing order is in the words and :figl1res following, to-wit: 
page 8 ~ MOTION OF DEFENhANT. 
I 
The defendant, Julius Hogan, now 1 comes and moves the 
-Court that A. T. Lanhan be made a party defendant to this 
action, under and by virtue of section 6102 of the Code of 
Virginia of 1919, and for grounds of ~aid motion defendant, 
says: [ 
·. 1. That this action is a notice of mqtion for judgment for 
damages claimed by said Susanne B. ~!iller as the result of 
an accident on, to-wit, the 9th day of December, 1928, and 
w~ieh occurred at the corner of E~.ghth[ and :Clay Stre~t. in the 
C1ty of Lynchburg, all as set out 1n the notice of motion filed 
in this cause. 1 
, I 
2. That the accident from which the injury resulted to Mrs. 
Susanne B. ~filler was the result of the negligence of the said 
A. T. Lanhan, who at the time of the a!ccident was driving an 
automobile eastward on Clay Street down grade from Sev-
enth to Eighth Street, while the car o~ Julius Hogan was go-
ing upgrade on Eighth Street in a. northerly direction. The 
automobile of the defendant, Julius Hogan was thus approach-
ing from the right of the automobile df the said Lanhan and 
under the ordinance of the City of Lynchburg was thus en-
titled to the right of 'vay. In addition, the automobile of the 
said Julius Hogan entered the intersection ·prior to the time 
that the automobile of the said Lanh~n reached the said in-
tersection. The automobile of the silid Hogan reached or 
crossed the center of the said inters$tion when the impact 
between the two automobiles occurred knocking the automo-
bile of the said Hogan over against the northeasterly corner 
of said intersection. I 
' . 
page 9 ~ 3. The said Hogan furthJr alleges and charges 
that the automobile of the I said Lanhan was ap-
proaching said intersection at an unlawful rate of speed 
I . 
I 
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without the exercise of care and caution required of him on 
approaching said intersection, at which his view from the 
right was obstructed by a building built up to the street lines 
on Clay and Eighth Streets. 
4 .. The defendant Hogan charges and alleges that the driver 
of his car approached said intersection and entered same in 
a lawful and proper manner without negligence of any kind 
and that the accident was proximately caused wholly by the 
negligence of ·the said A. T. Lanhan, a.nd further alleges that 
if there was any negligence whatsoever on the part of the 
driver of the car of the said Hogan, the negligertce of the 
said Lanhan as set out above was the principal negligence in-
volved and there was at most mere concurring, slight negli-
gence, if any, on the part of the driver of the car of said 
Hogan. 
5. Said Hogan therefor emoves that the said Lanham, may 
be made a party defendant to this action and in accordance 
with provisions of section 6102 files herewith affidavit as re-
quired by _said section, and which said affidavit is to be tre_a.ted 
as a part hereof. Ahd that plaintiff be required to nmend the 
notice of motion to bring in said Lanhan. 
CA.SKIE, FR·OST & COLEMAN, 
. Attorneys, P. D. 
State of Virginia, 
·City o£ Lynchburg, to-wit: 
I, Paul H. Coleman, a Notary Public in and for. the State · 
and City aforesa.id, do certify that Julius Hogan th_is da'1 ~ 
personally appeared before me in my ·City aforesaid and 
made· oath that he is defendant in a certain motion for judg-
ment pending in the Circuit Court for the City of Lynchbtn•g,. 
Virginia, wherein .Susanne B. Miller is plaintiff; that A. T~ 
Lanham is a necessary party defeJ?.dant to saJd motion and 
has not been joined as such defendant 'vith the said .Julius 
Hogan; that said A. T. Lanham is a t~sident of the ~tate 
of Virginia and that his place of residelic~ is 1917 Bluff 
Street, within the eorporate limits of the said city. 
Given under my hand this 3rd day of October, 19~H. 
P~ffi.J H. COLE~IAN, 
Notary Public. 
- -I .. 
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page 10 } At another day, to-wit: A~ Lynchburg Circuit 
Court, October 8th, 1929. : 
. I 
This day came again the parties by their attorneys, and 
the defendant for plea. says that he is n!ot guilty" in manner 
and form as the plaintiff in her notice bf motion for judg-
ment against him has complained, and ofi this he puts himself 
upon the country, and the plaintiff likewise, and said defend-
ant filed ·by leave of court a statement! in writing of the 
grounds ·of his defense, to which the p~aintiff replied gen-
erally and prayed that the same be inquired of by the coun-
try, and the defendant likewise. And .sa~d parties demanding 
a jury, there came a jury, to-wit: W. R. Boze, W. G. Burs-
nan, S. J. Fielder, Clyde Franklin, J. Yr· Morrison, T.homas 
Phillips and J. B. Riley, who were sworn to try the issue 
joined, and having heard the evidene.e, and, by consent of 
parties, having viewed the premises inl controversy herein, 
were adjourned until tomorro'v morning at ten o'clock. 
I . 
GROUNDS OF DEFENSE, REFERRED TO ABOVE. 
The defendant, Julius Hogan, for g~ounds of defense to 
the notice of motion filed in this cause says : 
1. That he denies each and every all~gation of the notice 
which in any way charges or imputes negligence to the driver 
of the car of the defendant a.t the. time of the accident in 
question. · 
2. That the injuries of which plaintiJ complains were sus-
tained as the result of the negligence of~. T. I.Janham, driver 
of the car which came into the car of the defendant, in that 
the said Lanham was proceeding at an :excessive and hnlaw-
ful rate of speed, that he failed to grant the right of way to 
the car of defendant, which was approttching from his right, 
as required by the ordinance of the Ciiy of Lynchburg, and 
that he failed to exercise due care in continuing on the rig·ht 
hand side of the driveway but pulled hi's car over on the left 
hand side of the driveway of Cla.y Sti~eet, and into contact 
with the car of defendant, and that the icar of defendant was 
within the intersection of Eighth and ·Clay Streets before the 
car of said Lanham entered said int~rsection, and it was 
thus the additional duty of said L~nhhm to grant right of 
way to the car of the defendant. 
I 
CASKIE, FROST & COLEMAN, 
1 P.D. 
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page 11 r .And now at this day, to-wit, At Lynchburg Cir-
cuit Court October 9th, 1929, the date first here-
inbefore mentioned. 
This day came again the parties by their attorneys, and 
the jury sworn on yesterday for the trial of this controversy, 
appeared according to their adjournment, ·and having fullv 
heard the evidence and argument of counsel, returned the foi-
lowing verdict, to-wit: "We the jury find for the plaintiff 
and fix the damages $10,000.00. W. G. Bursnall, Foreman.'' 
Thereupon the defendant by his attorneys, moved the court 
tq set aside the said verdict and grant him a new trial on the 
ground that the said verdict is contrary to the law and the 
evidence, on the further ground of error in the admission of 
certain evidence ·before the jury and the exclusion of c.ertain 
other evidence from the jury, on the further ground of error 
in granting, refusing and amending instructions give to the 
jury, and on the further ground that the damages assessed 
by said verdict are excessive, which said motion the court 
overruled, and to 'vhich ruling of the co11rt the defenrlant by 
his attorneys excepted. 
It is therefore considered by the court that the plainti:tf 
recover ag·ainst the said defendant, Julius Hogan, the sum of· 
$10,000.00, the damages by the jurors in their verdict ::~.fore­
said ascertained and assessed, with legal interest thereon 
from this day until paid, and her costs by her 8!bont her mo-
tion in this behalf expended. 
At the instance of the defendant by his attorney, who in-
timated a desire to present a petition for a writ 
page 12 r of error and S1l·1Jersedeas, it is ordered that the exe-
cution of the foregoing judgment be suspended for 
a period of 60 days from this day, provided that the said de-
fendant or some one for him shall execute before the clerk 
of this court a proper suspending bond in the . penalty of 
$200.00, conditioned according to law. 
The defendant's bills of exceptions are in the words and 
figures following, to-wit: 
page 13~ BILL OF EXCEPTIONS' NO. 1. 
Be it remembered tha:t upon the trial of this cause, after 
the jury had been impanelled and s'vorn and the opening 
statements of counsel had been made, the following evi-
dence on behalf of .the plaintiff and defendant was introduced 
and the following proceedil_lgs were taken: 
'l ------~~ -----
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page 14 ~ By J\IIr. Caskie: We have a plat made of this 
intersection by Mr. Garland! and we would like to 
put him on first. 1 
By Mr. Abbot: There is no obj~.tion rwhatever but we want 
to take up a matter with you and the J udg·e before we com-
mence. 
By Mr. Caskie: Very well. I 
By ~fr. Abbot: If Your Honor please, in view of the open-
ing statement which Mr. Caskie has ju~t made, we think it is 
proper right now that the jury be instructed as to the cause 
of action and Lanham's negligence. : In other 'vords, the 
· question here is Hogan's neg·ligence, and if it con-
page 15 ~ tributed to the injury, Lanham's · negligence goes 
out of the picture. Of coutse, at the end of the 
case ·we will ask for an instruction, but in view of the remarks 
l\1:r. Caskie has made to the jury in his ppening statement, we 
think it is proper that the right impression be placed on the 
jury's mind now. 1 
By l\1:r. Caskie: They have sta.ted that they sued :Nir. Ho-
gan and Mr. Lanham's negligence wottld not make any dif-
ference and I never heard of the jury being instructed before 
the evidence has been introduced. I 
By the Court: No, I will not do that now. 
By JVIr. Abbot: It certainly is not improper at this stage 
of the case that the jury 'be instructed !to disregard :Nir. Cas-
lde 's remarks along that line. 
1 By the Court: I will endeavor to ghre a proper instruction 
on that matter at the proper time, but) do not think I shall 
undertake to give an instruction now about anything. I will 
rule on the questions as they arise. ! 
By Mr. Abbot: We desire to save an exception. 
By the Court: I will g·ive such instru,6tion as I think proper 
on that matter, at the proper time. 
By Mr. Caskie: \Ve would like to ilntroduce ::Mr. Garland 
so that we can get this map in. I 
By Mr. Barksdale: Very well. 
page 16 ~ H. G. GARLAND, s,vorn. 
By .Mr. Caskie: Gentlemen, in ordeJ to save time, will you 
ndmit tl1at l\ifr. Garland is a duly qualified Civil Engineer and 
'vas -City Surveyor for a number of years? 
By Mr. Barksdale: Yes, just let him explain his map. 
I 
I 
By Mr. Caskie: I 
Q. I hand you herewith a plat of the intersection of 8th 
I 
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and Clay Streets, Lynchburg, ·virginia, made September 26th, 
1929. You made that pla.t, I believe, did you not? . 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Will you please explain the location of the various build-
ings and other matters indicated on that ma.p? 
A. This is a· plat of the intersection of Clay and 8th Street. 
On the west corner is the Church building right up to the 
street line and on the south corner there is a stone wall built 
up to the street line. 
Q. How high is that stone wall t 
A. It will vary from 12 inches to a foot or two, I will e:ay~ 
Q. You mean it lessens as 'it approaches the cornerf 
A. Yes, sir. On the west corner is a frame garage built 
out to the street line on Clay Street and then about two feet 
of the line of 8th street, and on the north corner is a stone 
wall built out to the street line. That stone wall is about 3~ 
or 4 feet high I should say. · 
Q. What is the grade as you go northeast on 8th 
page 17} approaching Clay? 
A. That is a 10% grade up. 
Q. What is the grade going southeast on Clay Street down 
from 7th to 8th?. 
A. That is a 6% grade down. 
Q. In the neighborhood of the ·center of the intersection you 
have a little circle. What is that? · 
A. That is a sewer manhole. 
Q. And in the middle of 8th stret there is another one Y 
A. That is a. telephone cable manhole. 
Q. Then there is a small circle in the intersection 7 
A. That is a water valve box. 
Q. Over on the east corner there is another small circle 
within the side,valk lines there f 1 
A. That is a street sign post. 
Q. Does that hold the sign with the name of the street? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Are. you familiar with the general grade of 8th street 
or Clay on down to Harrison, two blocks beyond? 
A. It is downgrade all the way but I don't know the ex. 
act percentage of it. · 
Q. I believe this shows the width of ·Clay Street as ·75 feet f 
A. 60 feet. 
Q. Yes, that is correct, and the width of 8th 
page 18 ~ Street as what? · 
A. As 30 feet. 
Q. That includes the sidewalks? 
A. Yes, that is the entire street. 
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I •.• By Mr. Abbot: ! 
Q. Will you just explain to the jury 1· what yon n1eau by 
a 10% grade? 
A. A 10% grade means a drop of 10 feet in a hundred 
h~ I 
Q. Horizontal distance of 100 feet. , 
A. Yes, the horizontal distance in 100 feet, your grade 
would·be 10 feet below the other or 10 feet Iabove, as to whether 
it was down or upgrade. I 
Q. Of course the actual street line is more than 100 feet¥ 
· . A. I don't understand that. i 
Q. Your horizontal distance is less than the distance of 
your incline Y I 
A. Yes. ' 
Q. And the same thing is true of a 6% grade Y 
A. Yes, sir. I 
Q. A drop of 6 feet in a horizontal distance. of 100 feet? 
A. Yes, sir. I 
By Mr. Caskie: i 
· Q. Mr. Garland, generally ~peaking, is a street 
page 19 ~ grade with a 10% grade· easy or fairly stiff or a 
stiff grade Y I 
By Mr. Barksdale: We object to that because it is a mat_; 
ter of common knowledge. I 
i 
Objection overruled. 
A. It is considered a steep grade. 
. - ~ . 
Witness stands aside. ···--·---·-
:r;>age 20 ~ J. M. PARIS, I 
Sworn for plaintiff~ 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Abbot: I 
Q. What is your employment? I 
A. I am employed as a policeman f~r the City of Lynch-
burg, but my duties for the last four orl five years have been 
· issuing .State licenses, City licenses, and, registration for taxi-
cabs and drivers' permits. I do not do any police work at 
all, I work in the office all the time. i 
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Q. For the year 1928 did you, or not, is~ue a taxicab license 
to Mr. Julius L. Hogan T 
A. Yes, sir, he had a taxicab license for 1928 and also has 
ooofurlli~yoo~ _ 
Q. Do you lmow whether he operates a taxicab? 
A. Yes, sir. 
By Mr. Caslde: That is admitted. It is not a taxicab but 
it is a public car for hire. 
A. Yes, sir, it is known as a public car for hire. 
Witness stands aside. 
page 21 ~ 
By Mr. Abbot: 
A. T. LANHAM, 
Sworn for plaintiff. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Q. Mr. Lanham, where do you live? 
A. 1917 Bluff Street. 
Q. Where are you employed f 
A. At Craddock-Terry, Central plant . 
Q. What is your position there? 
A. Foreman. · 
Q. I.n what work are you engaged 1 
A. Cutting. 
Q. Cutting what? 
A. Cutting linings. 
Q. For what? 
A. For sh.oes. 
Q. About 4:15 on the afternoon of the 9th of December, 
l 928, where were you f 
A. I was on Clay S'treet, .about 4:15. 
Q. Where had you been~ 
A. To the Rivermon.t Baptist Church. 
Q. And where were you goingY 
A. To the Franklin Street Baptist Church. 
· Q. ~Were you driving an automobile? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What kind of an· automobile? 
A. A star. 
Q. What condition was that car in? 
page 22 ~ A. In first class condition. · · 
Q. Had you recently had it overhauled 7 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was the condition of the lirakes1 
A. They were in first class conditiort. I just bad had the 
brakes relined and had two-inch brake.s bands on them. 
Q. When was that done V 1 
A. About four dayR before. I thinl~ I got it on Tuesday, 
and I had been driving it since Tuesday. 
Q. Was there anyone in the car with you Y 
A. Yes, sir, my wife and kid and three other people, Mrs. 
Grant, Floyd Carroll. There was five of us altogether, no, 
six o.f us altogether. 
1 Q. Who was sitting on the front seat with you? 
A. ~Iy wife and ~Iiss ~Iargaret lVIlson, or something I 
did not quite catch her last name, but I think it is Mason. 
Q. ~Ir. Lanham, there has been introduced in evidence a 
map of the intersection of 8th and Clay Streets. When you 
approached that intersection what o9curred Y 
A. I was coming on down ·Clay Street here (indicating) 
·and this other automobile was coming[ up 8th Street and of 
course there is a Church sitting right !here (indicating) and 
you cannot see but just so far, and I 'got here to the inter-
section and I just had started through, just got right along 
in the line and 1 noticed this car coming up 8th 
page 23 ~ Street and after I seen the why he was going I seen 
he could not stop, so I cut I right that way (indi-
cating) and applied my brakes in the emergency and put the 
foot brake on. I locked the emergency and put the foot brake 
on. I locked the emergency so tight I had to take both hands 
to release it, my wife could not relea:se it, and he made a 
swerve around like he was going to trry to dodge me, and I 
thought he was going down Clay Street, and that wonld have 
given us a chance to get by, but insteatl of doing that, I had 
come to a stop in the center, I was on a: 45 degree and started 
up 8th street and he hooked my front fender and bumper 
and that caused my car to overturn. I - · 
Q. Did it turn your car over? 
A. Yes, sir, upside down. ! 
Q. Which side Y · 
A. The right side. 
Q. As you approached the intersection approximately how 
fast were you going1 I 
A. Around 15 miles an hour when 1 came down Clay 'Street, 
~Ir. Edward Taylor, he pulled into 6th and Clay Sti·eet and 
I gave him the signal to stop until I passed, then I kept on 
going and he was right behind, and he said he was going, I 
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don't know how fast, it is up to him to say tha.t, but he was 
right behind me. 
Q. Did you, or not, notice the speedometer? 
A. No, sir, I did not, but I have been driving c~rs for a 
good many years and I know about the speed of a 
page 24 ~ car. 
Q. At what rate of speed would you say the car 
of Mr. Hogan was going? 
A. I would say he was running around 30 or 35 rai.les an 
hour. 
Q. After the accident, l\!Ir. Lanham, did you notice any skid 
marks on the street made by the Hogan automobile Y 
A. No, sir. · 
Q. Had his brakes been applied efficiently, there would 
have been skid marks? 
A. It looks like to me on a ground like that that there 
should be skid marks; mine showed up. 
Q. Did you notice the skid marks made by your carT 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where were they? 
A. They started this way (indicating) right up towards 
8th Street, there wasn't any skid marks at all down here (in-
dicating). I made my turn and my skid marks started going 
up 8th Street. 
Q. You noticed those after the accident 7 
A. Yes, sir, I looked at that, I went over there an<l looked 
at that, and I also went to look and see if he had any, but I 
didn't see any. The reason I noticed that was someone was 
talking about· the :way I started skidding, then I went back to 
see if he had done any of it. 
Q. Why did you turn your car to the left! _ 
A. To avoid the accident. I seen at the rate 
page 25 ~ of speed he was going if I had kept straight to him 
we both probably would be hit, and I probably 
would be hit right at his engine) or something like that, be-
cause I had done entered the intersection, and after I seen 
that he wasn't going· to stop, at the rate of speed he was going 
he could not stop, naturally I cut to the left, to give him a 
chance to go down Clay Street and I had brought my car 
mighty near to a standstill when he whipped a.round it. 
Q. Did you notice the taxicab after the accident or did 
you know who was in it; did you s-ee anyone in the cab after 
the accident 1 
A. The only thing I noticed, I noticed two cadets, and they 
were either g·etting in or out, and one was standing on the run-
ning board trying to say something to a lady that was in the 
i 
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c~r, and just as soon as I got out I wJs trying to get my 
bunch out of the car and after I got thexrt out, my wife went 
around and said something to the lady, but she did not an-
swer her. i 
I . 
By Mr. Abbot: Just strike that out, Mr. ~{orris, what he, 
said about his wife. r . 
Q. What was the position of the cab af~er the accident, lfr. 
Lanham? I 
A. You mean the taxicab Y I 
·Q. Yes, sir. I 
· A. The only thing, it looked like to me that the 
page 26 ~ rear fender was bent a little bit. 
Q. Was it standing up on its wheels. 
A. Yes, sir. i 
By Mr. Caskie : 
I 
CROSS EXAMINATIQN. 
Q. Mr. Lanham, as I unde.rstand, and I think other wit-
nesses will testify that the ca.b was thrown! over into this street 
sign that holds the sign ·of the street? I 
A. ·Yes, sir, it was· thrown over there, ithatis true enough, 
the compact of both cars, it kinda or L will say that my car 
was dragged a little bit when it struck my fender, and from 
the compact of the two cars I think it s~ng that way (indi-
cating). ' i 
Q. The taxicab was thrown over against the street sign Y 
~. Yes, sir. 1 
Q. And your car was turned over f . 
A. Both cars were right against each other. 
Q. Your car turned over to the left o£ the taxi Y 
A. Yes, sir. I 
Q. No'v you say yon approached that intersection at about 
. 15 miles an hour? 
A; Yes, sir. 
Q. \Vhat side of the street iwere you on Y 
page 27 t A. I was on the right hand side. 
Q. You were on the right hahd ·side of the street 1 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. You got down at the intersection when you sa'v this taxi-
cab coming Y · 
A. Yes, sir. I 
Q. And you were still on the right harld side of the street Y 
A. Yes, sir. · 
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Q. Had you gotten in the intersection at all before you 
saw it? 
A. Yes, sir. You cannot see down 8th Street until you 
get right at the corner. 
Q. You mean on account of the Church 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. An~ you say you had gotten to the intersection before 
the taxicab got there? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Then you made a sharp turn to your left when you saw 
that to attempt to avoid an accident? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you say your car skidded 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How far did your car skid Y 
A. I will say between 8 and 10 feet. 
Q. And you were coming at 15 miles an hour t 
J.l. Yes, sir. . 
page 28 } Q. On the right hand side of the street as you 
got right up to the intersection 1 
Q. And you put on your brakes when you saw this car1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you skidded 8 or 10 feetY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now I want to ask you something else a.bont this plat. 
You were right here (indicating) on the right hand side of 
the street, as you came into this intersection. IIere is the 
Church and you got to this intersection on the right hand sidef 
'A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And then just where did the accident happen1 
A. It happened rig·ht along in the center. 
Q. You put on your brakes when you saw that car ap-
proaching there and you say you skidded 10 feet? 
A. I said about 8 or 10 feet. 
Q. Did you have two wheel or four wheel brakes 1 
A. Yes, two wheel brakes. 
Q. Just on your rear wheelf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And your rear wheel was the one that did the skidding? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 29 } Q. Did you keep your brakes on 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long is your carY 
A. I never measured it, but I would figure that it was 
around 16 feet. 
Q. Then when the front of your car got to the intersec-
I 
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tion the rear of your car was something like 16 feet hack up 
Clay Street, wa.sn 't it 1 i · 
A. Something like that, yes, sir. I 
Q. Now this plat shows that Hth Street is 30 feet wide? 
A. Yes, sir. : 
Q. And that Clay Street is 60 feet wide, coutning the side-
waTh? I 
A. Yes, sir. [ 
Q. That being true then, from the point where you came 
on the right you had to go 15 feet to get to the center point of 
8th 8treet 1 r 
.A.. It takes a second or two to apply
1 
your brakes and you 
cannot do all that while your car is running, right at once. 
Q. But it would take 15 feet to get there? 
A. Yes, sir. I 
Q. So you had to go 15 feet, and Clay,Street is 60 feet wide, 
so you had gone up beyond the cente~ and you would have 
gone 20 or 25 feet up there before the point of impact was 
. reached. I mean if you weJ:lt straight across, you 
page 30 ~ did not go at right angles, your car was curving 
all the time. ! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now how can you say that you applied your brakes im-
mediately and you went that distance, lit must have been 30 
or 35 and kept your brakes on all the ~ime and you skidded 
10 or 12 feet¥ ! 
. A. The~e brakes did not start right there, they started 
right at your curbing there (indicating~). 
Q. I am taking up from the curbing, you had 16 feet for 
your rear wheels to take hold? : 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. 'fhen from that point to the poi:rh of intersection was 
35 or 40 feet according to that pla.t. Nlow how is it you only 
skidded 10 feet? 1 · 
A. The marks there showed where th~y skidded and several 
saw it. r 
Q. Don't you know as a matter of fact, even allowing 16 
feet for your rear brakes to take hold you would still have 
to go 35 or 40 feet before you reached the point of collision? 
How is it you only skidded 10 feet if you kept your brakes 
on? 'I 
A. I said about 8 or 10 feet. , 
Q. Can you answer that question? . 
A. No, more than what I
1 
told you, just what I 
page 31 ~ said. 1 
Q. All right. As a matt~r of fact, wasn't it a 
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fact that you were right in the middle of Clay Street as you 
came down and your skid marks started right in the middle? 
A. No, sir, they did not. 
Q. They did not start in the middle! 
A. No, sir. 
Q. If the police went there and examined it and said they 
did, then they are mistaken Y 
A. After I made my turn naturally that throwed me to the 
center of the street to a certain extent, by the time I applied 
my brakes, and you can see where the marks started, right 
on the line. Of course, the streaks started here (indicating) 
and I would say the car could be between me and that side 
of the curbing then (indicating). · 
Q. What kind of a car is your car? 
A. A Star coach. 
Q. It is not a jumping jack! 
A. No, sir. 
Q. If the evidence should disclose that. those skid marks 
of yours began in the center of .Clay Street at the intersec-
tion with 8th, how can you explain that, if you say you were 
on the right? 
A.. It is easy enough to explain it, the slo,ver a car runs 
the less impression you leave on the street. 
Q. Yes, but if you are making 15 miles an hour-
A.. To show a skid mark about 8 or 10 feet then 
page 32 ~ your car has about come to a close, it is not going 
to show any skid marks. 
Q. The skid marks were there, everybody admits that, and 
you saw them yourself? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And if the evidence should disclose that these skid 
marks began in th~ middle of Clay Street right at the inter-
section of 8th, how would you explain that, when you say 
you were over on the right. You couldn't get your car to 
jump back over here to the middle, you would have to take 
some time before the rear of your car got in the middle of 
the street . 
. A. Just as I cut my wheel to the left, then I applied my 
brakes. 
Q. Then your wheel would come around this way, wouldn't 
it (indicating) ? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How did the skid marks start here then (indicating) 
in the middle of the street~ 
A. It could have been the inside track, couldn't it? 
Q. It could have? 
I 
I 
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A. Sure it could. 
Q. The street is 30 feet wide. How w.i.de is your cal' Y 
A . .Around about 6 feet wide. I 
Q. If yon were over to the right, how could you 
page 33 } go 50 feet here to the middle, ~f they began in the 
middle; in other words, if yoh were on the right. 
when you reached that intersection, how 
1
bould you ever have 
gotten the rear of that car in the middle of Clay Street be-
fore you got into 8thY ; 
A. I was on the right all right. I 
Q. Now, Mr. Lanham, you cannot giv~ us any explanation 
of that .except to say that you were on the rightY 
A. I know I was on the right. Of course I 'vas not hugging 
the curbing, that is true enough, it is very seldom you ever 
see one do that, but :fo was on the righ~. I would say that 
two cars abreast could have passed myi car up Clay Street 
when I was coming down. · 
Q. When you cut your car did you go 1 over the center line 
of 8th Street 7 , • 
A. Yes, sir, I went over the center because I was right 
along here (indicating on map). . 
Q .. That is not the center, that is the!' manhole, the center 
is right here (indicating). 
A. Yes, I was just about right along i in the center, there, 
I was a little beyond the center 'vhen the car had come to 
about a close, and this fellow cut around! and struck my front 
fendet and that is what caused my.car tq turn over. If I had 
applied my brakes and showed a 6 or 18 foot stop there, 1 
conldn 't hit him very hard, hard enough: to turn over myself, 
if he hadn't struck my fender and the bumper, it 
page 34 } don't look like I could have turned over. 
Q. Then let me ask you tliis question, you say 
you were going about 15 miles an hour? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you had good brakes Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And just had them relined 1 
A. Yes, sir. i 
Q. Going 15 miles an hour you skidqed 8 or 10 feet on u 
curve as you were_ coming around th~re Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q .. Then you hit this taxicab Y , 
A. I didn't say I hit the taxicab. I 
Q. Well, you came in collision 'vith the taxicab, I will put 
it. that way? 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. And you knocked it clean out of the street over against 
this sign post, with g-ood brakes on your car, going 15 miles 
an hour and putting your brakes on and still hit it hard 
enough to throw it over against the ·sign post?· 
A. Yes, sir. Could not this car coming at the rate of 
speed he was going after he hit my car, naturally he would 
slide himself some. 
Q .. Still that happened, it was knocked over against that 
sign post. · 
A. The post was bent, that is true enough, but 
page 35 ~ whether he hit the post or not, I don't know. He 
wasn't down there (indicating), he was right at 
the curbing here (indicating) where it makes a turn. 
Q. But he bent the pole. The car never got into the side-
walk line? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. I mean the wheels of the car never got over there at 
all (indicating) Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Your car was likewise turned over Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now J\llr. Lanham that is what you say now, but do you 
recall when ~1r. Hogan came up to your house the night of 
the accident, just after the accident Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you recall that ~{r. Hogan asked you about it and 
you told him you didn't know how it happened, it came so 
suddenly, you lost your head and didn't know what you did? 
A. No, sir, I never lost my head in my life. 
Q. I wish I had one like yours then Y 
A. I never had any occasion to lose my head. 
Q. You are luckier still. Now didn't you tell Mr. Hogan 
then as a matter of fact, that you did not see the car until 
you were right on it and you didn't know what you did, and 
if you had kept straig-ht on, it never would have happened 1 
A. No, sir. 
page 36 ~ Q. ·You didn't tell him that Y 
·A. No, sir. 
Q. Didn't you and your wife come to 1\Ir. Hogan's office. 
later and see him down there? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Didn't you make the same statement there? 
A. No, sir. We came down there, he told me. to come to 
his office on the following Monday night, and I did, J went 
down there, and he wanted to know what I was going to do 
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and I said there was nothing I coul~ do but let the Court 
settle it. ; 
Q. You did not tell him you did not. see that car until it 
was right on you and you just lost yotir head 7 
A. No, sir. I 
Q. You never had occasion to lose ypur head in your life? 
A. No, sir, I never had occasion to lose it. · 
Q. You are a fortunate man. You[ said your car was a 
Star carY 
A. Yes, sir. I 
Q. That is a light weight car, isn '~ it 7 
A. I done forgot just how much it did weigh. I know wl1en 
I taken out my license the weig·ht was rl'orr the slip. It is a 25 
model car, you know what it is. , . 
Q. It is a little·bit heavier than a Ford, isn't itT 
A. I :figure it is right mu~h heavier than a Ford 
page 37 ~ car, a '25 model coach. I 
Q. It is not as heavy as a Chevrolet, is itY 
A. I would :tig·ure it would weigh just!· as much as a ~Chevro-
let. 
Q. A Chevrolet is not a big car? ' . 
A. No, sir, it is not such a big car. 
Q. It is not like a Lincoln or a Packard Y 
A. No, sir. ! 
Q. You said you were driving and there were three on the 
·front seat Y . I 
A. Yes, s1r. 1 
Q. You and Miss Mason and your wife? 
A. Yes, sir. i 
Q. All three on the front seat Y 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you were going from the Rivermont Church over 
to the Franklin Street church? I . 
A. Yes, sir. : 
. Q. Were not you in a sort of a huljry to get these people 
over there? I 
A. No, sir, we had already been t'o the City Union and 
there is where 've started from at 2 :30, and they had been 
to the City Union, and that is where If picked them up, at the 
Church and that is where they were going to get out and go 
to their homes or wherever they were going. 
page 38 ~ Q. I thought you said x
1
ou were going to the 
Franklin Street ·Church? 
A. That is where I was ·going. I said we had been out 
to the Rivermont Baptist Church. i 
Q. As a matter of fact, weren't yqu in such a hurry im-
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mediately after this accident happened, that you phoned for 
another car to take these people over there, so that they could 
get there in time Y 
A. No, sir, my wife walked home, and I taken the car home 
on its own power. After the accident happened, I let her 
and the little boy walk home and L got Mr. Carroll to get in 
the car with me and I drove it home. · 
Q. Did not the ladies all go over to the Church f 
A. No, sir, they did not all go over to the Church. ,rhey 
had done been to Church, that is where I picked them up. 
Q. You picked them up at the Rivermont Baptist Church 
and you were taking them to the Franklin Church 1 
A. No, sir, I picked them up out there at 2 :30 v.fter the 
meeting was over, and I 'vas taking them back to the ],·rank-
lin Street Baptist Church. 
Q. That is what I understood you to say before, you were 
going ·back to the Franklin Street Baptist Church 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What were you going back there for~ 
A. To leave these people out. 
Q. So you were really going home? 
page 39 } A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where were these other ladies going? 
A. I don't know where they lived. 
Q. You say you did not notice your speedometer at all? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. But you think you were going about 15 miles an hour? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you put on your brakes and skidded 10 feet and 
hit this other carY 
A. 8 or 10 feet. 
Q. And this other car went over against the sign post 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
VVitness stands aside. 
page 40} 
Bv lVIr. Abbot: 
MRS. A. T. LANHAM, 
Sworn for Plaintiff. 
DIRE-CT EXAlVIINATION. 
\ .• .. -... -~,-- .. 
WQ. You are the wife of l\1:r. A. T. Lanham, I believet 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. It has been testified that you were in a Star automobile 
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'that was in collision with a taxicab own~d by· ]tlr. Hogan at 
the intersection of 8th and Clay Streets. I That is correct, I 
believe! 
A. Yes, sir, that is true. . i 
Q. Mrs. Lanham, will you state what ~peed you think the 
ca;r was going as you approached that intersection T 
A. Which carT · 
Q~ Your carY 
A. I don't have any idea, but we were driving at a moder-
ate rate of speed. · 
Q. You don't know how fast you wet·e going t. 
A. No, sir, I do not. 
Q. Would you undertake to estimate the speed? 
A. I would not like to because I don't :know. 
Q. Here is a map that has been put i~ evidence, here you 
are going down .. Olay S'treet, this is 8th Street.· Now where 
was your car being driven, on the right or left or center of 
Clay Street 1 · i 
A. We were driving near the right of Clay Street, I should 
think we were nearer the right than the center. 
page 41 ~ Q. Did you see this taxicab approaching driven 
by Mr. Webber? : 
A. I did see it, hut not until it was just ·on us or just before 
we h~d the collision. i 
Q. Do you have an idea as to the speed that car was going 
at the timeT i • 
A. I do not. . 
Q. You can make no estimate of that at an? 
A. No, sir. i 
Q. Do you remember what ~Ir. Lanham did after the ac-
cident happened or just before the accident happened' 
A. I know he put on his brakes and cut !to the left. 
Q. Did he do that about the time you I saw this car? 
A. Just about the time we saw the dar, just before the 
car struck us he put on his brakes and cut to the left. 
Q. Were you, or not, ill: the intersectioh prior to this taxi-
cab getting into it 1 I 
By Mr. Caskie: We object to the form of the question as 
leading. I 
Bv Mr. Abbot: 1 
"'Q. 'Which car reached the intersection first, your ear or the 
t~xieabY . I 
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Q. Mrs. Lanham, d~d you, after the accident, 
page 42 } notice any skid marks on the pavement in Clay 
Street? 
A. I did. 
Q. Where were they, were they in Clay Street or 8th ~tre~t 
. or both? 
.A. They were both, they 'vere in ·Clay, they were a little 
'vest in Clay, then they came around in Clay and 8th, we 
had skidded the car around. 
Q. ·How long were those skid marks 7 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Could you give any estimate? 
A. I should think so, it was about the length of possibly 
more, of the car. 
Q. After you were taken out of your car did you see a. lady 
in the taxicab? · 
·A. I did. 
Q. What was. her condition Y 
A. She was just sitting up in the back seat of the car. 
Q. Was she conscious Y 
A. She did not seem to be. 
Q. Did you do anything to attract her attention Y 
A. I spoke-to her, asked her if she was injured, and she 
did not make any reply. 
Q. Did she make any movement 7 
A. Not that I noticed. 
Q. Mrs. Lanham, do you remember whether or 
page 43} not Mr. Hogan came over to your house the night 
of this ·accident Y 
A. I was not at home, I did not see M:r. ·Hogan. 
Q. You did not see him T 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You went down to his office? 
A.· Yes, sir, the following evening, I think it was the fol-
lowing evening. 
Q.. Will you ·state what conversation you had or what- the 
nature of your conversation with ~{r. Hogan was down 
there? 
A.. I could not do it correctly to save my life. 
Q. What were you talking about or why did you go down 
there¥ · 
A. We went down there because we thoug~t it was our duty, 
and I think Mr. Hogan stated he wanted to see us. 
Q. What did you talk about down there? 
A. I don't think we talked about very much of anything, 
there was very little _said. 
I 
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Q. Did you hear Mr. Lanham say th~t he lost his head at 
the time of the accident down there or at any other time? . 
A. I did not. · I 
Q. Did he lose his headY , 
A. If he did I don't know, if he did do it he does it often, 
· · but I didn't notice any change in him, he was just 
page 44 ~ normal. • 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
I 
;By Mr. Caskie: I 
Q. Mrs. Lanham, as I understood you to say, you saw skid 
marks, a.nd they began a little way in; Clay Street f 
A. Yes, sir, and they curved aroundJ 
Q. To the point of the accident' I 
A. Yes, sir. I 
Q. And the car was nearer the right curb than it was to 
the center of the street Y I · 
A. Sure. 1 
Q. You are sure of· thatY 
A. Yes, sir. 
I 
Witness stands aside. 
I 
page 45 ~ MRS. E·. L. GRAN~, 
Sworn for Plaintiff. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
i 
By 1\tir. Abbot: I 
Q. Mrs. Grant, it is in evidence that you were in a Star 
automobile driven by Mr. Lanham ori Sunday, the 9th of 
December, which was in collision at 8th and Clay Streets. 
A. Yes, sir. · : · . 
Q. Just prior to the accident, do you know how fast ~fr .. 
Lanham was going? . 
A. No, I do not. 'I Q. Was he going fast? 
A. No, sir, it did not seem to me that: he was going so fast .. 
Q. At what rate of speed, or was he driving at a moderate 
rate of speedY I 
Question objected to. 
Q. Were you hurt in that accidentf 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. What was the nature of your injury Y 
By Mr. Caskie: We object to that. 
67 
By Mr. Abbot: I want to show that she knew nothing after 
the accident. 
By Mr. Caskie: Then that is all right. 
By Mr. Abbot: 
~ What happened after the accident f 
A. I had two fractured ribs. 
page_ 46 ~ Q. Did you see the car owned by Mr. Hogan? 
A. I got a ·glimpse of it, just a glimpse, I was in 
the back seat. 
Q. Have you any idea about its speed 1 
A. No, I couldn't tell anything about the speed. 
No cross examination. 
vVitness stands aside. 
page 47} F. A. ·CARROLL, 
Sworn for plaintiff. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Abbot: 
Q. Mr. Carroll, do you live in Lynchburgf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where are you employed? 
A. At ·Craddock-Terry & Co. 
Q. How long have you been working there 7 
A. The last time about a year. 
Q. Prior to that had you worked there before? 
A. About three years. 
Q. Were you in Mr. Lanham's car on Sunday afternoon 
the 9th of December? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. As 1\IIr. Lanham's car approached the intersection of 
8th and Clay Streets, did you notice anything about the speed t 
A. None other than he 'vas driving along at a normal rate 
of speed, a slow rate of speed. 
Q. Did you see another automobile in that intersection 
shortly thereafter 7 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Where was the Lanham car at the timet 
A. Approaching the intersection. 
,-
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Q. Approaching the intersection? i 
A. A. pproaching into the i:p.tersection, ,1~ right at the inter-section, he wasn't in it at the time. page 48 } Q. Where was this other ~r? 
A. Coming up 8th Street. : 
Q. It was not in the intersection either; was either car in 
the intersection? · I 
A. It was so close I could not say~ . 
Q. It was so close you could not say?! 
A. Yes, sir. : 
Q. Which car got into the intersection first f 
A. It appeared to me that both of th~m got there about 
the same time. . I 
Q. Where was Mr. Lanham's car in Clay Street, was he 
driving· in the center or on the right or~· on the "left of Clay 
Street? . 
A. He was not driving in the center, he was closer to the 
right than he was the center. 1 
Q. He was on the right hand side? .
1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was approximately the sp~ed of this· taxicab 
when you saw it? I 
A. I would estimate around between :30 and 35 Jniles an 
hour. I 
Q. What did Mr. Lanham do thenY 1 
A. He cut and gave him a chance to go down Clay Street, 
it appeared that way to me, he cut his wheels. . 
Q. Which way, to the right or leftY .
1
: 
A. To the left. 
Q. And then the collision occurred tllere! 
A. Yes, sir. i 
page 49 ~ Q. Was the automobile yo~ were in going fast 
or slow at the time of the coflision 7 
A. We were going slow. Mr. Lanham had applied his 
brakes at that time. ! . 
Q. And the result of the collision to :the car you were in 
was what? :
1 
A. It turned· over. 
Q4 Did you .notice any skid marks in. the street 1 
A. Yes, sir. ! 
Q. State to the jury where they were and where they 
started? 1 
A. The skid marks started before he entered into the in-
tersection. 
Q. You · mean the skid marks? 
A. They started on ·Clay Street. 
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Q. How far from the intersection T 
A. I don't know, probably the length of the car. 
Q. And where did they got 
69. 
A. They went to the left, the way he cut. When he cut 
to the left the skid inarks occurred. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Caskie: 
Q. I did not understand :what you said; how fast did you 
say the Lanham car was going? 
A. Between 15 and 18 miles an hour, the normal rate of 
speed. 
page 50 ~ Q. I , believe you said also as you approached 
· the intersection that the two got to the intersec-
tion about the same time and you could not say which was 
there first t 
A. No, sir. 
Q.. That is correct, is itf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the skid marks of the Lanham_ car started back 
in Clay StreetY 
·A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Before it got to the intersection, about the length of the 
car? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now there is a ·Church built right out to the corner to 
your right as you came down there 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You were on the back seat of the Lanham cart 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So you could not see down 8th Street at all until you 
got right up in the intersection Y 
A. I wasn't noticing it. 
Q. And the only time you could notice it was just as you 
saw the intersection and saw the two cars get there about 
the same time f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How do you estimate so accurately the speed of that 
car? 
page 51 ~ A. I have not estimated the speed, I said what 
I thought it was going. ' 
Q.. You do not really make that as an estimate, but you 
just think it was going at that rate? 
A. That is my opinion. 
Q. The same thing applies to the Hogan cab? 
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A. You mean the speed the cab was makingt-
Q. Yes, sir. 
A. Yes, sir, that is what I said the .
1
:speed of the cab was 
making. · 
Q. You had very little chance to make any estimate, did 
you? 1 
A. I saw it. · 
Q. It was a very short time, just from the point of inter" 
sectio:n to the point of accident. Tha~ is the only time you 
saw it? I 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. And that is the only time you had.to see it? 
·A. Yes, sir. I 
Q. And during that time Mr. Lanhatm was putting on his 
brakes? . I 
A. Yes, sir. • 
Q. And your mind was :fixed on that, ~oo T 
A. My mind was not ·fixed on his putting on the brakes, I 
knew he did it. i 
• Q. Could you see that an accident was probably going to 
occur? I 
. A. Yes, I knew an accident was going to occur 
page 52 ~ when I saw the car coming up 8th Street. 
Q. You work for the Crad~ock-Terry Shoe Com-
pany, central plant, don't you Y • 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you work under ~{r. LanhamJ 
A. Yes, sir. f 
. I 
By the Court: . 
Q. At what rate of speed did you say the taxicab was coming 
up the hill? , [ 
A. According to my estimation it was going between 30 
and 35 miles an hour. I 
Q .. At what point did Mr. Lanham b,egin to turn the car to 
the leftY 
1 A. Immediately after the car had :come into 8th Street, 
immediately after he seen the car he swerved the wheel 
around to try to avoid the collision. i . 
Q. You say you were driving on the right hand side of 
Clay Street? · i 
·A. Not exactly to the right and no~ in the middle. 
· Q. Did he begin to turn towards thelleft before he reached 
the intersection or after1 i 
A. He began to turn to the left after he saw the other car 
approaching the intersection. 
1 
I 
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Q. Where was his car at that time? 
A. Right on the corner of 01ay and 8th, almost in the in-
tersection. . 
page 53 } Q. Had he entered the intersection Y 
A. I could not say. 
Q. Did that leave enough room to pass to the right or 
turn to the right at that pointY 
A. At the rate of speed he was making, I don't think he 
could have turned, I don't know whether he left room or not, 
I could not say. 
Bv Mr. Caskie: 
·Q. Where were you going? 
A. We were not going anywhere, 've were coming back 
from the Rivermont Baptist Church, and going to Franklin-
Street, where we started from. · 
Witness stands aside. 
page 54} FATHER THOS. E. MITCHELL, 
Sworn for plaintiff. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Abbot: 
Q. Where do you live nowY 
A. I am at 310 Duke Street, Alexandria, Va. 
Q. What do you do? 
A. I am an Assistant Pastor there and student at the· 
Catholic University in Washington. . 
Q. In December, 1928, where did you liveY 
A. Here in Lynchburg. 
Q. What was your duty at that time Y 
A. I was Assistant Pastor here of ,Holy Cross Church. 
Q. On the afternoon of Sunday, December 9th, do you 
recall being on Clay Street, near 8th StreetY 
A. Yes. • 
Q. There was a collision there, I ·believe! 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know what cars were in collision 7 
A. I did not at the time, but I do now. 
Q. Where was the Lanham car when you first saw it Y 
A. It was approaching the intersection of 8th and Clay, 
coming down Clay. 
Q. Whereabouts in ·Clay Street, on the right or leftY 
• 
1-
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A. On .the right hand side of the street coming down to-. 
wards 12th. I 
page 55 } Q. Did you see the car coming u11 8th Street f 
A. I did. . I 
Q. Have you any idea how fast the ca.r comiug up 8th 
S'treet was going? . I 
A. I _would judge between 25 and 30 miles an hour. 
Q. Which ear reached the intersection of 8th and Clay 
first? · i. . 
A. They were both very close, but t th1nk the car com1ng 
down Clay was a foot or so perhaps close~ to the intersection 
than the other one. I · 
Q. Where were you, Father Mitc.hell, at the time you saw 
these cars f I 
A. I was within a few spaces of the sigh pole on the corner 
that was bent. ~ 
-Q. In other words, .YOU were on the opposite side of the 
street from the side the Lanham cars was driving on? 
A. Yes, I was o:q the right hand side of Clay Street pro-
gressing towards 5th. I 
Q. Do you know what happened there rin the intersection Y 
A. At the actual moment of contact, ~ou mean? 
Q. Yes, sir. , 
A. No, sir, because I turned to run out of 
page 56} danger. i 
Q. After the collision what twas the position of 
the cars with reference to one another; where was the taxicab 
and where was the other car? I 
A. One car was right along there at: the corner of the 
street right by the sign pole. I 
Q. That is the east corner? ~ 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Which car was that, do you recall¥ 
A. At the time I thought it was the Lanham car. 
Q. Where was the other car? i 
A. The other car was about in the middle of the street 
turned over on its side. I 
Q. Which side? i 
A .. To me, going up the street, it woula be the right hand 
side. . ' 
Q. I mean which side of the car? 
A. The right hand side of the car. 
· Q. The car was turned over on its ri-ght side f 
A. Yes, sir. 1 
Q. Do you know which car that was? i . 
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Q. Did you notice any skid marks in Clay Street 7 
A. No, sir, I did not. 
Q. After the accident, what did you dot 
A. I turned and came back to the car that was 
page 57 ~ overturned and opened the door and helped the 
man and several ladies to get out. 
Q. Where was that carf 
A. That was the car that was turned over on its side about 
in the middle of the street. 
Q. Did you then go to the other cart 
A. I merely stopped there a moment and looked in as I went 
on towards the rectory. 
Q. The car whose speed you estimated at 25 or 30 miles· 
an hour was on what street? 
A. On 8th Street. 
Q. Coming towards town 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By :.M:r. Caskie : 
. Q. Father Mitch.ell, I believe whei;t you went to help the 
people out of the car in the middle of the street, that was the 
car that had a number of people in it, was it not? 
A. I don't know the exact number that were in there, but 
I believe there were six. 
Q. Later, it developed that that was the Lanham cart 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You stated, I believe, that as the two cars approached 
. the intersection it was very close and you think 
page 58 ~ possi~ly the car coming down Clay Street was a 
foot or so in the intersection ahead of the other 1 
A. I think so. 
Q. Being that close, you are not willing to be positive of 
that, are you? 
A. No, sir.· 
Q. You cannot be positive of that, but that is your impres• 
sion? 
A. That is my impression. 
Q. Did you notice after the accident the sign post over 
there near which you, at the time of the accident, were, and 
which was hit by the car and bent over 1 
A. I did not see it bent, I noticed it bent afterwards. 
Q. You noticed it afterwards, and you know it was bent 
over? 
A. Yes, sir. 
------------- 1----~~-
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Q.. Do you drive a car yourself? 1 
A. Yes, sir. 1 
Q. How long have you been driving? 
1 A. Near about two years. 
1 Q. You did not see the car coming·up 8th S'treet until just 
before the accident¥ I 
A. No, sir, I saw them ·both about the same time, or I no-
ticed them. 
Q. Did you know that the car coming! up 8th Street was in 
second gearY 1 · 
page 59 ~ A. No, I did not notice what gear. it was in. 
Q. That is a rather steep grade coming up from 
Madison to Clay, is it not¥ ~-
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And rough cobblestones? 
A. Yes, sir, it is. 
Q. -Clay Street is a smooth street Y 
A. Yes, sir. I 
Q. And the car coming down Clay Street was going down -
grade but not so steep as the one on 8th? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you notice at all the speed of I the car coming down 
Clay before the accident? r · 
A. I think he was going about behve~n 20 and 25 miles an 
hour. I . 
Q. Yon had no occasion to make any Special estimate of the 
speeds of these cars Y · 
A. No, I had no special occasion to «tlo so. 
Q. And you put the speed of the car coming· down Clay 
.Street from 20 to 25 miles an hour and the other one at 25 
to 30 miles an hour? 
A. That is my opinion or my judgme~t. 
Q. But you will not be positive about that? 
A. No, sir. · 1 
Q. And after the accident you got th
1
e cars mixed and you 
thought the cab was in the middle of tlie street and the Lan-
ham car 'vas up against the! corner? 
page 60 ~ A. Yes, sir. · . 
Q. When you first noticed these cars you did 
not have time to make any real close bstimate of the speed 
and you had no reason for doing so 1 1 
A. No, sir, it was all done in a moment. I saw them com-
ing and just saw the impression of th~t moment. 
I , 
Wtiness stands aside. ! 
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page 61} MRS. SUSANNE B. MILLER, 
Plaintiff, Sworn. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Col. Woods: 
Q. Are you the plaintiff in this case, the party suing ·r 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where were you reared 7 
A. In Bedford, Virginia. 
Q. Bedford County Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was your maiden name 7 
.A. Suzanne Burks. 
75. 
. Q. Where did you g·o after you were grown and left Bed. 
ford? 
A. I went to school in Culpepper County, Virginia. I lived 
with my Uncle who was an Episcopal Minister. 
Q. And after completing your education at that time, where 
did you go? . 
A. I finished the high school there and 'vent in training 
at the Roanoke Hospital. 
Q. Did you graduate there as a trained nurse' 
A. I did. 
Q.. How long did you practice your profession in Roanoke 
and elsewhere before this accident? 
A. For about 8 years, off and on, not all the 
page 62 } time. · 
Q. Did you hold any public position there? 
A. Several, I was with the Visiting Nurses Association 
there and then I was with the Public Health Department for 
two years. · 
Q. Are the Visiting Nurses employed by the StateY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you under the Health Officer there in Roanoke 7 
A. Indirectly, and then I was directly under Dr. Foster, 
the Public Health Officer of Roanoke. 
Q. For how long Y 
A. One year with the Visiting Nurses Association and 
about two years with the Health Officer. 
Q. What salary did you receive? 
By Mr. Caskie: We object to that. They must limit that 
to the present time. 
By lVIr. Woods: I want to show her earning capacity ever 
since she has been a trained nurse. 
76 
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By Mr. Caskie: We do not think thaV-is a proper rule, it 
should be at the time of the accident. I 
By the Court: At the time of the accident is proper, and 
is the only thing pertinent to this case.! The earnings she 
was making at the time of the accident i$ the only pertinent 
thing. I 
By Col. Woods: . 
Q. Did you do private nur~ing in Roanoke? 
page 63 ~ A. Yes, sir. I · 
Q. Did you ever do any in Washington Y 
A. No, sir. i 
·Q. What do you make in private nur~ing? 
I 
I 
·By Mr. Caskie: We object to that. lit should be at the 
time of the collision. 
By Col. Woods : 
Q. At the time of the collision. . 
A. $7 a day. 1 
Q. Now, Mrs. Miller, where were you at the time or just 
prior to this accident or where were you coming from! 
A. From Washington. . 
Q. Did you have a position there? I 
A. Yes, sir, at the Columbia Hospital. 
Q. Tell the Court an~ jury what the cbnditions \Vere there, 
or what the work was there and what your compensation 
was, just. b!iefly? [ , 
A. I was in charge of a Ward and received $80 nnd main-
tenance, which included board, room a~d laundry. 
Q. Tell the jury what your maintenance was 1 
A. Bpard, laundry and room, and hny other jncidental 
expenses connected with the hospital. I ' 
Q. Now you started to come through Lyncl1burg, or where 
were you going? I 
. A. To Roanoke, Virginia. 
page 64 ~ Q. Did you have relatives 
1 
there f 
A. I-was to meet my mother and I have an aunt 
and several uncles in Roanoke. I 
Q. What train did you come on.? . 
A. I came on a train that I thought was going into the 
Union Station, but I learned just before arriving here that 
it did. not, but that it came into another station. 
Q. You mean another Southern Station 1 
A. Y:es, sir,. and to get the train to Roanoke, I bad to 
transfer. 
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Q. To the Union Station Y 
. A. Yes, sir. 
77 
Q. Were you acquainted in Lynchburg, or did you ever 
spend any time in Lynchburg Y· 
A. No, sir, not over 3 hours. 
Q. Did you know the distance between the stations Y 
A. No, si:r, L did not. 
Q. Now, what did you do when you got off your train 
and learned that you had to go· to another station to catch 
your train? 
A. I took a ca.b, not knowing anything about the town and 
having a limited amount of time, I took a cab. 
Q. Was it a cab that you have since learned was Mr. Ho~ 
gan's cab? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now after taking the cab, do you know when. the ac-
cident occurred or did you see anything about the 
page 65 } accident f 
A. No, sir, I know nothing of the aooident, I 
have no recollection just preceding or after the accident. 
Q. Why don't you have any recollection of it; did anything 
occur to you, or did you receive any injury? 
A. I· did not know anything until I was in the hospital. 
Q. You don't remember being taken from the scene of the 
accident to the hospital? 
. . l\.. My last recollection is getting in the cab and starting 
out on my journey to get to the station, and I trusted of 
course to the taxicab driver that he would know the 'vay 
und get me there safely, so I dismissed every other thought 
from my mind. . 
Q. "'\Vhen did you first regain consciousness after the ac---
cident? 
A. I cannot vividly recall anything until the next day. I 
remember having a terrible pain in· my head but other than 
that I cannot recall vividly anything that night. 
Q. Did you tell the hospital authorities who you were or 
'vhere you were from 1 · 
A. I do not recall that I did. 
Q. Did anyone come to see you at the hospital that you 
had previously known from· the Columbia Hos-
page 66 } pi tal Y 
A .. Miss l{insey, Supervisor of Nurses, sent· a 
nl.].rse on to find out about me and to take care of me if it 
was necessary. 
Q. "\Vas she .a friend of yours, a Bedford girl? 
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Q. Who was she? 
A. Bernice Powell. 
Q. Was she raised in the same neighborhood with you t 
A. 1res, sir. I 
Q. Where is she now Y 
A. She is connected with the Inglewood Hospital, Ingle-
w.ood, Ne,v Jersey. i 
Q. How long did she stay at the hospital Y 
A. She was there nine months, I thin~. 
Q. I am talking about at the hospital here in· Lynchburg! 
.A. Oh, pardon me, she stayed there, 1i can't just recall, but 
I think she came one day and left the next, but I really could 
not say positively. ! 
Q. How long did you remain at the liospital, if you know, 
in Lynchburg Y I 
A. 1 started out on Saturday. 1 
Q. 1r ou went there on the 9th f 
A. I think I left there Thursday or Friday. 
Q. Where did you goY I 
A. I went to Roanoke, Virginia. 
page 67 ~ Q. Who went with you Y 1' 
A. My mother. 
Q. Did your mother live in Bedford !·County Y 
A. Yes, sir. · ! 
Q. Did she come to the hospital whild you were there sick t 
A. Yes, sir. I 
Q. Did you, or not, go with her to Roanokef 
A. Yes, sir. :
1 
Q. Where did you go when you got to Roanoke; did you 
go immediately to the hospital T 
A. No, sir, I went to my Aunt's, Mrs. Woodson. 
Q. Is she living now? I 
A. No, sir, she has since died. 1 · 
Q. Was she your mother's sisterf ' 
A. Yes, sir. i 
Q. What was your condition when you left the Lynchburg 
hospital? I 
A. I did not feel well, I had headacHes, still I felt groggy, 
and I was very uncertain on my feet. I 
Q. When yon got to Roanoke to your Aunt's, Mrs. Wood-
son 's, were you up and down or what was your condition just 
tell the jury Y I 
A. I was down most of the time. I tried though to get 
up, because t thought it was weakness • and I would get over 
it, but finally found out that I was g~tting no better and I 
I . 
! 
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could not sleep at night and I was so nervous and 
page 68 ~ had headaches of such a nature that I could not go 
on. 
Q. Did you call in Dr. Whitman or not 1 
A. I went to Dr. Whitman. 
Q. You went down to the hospital Y 
A. My Uncle took me there. 
Q .. Your Uncle took you in a car! · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Wha.t advice did Dr. Whitman give you after he ex-
amined you, when you went to his hospital 7 
A. He thought I was in no condition to be up, he thought 
I should not have come down there. 
Q. What advice did he give you Y 
A. Absolute rest and quiet, and to get that he thought it 
was best for me to come to the hospital. 
Q. To his hospital f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you go there f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. On what date, if you recall? 
A. I don't ·recall exactly, but the 20th I think but I don't 
recall exactly. · 
Q. The hospital record will show that. Now how long 
did you remain there 7 
A. I think about five weeks. 
Q. What day did you leave the hospital Y 
A. About the 28th of January or February. 
Q. W11at was the occasion of your leaving, did 
page 69 ~ you have any engagement to meet? 
A. It meant th~ loss of my position if I did not 
go on. I was in such mental state that my Doctor thought 
it was best that I try to forget it and have something else 
to think about, rather than to be self-centered as I was and 
nervous I was. 
Q. Was the position that you held at the ·Columbia Hos-. 
pital in Washington such a position that required, heavy, 
strenuous work or was it a light position as you nurses 
claim? 
A. No, you would not consider my going to take a posi-
Hon tha.t 'vas heavy. It was a position, more or less that 
would not tax my strength and yet it would keep me di-
verted? 
Q. Wha.t was your position? 
A. In charge of a ward. 
Q. What do you call itt 
I 
I 
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. A. In charge of a Ward, Supervising !a ward. · 
.. Q. Did you, or: not, have.any special p~tients that yo_u had 
to stay with over your rest or did you have regular rest' 
A. I had regular rest. . . 
1 
••• 
Q .. After you undertook that pos1holi h0w dtd you get along 
with itt I 
A. It was very hard, of course, at fuist, even though the 
hours were short, they were very long to me, n.n\1 th•) ~uper­
intendent made it easy for n~c by giving me 01is 
page 70 ~ Ward especially because it wks the easie~t place 
in the hospital. . 
. Q. Did you lose any time on account ~fiyour health·¥ 
A. Yes, I lost so many days that I da;red not ask for any 
more without giving up my position, because when ·I asked for 
my last week-end, asked could I have that off because I did 
not feei like working, and she. said that 1[1she thought I ought 
to give it up, and I tried to go on. 
By Mr. Caskie: We object to -those details. 
By Col. Woods: I . 
Q.· Did you, or not, give up your position on account of 
your ·health, or for any other reason t I 
A. Yes. 
Q. When did yon give it up Y· , 
A. The first of May. i 
Q. If your health had permitted, could you have continued 
on in that position! I 
· A. Yes, sir. · · i 
Q. And would you have continued in that position for some 
time at leas.t 7 I 
A. Yes, Sir. : 
Q. Now to go back to the R.oanoke Hospital, Mrs. Miller, 
just state to the jury if you had. any i other trouble, o~her 
-than your headaches 'vh1ch ybu have told the JUry 
page 71 ~ about and your nervousness! · · 
A. Yes, I had a miscarriage. 
Q. You had a miscarriage at the h9spital f 
A. Yes, sir. , 
· Q. About when T 
A. I think it was Christmas Eve. : 
Q. We 'vill not go into the details of that. Now if you can, 
please give us a memorandum of the expenses that you have 
incurred on account of this accident a;nd this injury. The 
gentlemen on the other side have been f~rnished with this, but 
I hand you a bill of the Lewis-Gale Hospital and will ·ask· 
! 
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you if that is the bill that was rendered you for services 
.there? 
A. Yes, $297.53. 
Q. Did you have any other expenses at the hospital 1 · 
A. I had a special nurse. 
Q. Is the special nurse included in that billY 
A. No, sir, only her board. I paid her. 
Q. You paid the special nurse¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know how you got to the hospital in Lynchburg 
or how you come to go there, do you know anything about 
that? 
A. No, sir. 
page 72 ~ Q. Do you know whether or not M'r. Hogan sent 
you there? . 
. A. I do not, I don't know }fir. Hogan. 
Q. Who was the first party you knew there, and wl1a t doc-
tor was in charge of your case f · 
A. Dr. Rawlings. 
Q. Did you ever receive a b~ll from that hospital until re-
cently? . 
A. No, not until later, I mean about a month ago. 
Q. You haven't that billY 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you remember about what the amount ~as 1 
A. I think it was about $60, but someone else said it was 
$50, but I received a curt notice· that it should be paid, that it 
was past due. . 
Q. You have not paid that bill f 
A. No. I was told it would be taken care of. 
Q. What has been your condition this summer since you 
left the hospital? 
A. Frequent headaches and highly nervous and inability 
to sleep as I had been prior to my accident. 
Q. Is your condition improving, or not¥ 
A. I would say it was improving, but I am not back to nor-
mal at all. 
Q. Now ! forgot to ask you one thing about the 
page 73 ~ hospital in Lynchburg. After you became con-
scions or semi-conscious, do you remember what 
the doctors told you or what your symptoms were in regard 
to your head or the injul'y to your brainY 
A. At the first hospital Y 
Q. Yes, here in Lynchburg, after you became somcw!1at 
conscious? 
A. He said I had concussion, cerebral concussion, and am-
I 
I 
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nesia, I think that was it, I know I was 4-rayed several times, 
which alarmed me a little bit. [ 
Q. Were you X-rayed more than one~? 
A. Yes. i 
- Q. So they took you a second time fol an X-ray? 
A. Yes, sir. , 
Q. Did that disturb you, being a tra~ned nurse, that they 
were X-raying you again? I · . 
A. Yes, sir, it made me think, because one was all I thought 
was necessary. . 
Q. What was the .effect, if any, upo~ you, what was your 
symptoms when you were being X-ra~ed or how did you 
h~? I 
A. Of course, while I was in the hospital I was so dizzy 
that when I would move my head the whole room would spin 
and I would feel as though I was falling and I never did read 
~l).y ip the hospital because the prints ~11 ran together. 
Q. In the Roanoke Hospital, after you went 
page 74 ~ there, what about that? [ 
A. I did not read two lines of anything, I could 
not read. ' 
Q. Your vision 'vas affected_? I 
A. I was very much alarmed but I got better after I got 
out. 1 
Q. I did not ask you after the accident whether or not 
you were bruised Y · I 
A. Very much, on this arm and dowii this left side. 
Q. Down the left side 1 , 
A. Yes, sir. I 
Q. Was there any contusion on your I head or was the skin 
broken anywhere 1 ' 
A. There was a slight cut I think dver my eye, as I re-
member and one on my hand I believ~. 
Q. Those were glass cuts 1 1, 
A. Yes, sir. : 
Q. B-ut was there any injury to yotili.- back or head 7 
A. No. broken skin, no, no abrasion. I , 
Q. Where was the pain in your head? 
A. It was general but 1 think it ce~tralized around here 
(indicating). _ I 
Q.. Around the back of your head? : 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 75 ~ Q. \Vas your left leg bruised 1 
A. Yes, sir. ! 
Q. How come you to take this taxicab, if you remember f 
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limited time to catch the train, and whenever I had I always 
did take one. 
Q. Did the taxicab driver solicit you to take his cabY 
A. Yes, they were all yelling "taxicab", and I selected 
the first one I came to at random from the ones that were 
standi:Q.g there. 
Q. Did you have a. band .bag? 
A. I gave him my bag and he put me in the car. 
Q. And started somewhere, you suppose to the other sta-
tion. Is that right 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now it has been suggested by counsel·that you went to 
~fr. Hogan and insisted on going, to Roanoke 7 
A. Me? 
Q. Yes, or in talking with Mr. Hogan you said you wanted 
to go to Roanoke Y. 
A. I could not select him now, if he is here I don't know 
him. . 
Q. Do you remember talking to anyone or do you remem-
ber anything that occurred after. you got to the 
page 76 ~ hospital? 
A. ! saw no one because there was a sign across 
my door "no visitors". 
Q. Before you got to the hospital it has been said that 
you sugg·ested you wanted to go to Roanoke. Do you remem-
ber anything about that? 
A. No, I do not remember talking to anyone. I . do not 
remember anything about the accident, I don't remember 
going to the hospital, no, I didn't t~ to anyone. 
Q. You didn't talk to anyone so far as you remember? 
A. No, I did not talk to anyone. 
Q. Is your health such now that it will penp.it you to qo 
nursing as you did before or could you take a ease-l be-
lieve you nursed Mr. George MacBain several months ago . 
.Could you do that kind of work now? 
A. I could not do strenuous work or anything that would 
tax me to any extent. 
Q. How do you sleep now Y 
A. I do not sleep well. 
Q. Did you sleep well last night? 
A. No, sir, I was awake three or four times after mid-
night. 
Q. Are you nervous, or not? 
A. I am. 
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eident, and as you grew up as ia girl and up to the 
page 77 ~ time of the accident? I 
A. I didn't know I had arty nerves .. 
Q. Did you sleep well, or not Y ,: 
.A. Yes, perfectly. I 
Q. Were you, or not, a robust girl prio;r to this accidentf 
A. I was. I 
Q. Physically robustT i 
A. ·I was perfect physically and I nev~r had any sick days 
that I know of. [ 
Q. Were you able, before this ac.ciden,t, to drive your car 
alone from Washington to yonr mother's home on the north 
side of Bedford County in a dayT I 
A. I have done it a number of times.[ 
Q. Do you .have any nervousness now ;in driving a carf 
A . .Slight. i • 
Q. ·Or any car that is being driven T I 
A. I would not trust many people to I drive me now. 
Q. You would not trust many people :to drive you now 1 
A. No, sir. 'I 
Q. You can d;rive yourself now? . 
A. I feel more confidence in myself than 1 did or with any-
. one else driving just now. i 
page 78 ~ Q. Have you had any expetiience of nervousness 
coming on after riding.in a bar wi~h some other 
driver since this accident? ~ 
A. Yes, I was awake all night one night after driving in a 
car with another person, it frightened me so bad, it was just 
after my accident, that I could not slebp at all, it just un-
nerved me. i · 
Q. That was after driving with another person Y 
.A. Yes, sir. I 
Q. Did you l1ave any pain in your head after that Y 
A. Yes, sir, I have pain off and on occasiontlly I have 
shooting pains back here (indicating) ~nd then of. course I 
have frequent headaches and I never llad headaches before. 
Q. You mean before the accident? I 
A. I was never subject to headache~. . 
Q. IIow frequently do you have headaches now, or does it 
depend on whether you get nervous, or/not? 
A. It just depends on what I do, if] over do or have any 
undue excitement or anything like that, II give way, the strain 
is too great. 
Q. Will physical exertion cause it as well as excitement! 
A. Yes, sir. ! 
! . 
I 
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CROSS' EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Caskie: 
Q. You said you went out on one occasion with 
page 79 ~ someone else driving you and you could not sleep 
that night! 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall when that was? 
A. I canont tell you but it was after the accident, after I 
was back at work in the hospital. 
Q . .Approximately how long ago has it been? 
A. It has been about, I imagine it was March or April. 
Q. You ·stated that you do not recall at all going down 
to Mr. Hogan's office after the accident 1 
A. I do not recall anything about that, or from the time 
I took the cab until I was in the hospital. If I went to ther 
office or if I talked to anyone, I would say I did not, but 
of course you all say I did, I guess I did. 
Q. You remember nothing about that at allY 
A. No, sir, it is absolutely blank, my trip to the station after 
I got in the cab, I know nothing else. · 
· Q. You stated your earning·s in Washington were $80, 
board, laundry and you said incidentals. You mean $80 per 
month! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Witness stands aside. 
page 80 ~ DR. W. R. WHITJ\1:AN, 
Sworn for plaintiff. 
DIRECT EXAl\IINATION. 
By Col. Woods : 
Q . .Are you a graduate physician Y 
A. Yes, sit. 
Q. How long have you been practicing medicine? 
A. Since 1901. 
Q. What connection have ·you with the hospital known as 
the Lewis Gale Hospital in Roanoke. 
A. ·Chief Surgeon. 
Q. Are you also proprietor or owner of the hospital or 
do you own .a majority of the interest? 
.A. Yes, sir, a majority. 
Q. Do you hold any other position in connection with _any 
railroad Y 




A. Chief .Surgeon for the Norfolk & WI estern Railway Com-
pany. · 
Q. Do you k~ow the plaintiff here, ~rs. Miller! 
A. I do. .
1 
Q. How long have you known her Y 
A. Probably 10 years or more. 
Q. Did she ever nurse in your hospital¥ 
A. Yes. . I 
Q. Tell the jury whether or not prior to this accident she 
was a competent ana efficient nurse f ! • 
A. Absolutely competent, normal individual, did her duties 
in a nofmal way. I 
page 81 ~ Q. What was the conditiot!t of her nerves prior 
to this accident? I 
A. I never noticed anything abnormal. 
Q. What was her disposition! f 
A. Even disposition. . 
. Q. When did you see her just after the accident, and have 
you your chart with you! i 
A. It was on December 18th, I see here that she came to 
my office first on the 18th and was admitted to the hospital 
on the 20th. ; 
·. Q. What advice did you give her on 1 the 18th? 
A. I advised her to come to the hospital where she could 
have absolute rest and a long rest and treatment for the con-
dition as a result of the injury she sustained in the automobile 
accident. I 
Q. What was her injury in your opinion when you saw 
her, as you formed your opinion after: observing her in the 
hospital? I 
A. It looked to me from her history that she had sustained 
a concussion of the brain. I 
Q. Was it severe, or not¥ : 
A. I ·should say moderately severe I concussion from the 
history. Of course, I don't know anything about what hap-
pened at Lynchburg, but from the patient's history, she was 
unconscious for a couple of hours or more. 
page 82 ~ Q. What was her conditibn as a result of the 
accident or from any other hanse' 
A. At that time she presented the; appearance of being 
highly nervous, rather exciteable, complaining of headaches, 
dizziness, and inability to sleep. ! 
Q. Was it, or not, necessary for you to give her opiates 
or sedatives, or I don't know what yon call itt 
A. Sedatives, yes, sir. i 
Q. While she was in your hospital? I 
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·A. Yes, sir, 
Q. Why was that? 
A. In order to- quiet the exciteable nervous state or to in-
duce sleep. 
Q. Was she, or not, a good patient, or did she follow your 
instructions and co-operate with you 1 
A. Yes, she co-operated. 
Q. What condition developed in Mrs. ~filler after she got 
in your hospital. Tell the jury how long she stayed there, 
what her symptoms were and when you discharged her7 
A. She was admitted on the 20th with the symptoms I 
have just recited, and in addition to that she began to com-
plain of lower abdominal pains, cramps in the lower abdo-
men and that condition progressed until she had an abortion 
on the night of the 25th. The following day, I think 
page 83 ~ it was, she.was given an anethesia and the remnant 
of the abortion which was incomplete, was cleaned 
out and she made a good convalescent from that complica-
tion of her accident. . 
Q. From the miscarriage you mean? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was her condition when you discharged her, or 
how long did she stay at your hospital Y 
A. I think she was dismissed around about January 24th 
or 25th and she was not normal,. in other words, she was still 
nervous and having some headaches and was very anxious 
and apprehensive about herself and had trouble sleeping. 
Q. Up to the time she was dismissed Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Why did you allow her to be dismissed if she had not 
regained natural condition? 
A. Pressure, she contended she was going to lose her po.:. 
sition in Washington unless she returned to her duties. Per-
sonally I felt she should have prolonged her stay there and 
advised her to that effect, but she felt that she had to return 
to her duties in the Columbia Hospital a.t Washington. 
Q. Did you, or not, consent for her to go under those con-
ditions and under the representation that the work was very 
light? 
A. Yes, under the representation that the work was light. 
Q. Have you seen her since, until you saw her 
page 84 ~ today Y · 
A. No, sir. 
· Q. Now, Doctor, as to this concussion of the brain, have 
you, or not, had a great deal of experience with injuries con-
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nected with your railroad practice and other work, of in-
juries to the brainY 
A. A great deal, yes, sir. 
Q. Do ·they frequently r~cur and give ~rouble afterwards 1 
A. Very frequently. I . 
Q. If her headaches persist as she has testified up to this 
time, would you say. those headaches ate due to that con-
ClissionT 1 
By Mr. Caskie: 'Ve object to the qu~stion as leading. 
I 
By Col. Woods: I 
· Q. Assuming, doctor, that the patien~ came to your hos-
pital with these severe headaches and nbrvousness and that 
they have persiste~ up tq the present time, although less vio-
lent and less frequent, what would you /say is the condition 
of the patient now with reference to that concussion of lhe 
brain or what would be your prognosis~ 
A. The natural assumption is that she has not entirely 
recovered from the affects of the accideht. or the concussion 
that abe sustained. I 
Q. What would be your prognosis¥ , 
A. Those oases ultimatelYi recover and come 
page 85 t back to normal but sometimes it is over a pro-
longed period of m~ny months. 
Q. Do some of them not recover at all T 
. A. Some do not. I 
Q. From what you knew of this young woman and from 
what you saw of her in your hospital, aPd you said you had 
ik:nown her before, would you say, or not,/ that her miscarriage 
was due to the accident or her nervou13 shock that she re-
ceived "in the Lynchburg accident y· ! 
A. That was my belief that it was secondary to the acci-
d@t I 
Q. Did you see any other cause or could you detect any 
other cause that would produce it f . I 
A. 1 knew of no other cause at all. i · 
Q. Would you say, doctor, that from }vhat I have detailed, 
of this young woman's symptoms, whether she will ever en-
tirely recover from the nervous shock and strain to her 
nerves occurring from· that brain concu~sion? 
A. I do not kno,v, I have not seen h¢r in a personal way 
since she was dismissed from the hospital:. 
Q. Did you regard the shock to her !nerves as severe, or 
not, from what you saw of her when she came to your hos..: 
pital and was under your treatment? I 
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A. I have stated previously that I classed her as a mod-
erately severe case. 
page ·86 ~ Q. Can you, or any doctor say that she will ever . 
entirely recover and regain her normal condition 
~th reference to her nervesY 
A. No. 
Q. While she was in your hospital did she appear, or not, to 
suffer from those headaches? 
A. She suffered undoubtedly. 
Q. Did you give her anything to relieve her pain and for 
~ her nervousness! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What did you give her? 
A. I gave her a variety of drugs, she had quite a good 
deal of allonal, she had paralgia and she had codein and at 
times she had morphine in small doses. 
Q. Did you perform any operation or any special test or 
whatever you call it 1 
A. Just a test. 
Q. To see about the pressure on the brain? 
A. Yes, sir. " 
CROSS EXA~1IN.ATION. 
By Mr. Caslde: 
Q .. That is just simply a test, it is not a serious matter 
at allY 
A. No, sir, purely diagnostic purposes, I mean it was for 
that purpose. 
Q. And that showed nothing wrong! 
page 87 ~ A. ·The pressure was normal. 
Q. You stated a little while ago when Col. Woods 
outlined to you the circumstances and the facts of these head-
aches, that they had continued to gradually improve and be-
come less frequent and that your prognosis was she would 
ultimately recover? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. From the situation outlined that would probably be 
what would happen Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q~ This concussion that you speak of,-concussion is noth-
ing unusual, is it? · 
A. We see a good deal of it since automobile accidents have 
become so popular. · 
Q. If any person falls and strikes their head and loses con· 
sciousness for a minute, that is concussion 7 
90 Supreme Court of Appeals lof Virginia. 
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A. We speak of it as concussion. i 
Q. And it occurs very frequently with children, doesn't 
itY I 
A. It occur~ in. all c!asses. . 
1 
• 
Q. And ord1nanly a httle concussion ;of the brain, does not 
mean anything serious f I 
A. I wouldn't say that, it might be aJ very serious matter. 
Q. I said ordinarily. i 
A. The difficulty is in telling what is ordinary. 
Q. I mean most of the cas~s that come to you-
page 88 } the general run, where they 1 have a few hours of 
insensibility most of them amount to nothing seri-
ous? I 




Q. Most of them Y 
A. 1res, sir. I 
Q. I believe you said Mrs. 1\filler made a good convalescence 
after this unfortunate loss of her child? 
A. 1[ es, . sir. . I 
Q. This accident happened on the 9th of December, I be-
lieve, and the loss of this child, I belie'le, was on the 24th or 
25th of December, a period of 16 dayf3. The evidence dis-
closes there was no bruise or sign of any bruise or blow at 
all in the region of the abdomen at all !and this matter com-
ing on 16 days afterwards, is it your opinion that probably 
it did not come from the accident 1 I 
A. No, it is not, you can have abortions from much more 
trivial traumas than an automobile acc~dent, you can get it 
from an automobile ride, and I could rtot say at all that the 
accident was not responsible for it. I . 
Q. And likewise you could not say that the accident was 
the responsible cause of it? 1 
A. Of course it was my opinion it was responsible .. 
Q. You attribute it to that because you know of no other 
cause? · 
A. No. I Q. There are a great man}ll causes that can cause 
page 89 ~ itY 
A. That is true. 
Q .. 1[ ou attribute it to that cause ~eca.nse it is the only 
one yon Irno'v of. I . 
A. It was the most apparent cause. :she was a normal in-
dividual so far as I know and she did not know she was preg-
n~. I . . 
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Q. You stated just now it can come from a very trivial 
cause? . · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is it not possible that it might have been some trivial 
cause that caused it that you know nothing about? 
A. Yes, but it is most log·ical to attribute it to some cause 
like trauma. 
Q. In other words, the situation is so much similar to a 
man who has a set of 'veak veins in the brain, I don't know 
what you call it, where they burst and cause death. Is that 
a.ppoplexy? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And if he is subject to violent exertion you probably 
attribute it to that exertion? · 
A. That would be one cause. 
Q. And it is apt to come on any timet 
A. It may come on in his sleep. 
Q. You just have to guess at that? 
A. It is not a gues, it is reasoning. 
page 90 ~ Q. But it might come .on without it, and nobody 
can say? 
A. I cannot say, I am simply giving you my opinion. 
Q. You cannot· say positively about that Y 
A. I have answered your question. 
Q. Suppose it should develop that just after this accident 
Mrs. Miller was given a very thorough examination by a 
physician looking for every indication of contusion bruises, 
&c., and he found absolutely nothing in the neighborhood of 
the abdomen. Wouldn't you think it reasonable to suppose 
in such a case there must be some other cause for it Y 
A. You do not have to have any direct trauma near the 
abdomen to produce an abortion, a violent shock will bring 
it on. 
Q. Suppose just after that· doctor had made an investiga-
tion and who knew of her pregnancy and made an investiga-
tion of that and found everything normal five days after 
the accident? 
A. What is your question Y 
Q . .Suppose that a very thorough examination had been 
made five days after the accident, the doctor knowing of the 
pregnancy and also examined as to that and .finding every 
thing normal, would you think if there had been any cause 
it would have shown up in five days? 
page 91 ~ A. No, I have seen them go two weeks numbers 
of times. 
Q. You have to guess at the cause then, don't you, when 
I 
. I . . .. 
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they go .two weeks, in other words, youl attribute it to that 
because yon don't know of any other cans~ Y 
A. We attribute it to the most logical !cause. . 
· ·Q. But there are a number of trivial things that might 
cause it. I 
A. A great many causes. I 
Q. I believe yon stated that you would; classify this case as 
what y.ou call a moderately severe concussion? 
. I 
.A. Yes. I 
I 
By Col. Woods : 
1 Q. I will ask you this question, whether .or not one abor-
tion has the effect of predisposing the p:atient to subsequent 
abortions. I • 
A. That is very frequently true. ~· 
Q. Is it usually soT · 
A. Not always, but I ·would say it is ,commonly true, one 
predisposes another. , 
Q. Mr. Caskie was asking you about ttivial causes, causing 
this abortion, other than the collision ahd blow that she re-
ceived. Could you detect any other caus:e that would account 
for thi§J abortion after you saw the pati~nt? 
.A. I did not find any. I 
Q. Mr. Caskie asked you something ~bout the 
page 92 ~ effect of these concussions, whether or not they 
· are serious or 'vhether or n:Ot they give trouble 
afterwards. As I understood yon, you I said they frequently 
.or usually gave trouble. Now what is your experience as a 
surgeon with those accident cases with I concussion when the 
patient comes back to you after some m0nths with continuing 
headaches, what is your diagnosis of those and what is the 
probability of them lasting? : 
A. I will ask you to make yourself a little more clear. 
Q. A patient is injured witli concns¥on more or less se-
vere which produces several hours, I don't know how many, 
anywhere from two to 24 hours unconscfousness, I don't kno'v 
just how much it was, and then that p~tient after being dis-
charged from your treat~ent comes back and continues to 
complain of those headaches. What js your prognosis of 
those cases T i · 
By Mr. Caskie: vVe object to that question because it has 
already been asked and answered and further he has not 
stated all the facts for a hypothetical ~uestion. It does not 
state that these headaches occur with le~s and less frequency. 
; • I, 
• 
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Objection overruled. Defendant excepts. 
By ·Col. Woods : Answer the question. 
A. The prognosis is not good. As I have. stated before, 
there is no classifications that give the physician more dif-
ficulty in ·bringing them back to a normal state. 
page 93 r Q. I wish you would tell the jury what you mean 
by prognosis 7 
A. Prognosis, that means your hope for recovery COID:-
plete. . 
Q. Or your opinion as to what will be the resultt' 
A. Yes, as to what will occur. 
Q. Is the brain, or not, a very delicate organ? 
By Mr. Caskie: We object to the question because it is not 
proper on re-direct examination. 
By Col. Woods: I think you are right about that. 
By Mr. :Ca.skie : 
·Q. You stated your prognosis of the case was doubtful. 
I believe that is the effect of. what you said, if not your 
words. You just ·stated a little while ago on direct examina-
tion and also on cross examination that your prognosis of 
this case was ultimate recovery? 
A .. I was answering a hypothetical question this last time. 
Q. Assuming that these headaches to which he referred 
occurred with less and less frequency and less and less se-
vere, would that not indicate there would be an ultimate 
recovery? 
A. An encouraging sign. 
Q. And that there would be an ultimate recov-
page 94 ~ ety! . 
A. Encouraging, yes, sir. · 
Bv Col. Woods : · 
·Q. What is your prognosis of this particular patient! 
A. I have not seen her since J a.nuary and I would not be 
willing to make any prognosis a.t this time, but my prognosis 
when she left the hospital was favorable. 
Q. Have you been disappointed by her headaches continu-
ing as they do, from what your prognosis was? 
A. It is not unusual to see it. 
Q. Was that different from your expectation Y 
A. I felt that she would snap out of it and get back to her 
light work and get occupied. 
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. Q. Did you think by this time she could resume her normal 
work? I 
A. Yes, that was my feeling that sh~ would. . 
Witness stands aside. , 
. . I . 
page 95 ~ CONTINUING OF EVIDENCE ON BEHALF O.lr 
THE PLAll;fTIFF. 
MRS. SUSANNE B. MILLEiR, Recalled. 
By Col. Woods: ! 
Q. I forgot to ask you what was your weight just prior to 
the accident 7 : 
A. 138 pounds. · 1[ 
Q. What was your weight when you got out of the Roa~ 
noke Hospital? ! 
A. 120. 
Q. What is your weight now? i ' 
A. About 125. I am not positive just now because I have 
not weighed. . I 
Q. You have no other children, have 1 you Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. What is your age! 
I A. 28. 
Witness stands aside. 
page 96 ~ I MRS. R. A. BURKS, 




By Col. woods: I 
Q. Mrs. Burks, are you the mother of the plaintiff here, 
Mrs. Miller Y 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where do you live Y 1 
A. About ten miles from Bedford City. 
Q. In Bedford Countyf : 
A. Yes, sir. , 
Q. Did you come to the hospital here in Lynchburg in 
December? I 
A. Yes, sir. I 
Q. After you heard of your daughter'S' illnessf 
A. Yes, sir. ' 
• 
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Q. How did you hear of her illness Y 
A. A nurse from Washington came up and told me and I 
came down to the- hospital. 
Q. She was a neighborhood girl, was she not Y 
A. Yes,.sir. 
Q. What was the condition of your daughter'~ health prior 
to this. accident, if you know T · 
A. It was just perfect, I never heard of her being sick. 
Q. How was her nerves Y . 
A. As she says, she did not know she had a nerve. 
Q. Don't tell what she said, what do you know about itt 
A. She was not nervous at all. 
page 97 } Q. Was she physically active Y 
A. Yes, sir, very active. 
Q. After she left your home she went to Roanoke and took 
training as a nurse? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was her condition when you found her here in 
the hospital in Lynchburg, mentally, &c. 1 
A. She was not herself, but she knew me, but she seemed 
to be very nervous and she was not herself. 
Q. What do you mean by not being herself, was she at all 
times rational or irrational Y 
A. She seemed to be very nervous. 
Q. Was she herself mentally aside from her nervousness, 
or not? 
A. Not. altogether, I don't think. 
Q. Did they allo'v you to see her when you first came Y 
A. They did not want me to go in, nobody had been allowed 
to .go to see her but I told them I was her mother and I would 
·like to go in, so they let me go. 
Q. Did they let you in immediately or did they make you 
wait until the doctor came? 
A. I think they let me in immediately, no, let me see, they 
might have done it. 
· Q. How many days after her accident was it 
page 98 ~ before you got here, do you remember? 
A. I think it was three or four days, I don't know 
exactly. 
Q. When she went away from the hospital here, did you 
go with her to RoanokeY 
A. Yes, sir. 
· Q. Where did you go 7 
A. To my sister's. 
Q. J\1:rs. Woodson's, deceased. 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. How long did you stay there with her; until she went 
to the Lewis-Gale Hospital? 
A. Yes, sir. · · 
Q. How long did you state she was in the hospital¥ 
A. I stayed the whole time she was in :the hospiatl. 
Q. Did yott see her every day in the hospital? 
A. Yes, sir. I • 
Q. What was her condition after shel got to Roanoke to 
your sister's and then after she got to
1 
the hospital. Tell 
th"e jury how she suffered, if she did su:fifer Y 
.A. She suffered with her head and sebmed to be nervous 
and could not sleep, and she suffered a b-eat deal with her 
back and her eyes, she could not see h9w to read or any-
thing. She suffered dreadfully with headaches all the time. 
· Q.· Have you been with her this summer since 
page 99 ~ the accident? j · 
.A. Yes, sir, I was with her at home for two 
weeks and then I was· with my dktughter in Wash-
ington and I saw her at the time. I 
Q. You mean your other daughter that lives near Wash-
ington? · i 
A. Yes, sir, I saw her twice, two diffetent times. 
Q. What was her condition at that time Y 
A. She was not 'veil, she was worltinrJ though a.t the hos-
pital when I saw her. I 
Q. That was before she left there, abop.t the first of May? 
A. Yes, sir, it took all of her strength to work and she 
said she was afraid she would not he able to work. 
Q. Just tell what you saw, not what {vas said. 
A. Well; ·she was not well at all, she was still suffering with-
headaches at times. i 
Q. How. did she sleep when you were there Y 
A. She did not sleep, that was most of her troubl~. 
Q. How has she been up to this time 1 1
1 A. That has been the trouble with heJi, she was suffering 
with her head, and had trouble sleeping,i you know. · 
Q. How about her nerves 1 I 
.A. Her· nerves have been pretty bad. 1 She has been very 
nervous all along and she wpuld have nervous 
page 100 ~ spells and she did not seem to be able to control 
herself, she did not know what she was doing. 
Q. Did you ever notice any nervousness or sleeplessness 
in your daughter before this accident Y 
.A. No, sir, I never. 
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No cross examination. 
Witness stands aside. 
Plaintiff rests in chief. 
page 101 t EVIDENCE INTROD·U·CE'D ON BEHALF OF 
. THE DEFENDANT. 
DR. J. H. RAWLINGS, .. 
Sworn for defendant. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Caskie: 
Q. Dr. Rawlings; you are, I believe, a practicing physician 
in Lynchburg? 
A. I am. 
Q. How long have you been practicing here! 
A. In Lynchburg, for 27 years. 
Q. Did you practice anywhere before that! 
A. I practiced one year in Boston, one year in Baltimore 
and two years in New York. 
Q. What kind of work were you doing in Boston, Baltimore 
and New' York¥ 
A. In Boston I was in the government service. In Balti-
more I was resident physician for a hospital which handled 
exclusively diseases of women. In New York I was at the 
New York Infant Asylum where we had maternity cases 
. and children. 
Q. During those times did you have considerable experi-
ence ~th maternity easesf 
A. A great deal. 
Q. In your practice since you have been here did you do 
that class of work! 
A. At one time I did, but I am not doing much of it now. 
Q. Did you have any considerable amount of it 
page 102 ~ here? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you had any considerable experience, and have 
you any connection in a business way that gives you an 
opportunity to deal with accident and injury eases 1 
A. Yes, I have for a long time been the surgeon for the 
Glamorgan Foundry and ·Pipe Company. We have a great 
many brain injuries down there. 
Q. How long have you been their surgeon t 
·-- --, 
• 
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A. I canont tell you exactly, but I ~uess abollt 10 or 12 
years. 1 
Q. The Glamorgan Foundry and Pi~e. Company manufac-
ture pipe and iron works~ i · . 
A. Yes, sir. i 
Q. Have they any considerable amount of machinery there Y 
· A. Yes, sir, and they h~ve a large I number of ca~es of 
concussion of the skl.lll. 
Q. On December 9th, 1928,. this accident happened and the 
matter was referred to you as the physician. You were the 
doctor I believe Y : 
A. Yes, sir. ! 
Q. Who sent you to see this patientYi 
A. I was called to .the hospital I thi~ by the taxicab driver 
or someone else, I am not certain of that, but I was called to 
the hospital to see the patient. I 
· Q. When you got to the hospital what was the 
page 103 ~ situation at that time~ ;
1 
A. I found ~Irs. ~filler ~uffering from severe 
concussion of the brain and complete [ amnesia or loss of 
memory. That does not mean that sh~ was entirely uncon-
scious. She could talk, but she did not know who she was, 
where she was, or what her name w¥, she did not know 
where she was going or what had happened. This loss of 
memory persisted completely from three to four hours and 
partially for 24 hours. Do you want nie to tell exactly what 
I found her condition T I 
Q. After that 24 hours, did that feature of the case pass 
away? I 
A. Yes, after 24 hours. I 
Q. Was there any :ret~rn of that? 1 
A. None whatever that I could elicit., 
Q. It has been suggested that Mrs. 1\Iiller was carried to 
the taxicab office and then sent to the hospital and she says 
she has no recollection of that at all. I 
A. She would not have because she Had complete amnesia 
but I know nothing about that. I 
Q. Is it anything unusual for people !that have had an in-
jury to their head in that way to be able
1 
to walk and talk and 
yet know nothing in the world about it~ 
A~ No, tha.t frequently happens. i 
Q. They have no recollection of it at allY 
A. No, it is en tire loss of memory. I 
Q. Now .go ahead and state what situatioJl you 
page 104 ~ found out there? I 
A. I found she was suffering with entire am-
99 
:p.~sia but I found no s~ptmns of any jp.t~;rera;Qi.&} p~essure 
or intercraniall).emorrhage. Her temperature and pulse wer~ 
both normal. She suffered very sever~ pains i.n. her h~ad 
from dizziness and extreme pain in the .eyes from light. This 
persisted for s~ve;r~l daya and h~d nQt entirely ceased when 
she left the hospital. We gave her sedatives .and put an ic~ 
b.ag Pn ln~r heail. Sh~ also had some nausea ~nd we put up 
a sign that s.h~ was to hav~ ).J.Q compaJly .pp ~oqnt Qf her 
nervous condition. Her sym,ptom& impr9ved gradu~lly a:p.d 
'vhen she left the h9spital, in :five days s~ w~ a gr~at deal 
better but Was not entirely free fr9Jil SO)ne SyJllptoms of cgn-
Cl.ls.sion. Sh~ still f)uffered with sorne diziiness .~nd some 
pains in her head. I should have said also that she had some 
·bruis~s~ rSb~ h.ad !). ~~v~re blow on tb.e l~ft sid~ pf h~r h~ 
and forehead. She had several places that wer~ slight cuts 
from proken glass but I do not ·recall the location of them. 
and h~:r left ~u:m and leg. \Vere bruised· to ~ ~erta.in e4te:o.t, 
There were no bruises on her abdomen. ¥y opinion was 
th~t she had re~eiv.ed a sev~re concussion but ~he was gra.du.,. 
ally elea.ring l.JP wh.en she left the Memorial Hospital as sh~ 
said, to consult her family physician. · 
Q. Y 9U spoke of §everal slight ~uts. Were t~y a w,atter 
of any moment af all? 
page l()f> _} A. No, ~i:r, t.hey di9 not amonnt t9 ~nything. 
Q. Did you examine ~arefully h~r body to ~ee 
about any brufs~s 1 
A. I .did, .and there:~ was ~ome ~light bruises but they w~r~ 
not of .~ny ~ons~quen~.~~ · 
Q. And I believe you said there we;r~ llOI1~ at all ar<n~nQ. tb~ 
abdom~n? 
A. None at .all. 
Q. There has b~.en some qu~stion rais~d here about the lo~.s 
of a child. What about that Y 
A.. t made an· examination on the 4th day following her 
accid~Jl.t, th~ day b~for~ she left the hospital, and l found that 
she was pregn~nt and there was absolutely no ~vi@n..ee pf 
any miscarriage or of any symptoms leading to a misc~rr~~ge. 
She complained of no pain or symtoms indi~ating a mis~r, 
riage while she wa~ in the hospital The re~son l m~de thi~ 
examination was, I found out that her menstrual perjgd bad 
lapsed, and I wished to· se~ whether ther~ wa~ ~Y trouble 
of that kind. 
Q. ·Did you make a v~ry thorough and careful e;x:amination 
to ascertain that? -
.A. Yes, ·sir.· · · 
I 
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Q. Did you find anything at all to ~dica te any trouble 
there! I · 
A. No, nothing· whatever. I informed her that she was 
pregnant. · 1 
Q. You told her she was pr~gnant at that time Y 
page 106 ~ A. I did. I 
Q. What, in your opinion~ is the connection, 
from what you know from your examina.1lion, if any, between 
this accident and the miscarriage 1 1
1 A. Miscarriage caused by traumatism. 
- Q. Traumatism, what is that? [ 
A. External violence or injury, symptoms of which usually 
appear within two to three days after the injury. Almost 
anything can cause a miscarriage. Of course a psychic shock 
frequently causes a miscarriage, but it n;sually appears in a 
short time after the . shock or injury is received. Of course 
I cannot say what caused this miscarriage, I have no idea, 
but in my opinion it is very improbabl~ that an injury re-
ceived 14 to 15 days previously without tmy previous symp-
toms, of the impending mis~arriage, co~ld be the cause of 
il. I 
Q. And you say yon made a very th~rough examination 
for that purpose? i 
A. Yes, sir, I did, and there was nothing of the kind. 
Q. In regard to the concussion, as to iwhich you said she 
still had some symptoms, when she left the hospital five days 
after· the injury. From your examination and knowledge of 
the case and from the improvement showrt, what is your prog-
nosis with regard to that? I' 
A. I thought the concussion was graduhlly clearing up and 
in view of her symptoms, ray prognosis would 
page 107 ~ have been very favorable for ultimate recovery. 
I saw no reason why she should not entirely re-
cover. I 
Q. I believe you ag·ree with Dr. Whitman, who says his 
prognosis when she left was very favorttble Y 
A; Prognosis in cases of cerebral condussion, without any 
evidence of intercranial pressure or hemdrrhage or contusion 
of the brain is usua1ly favorable. [ 
Q. Did you have an X-ray picture taken? 
A. We had two X-ray pictures taken and there was no 
fracture present. I cannot recaJI why t:qe second X-ray pic-
ture was ta~en, probably it was because the first was not 
clear, but I really don't .know why the I s~cond picture was 
taken. [ 
Q. And they showed no pressure of any kind Y 
I 
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A. They were not taken for pressure, they were take~ for 
fracture or any depression of the vault of the skull, and 
there was no fracture of the bony vault of the skull shown 
in the picture. I can read the report of the X-ray if I am 
allowed to do so~ ''Mrs. [Suzanne Miller. Film made of 
this patient shows no evidence of fracture of the vault of the 
skull. Dr. H. B. Spencer, M. D., Taken on the lOth day of 
December, 1928.'' 
Q. Dr. Spencer is an X-ray specialist? 
A. He is the only one we have in Lynchburg.. He does all 
the work for all the hospitals here. 
Q. Dr. Rawlings, did you have any conversa-
page 108 ~ tion with Mrs. Miller after she had recovered from 
this amnesia Y 
A. I did. 
Q. With reference to who she blamed for the accident? 
A. She said she had no recollection of the accident what-
ever, she did not know how it occurred, but that the driver 
of the taxicab had impressed her as being a very careful 
driver. That is all she said about it. 
Q. He impressed her as being a very careful driver? 
A. Yes. She said she did not know how it happened, that 
she had no recollection of it at all. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Bv ~fr. Barksdale : 
.. Q. I understand from what she said to you it was not a 
detailed account or any account of how the collision occurred Y 
A. She knew nothing o~ that whatever, she had no recol- · 
lection of that, but she said the driver impressed her as being 
a careful chauffeur, but she knew nothing of how the acci-
dent occurre.d. 
Q. You said the X-ray showed no fracture. It is true, is 
it not, that there-can be a most severe concussion without any 
fracture whatever Y · 
A. Certainly, in the majority of cases. 
Q. In the majority of cases concussion occurs where there 
is no fracture? 
page 109 ~ A. Certainly they do. She had a severe con-
cussion. 
Q. I understood you to say that in cases of pregnancy 
'vhere there is shock or physical injury that the premonitory 
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. A. That has been my experience. I 1 have never seen one 
which did not appear within, inside of. ia week. 
Q. You are basing that on your personal experience Y 
A. Yes, sir, and what I have read i~ the books. I do not 
mean to say it is not possible, but I have never heard of such 
a thing waiting that long. • 
· Q. Where there was a miscarriage wllich occurred in 14 or 
15 or 16 days after a severe shock, such as you have described, 
and the premonitory signs begin to mahifest themselves :five 
days prior to the actual miscarriage, artd there was no his-
tory of any other cause for the misca~riage, would you not 
conclude that the miscarriage resulted from the shock? 
A. I would not necessarily conclude !that because miscar-
riages sometimes occur when we don 'ti know the cause and 
we cannot say. Of course, the only thiitg is this, if this mis-
carriage had been due to this shock and due to this injury I 
personally believe that I would have s~n symptoms withiD: 
five days of some such trouble, or she would have complained 
of some symptoms referrable to the *iscarriage, and this 
very long period, I do not mean to say I it is not possible, of 
course, I don't know, but I am simply telling you 
page 110 }- what my own opinion is. ! 
Q. In other words, your ~onclusion is you do 
not say it is impossible Y 1 
A. No, sir. 
1 
Q. For t~is thing to have occurred f I . 
A. No, s1r. · I 
Q. But in your practice or from your practice and reading 
you think it unreasonable¥ 
A. I think it i;mprobable. 
Q. I believe you testified that you did tnot know Mrs. Miller 
and you did not know whether or notj you were called by 
herf ' 
A. I did not, I had never seen Mrs. J\Iiller before I met her 
at the hospital when she was in this condition. I cannot re-
call who called me. Of course, I know Mr. Hogan is a friend 
of mine and whether I was called by him or by the taxicab 
~river _or by the hospital, I could not sf.1 y. 
Q. At any rate you were certainly cal ed by -someone other 
than Mrs. J\Hller 7 
A. Yes, sir, I had never. seen M'rs. Miller before. 
By }fr. Caskie: 
Q. As I understand you say with reference to. the loss of 
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have never heard of one with the symptoms showing up so 
late as this f 
A. I cannot recall any such case. 
page 111 } Q. But you would nqt say it could not hap-
pen? 
A. I would not say that because many things can cause a 
miscarriage. 
Witness stands aside. 
M.·s. MILES, 
Sworn for defendant. 
DIRECT E~XAMINATION. 
By Mr. Coleman: 
Q. You are l\L S. 1\tfiles, a member of the City Police Foree 
I believe? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you been a member of the police force! 
A. Seven years the 9th of this month. 
Q. This is an action growing out of an accident which hap-
pened on December 9th, 1928, at the intersection of Clay 
and 8th Streets. Did you make an investigation of that 
accident? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. How soon do you suppose after the accident 
page 112 ~ occurred did you get to the scene of the acci-
dent? 
A. I do not lrno'v exactly the minute that the call came 
in but it was just a few minutes after four o'clock. 
Q. Had any of the cars been moved, or do you knowt 
A. They did not seem to have been moved any. 
Q. Now, Mr. Miles, I want to ask you concerning conditions 
that were existing there when you got there. First I will 
ask you whether or not you saw any skid marks on the street, 
in Clay Street, if so, where were they 7 
A. There was one. 
Q.. You mean one set of skid marks 7 
A. One was a long skid mark, I would say 20 feet, and the 
other was just a little short spaces of skids. 
Q. Now the skid marks that you referred to as being 20 
feet, I will ask you to indicate on this plat where those skid 
marks were, and where they started and ended with refer-
ence to this intersection. This is Clay Street here. Do you 
understand this plat f 
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11. 1'es. I · 
Q. Please indicate on this intersection where the skid 
;marks were, where they started and w~ere they ended 1 
A. They were back here about 20 feet from the intersection 
of 8th street. I 
Q. Where abouts with regard to the center of this street, 
that is to say, were they nearet the right or nearer 
page 113 } the left or near the center Olj where 1 
A. The skid mark on the tight hand side, the 
right wheel made a skid mark about six f~et from the curbing 
on the right going towards 12th. I 
Q. The right wheel, so far as you could estimate it, was 
about six fe.et from the right hand curbtl 
A. Yes, s1r. · 
Q. Then do I understand that it was nearer the center 
of the street than the right side of the ~treet. Is that cor-
rect? · 
A. Yes, sir, a little nearer the center. 1 
Q. What general direction did those s~id marks veer? 
A. They went straight. · I · 
Q. Did they make any turn after theytl got into the inter-
section? 
A. No, sir, they went right straight, they might have turned 
a little bit, but I would say straight. I . 
Q. Now how long did you say the skid marks were, the 
_ best you could estimate it? ! 
A. 20 feet, the one skid mark on the r~ght hand side, that 
was plain all the way down, but the one ione on the left was 
just a skid a· little bit and then it lacked a little and it looked 
like the wheel would turn and skid againl 
Q. But two wheels did make a mark .. Is that 
page 114 } correct' I · 
A. Yes, the right·hand sidel·wa~ very plain, and 
you could see the other one. 
. Q. I pres~me after yo.u got to the sc~ne of the accid~nt 
you were porn ted out whiCh was Mr. Hogan's car and wh1ch 
was Mr. Lanham's car? : 
A. Yes, sir." 
Q. I will ask you to tell the jury as best you can what was 
the position of the Hogan car when you got to the scene 
of the accident? I 
· A. It was on the northeast corner. I 
Q. You mean the corner 'vhere the post is with the street 
sign on itt . \ 
A. It was right against that street sign post there. 
Q. What was its position Y . I 
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A. The rear wheel was up on the curhing right against that 
post on the right hand side and the front end was headed 
out into 8th S.treet, right in the intersection. 
Q. Was it, or not, leaning against the post that holds the 
street sign Y 
A. The rear wheel of the Hogan car was on the right hand 
side against that post, and the post·was bent right over. 
Q. To what extent was the post bent. I mean how badly 
'vas it bent? 
A. I would say half way over. 
Q.. Do you mean that the post was bent half way 
page 115 } from straight up to the ground¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now .J will ask you to tell the jury please, sir, as best 
you can, the position of the Lanham car? 
A. That was turned over on the right hand side in the 
street. 
Q. On its right hand side? 
A. Yes, sir, with the front of the car up near the rear of 
the Hogan car, laying right in the intersection across 8th 
Street on Clay, it 'vas just .turned right over with the front 
pointing towards the Hogan car. 
Q. From the investigation that you made at the scene of 
the accident, could you, or not, determine what parts of the 
cars came into collision? 
A. It ·looked like the front of the Lanham car hit the rear 
of. the Hogan car, just about the wheel. 
Q. The front of the Lanham car hit the rear of the Hog·an 
car? 
A. Yes, sir, on the left side of the rear of the Hogan car. 
Q. On the left rear side? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you see any evidences of that blow on the left rear 
side of the Hogan car? 
A. The fender and the wheel were broken down and some 
spokes were broken out of the wheel. 
· Q. To which wheel are you referring when you 
page 116 } say the spokes were broken out. Do you mean the 
left rear wheel¥ 
A. The wheel on the right was crushed and the wheei on 
the left was damaged some too, and the fender. 
Q.. Was the wheel on the right up against the curbing! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Could, or could not you tell from your investigation 
what in your opinion '\ras the cause of the breaking of the 
wheel on the right? 
I j 
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. A. The wheel on the right broke frdm hitting the curbing 
or pushing against the curbing. [ 
Q. Could you see any marks in the street to indicate whether 
or not the Hogan car. ha.d been pushed I or not Y 
A. There was a drag mark about 12 inches. 
Q. Explain to the jury what you mean by a drag mark? 
A. The 'vay the tire was pushed, i~ made a wider mark 
than it would have made from the tread rolling straig·ht 
ahead. . I 
Q. Are you now referring to the Hogan car? 
A. Yes, sir, it just looked like it was! pushed right around. 
Q. Did that mark continue from where it .fi·rst began up to 
the curbing where it finally rested f i 
A. It was a very short drag mark in there, the right rear 
wheel made the mark. I • 
page 117 ~ Q. From your investigation which you made at 
the scene of this accident ahd the position of the 
cars, as they were at that time, could you, from the investi-
gation determine where the cars were :With reference to the 
intersection, as to which one was in th~ intersection first f . 
By Mr. Barksdale : We objeet to thJt question. 
By the Court: That is fbr the jury.! 
By ~fr. ·Coleman: ! 
Q. Is there anything you could tell from the investigation 
that you made as to where the impact qccurred f 
A. A little over the center of the street, on the right of Clay 
Street, going towards 5th. ] · 
Q. On the right of Clay Street .going towards 5th? 
A. Yes, sir. There was some dirt th~t was knocked off the 
fender and grease and stuff in the stree~, and that was a: little 
over the center of Clay Street. I 
Q. Did it appear from the marks ~s you have stated, 
whether or not the Hogan car had passed over the center of 
the street? I 
A. Yes, sir, it was a little over the center when it was hit. 
Q. When the impact occurred? / · 
A. Yes, sir, where the dirt and grea.se was. in the street, 
it showed the rear of the car was a little over the center. 
Q. There is another qrt~stion I want to ask 
page 118 ~ you. Is that a residential section, that is to say, 
there are no business houses at that particular 
place, are there Y , 
A. No, sir, they are aU residences. 
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Q. ls that true from 11th to 6th Street, do you know the 
fact that there are residences there? 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. In other words there are no business houses there at 
allY 
A.. There is some stores on 8th street but I don't think they 
are anywhere near that corner, some grocery stores. 
Q. And there are none on Clay Street 7 
A. No, sir. 
Q. I understand from your testimony that the Lanham. 
car was coming down -Clay Street and that the Hogan car 
was proceeding up 8th street towards Main 7 
A. Yes, sir, that is the way they 41ppeared to be going. 
Q. Which car would be coming from the right 7 
Objection. Sustained. Exception. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Muse: 
Q. You, of course, are only telling us what you saw after 
you reached "the scene of the accident Y 
A. Yes; sir. 
Q. How the accident occurred you don't know 
page 119 ~ of course 1 · 
A. No more than what I saw in the street. 
Q. You are simply telling us the physical indications Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The skid marks that you have testified to, one of which 
was very distinct and the other one was less distinct, I be ... 
lieve you said was about 20 feet longY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is that an estimate of your eye7 
A. I stepped it off. 
Q. As 20 feet? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You also stated that this skid mark was practically 
straight with ~Clay Street, I believe? 
A. I would say so, yes, sir. 
Q. Did the skid mark end before the intersection was 
reached or did the skid mark extend over into the intersec-
tion? 
A. It did not get into 8th Street, it stopped b.ef.ore it got 
on 8th S'treet, about on the line of the curb. 
Q. How far was the Lanh.am. a-utomobile from the end of 
that skid markY 
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A. That had crossed over 8th Street apd was along on the 
other side of 8th Street, turned over, that! is the way I found 
it. I Q. Did the skid marks extend up to the Lanham 
page 120 } car? I 
A. No, sir, it stopped jus~ before it got with 
the curb line on 8th Street. I 
Q. And the Lanham car was over in the intersection? 
·A. It had turned over on the left side/ of 8th Street right 
in the intersection across 8th street or on Clay. 
. Q. you say these s~d marks did not 11veer to the left to-
wards where the automobile was lying ~rwhen you first saw 
it! 
A. As near as I can recall they ran ractically straight. 
Q. And ended about at the intersectidn Y 
A. Yes, sir. · I 
Q. And the Lanham automobile was ovel r to the left turned 
overY 
A. Yes, sir, headed towards the rear 1 of· the Hogan car. 
The front of the Lanham car was along near the rear of the 
Hogan car, turned over. I 
Q. In your experience as a police officer, you have inves-
tigated many accidents, of course Y I 
A. Yes, sir. ! 
Q. It is rather difficult, if not impossible, to tell by viewing 
automobiles that have been in wrecks as lito wha.t portions of 
the cars came in contact first, isn't itY 
A. The only thing we go by is where tlie cars are damaged, 
that will show where they hit each oth~r. 
Q. That may occur and th~y may come in con-
page 121 ~ tact with one another in various ways Y 
A. Yes, sir. i 
Q. The Lanham car might have been standing still and the 
other car moving as far as you know when this accident oc.:. 
curred f 11 - _ 
A. I wouldn't say so from the positio~ they were in when 
I saw them. j 
Q. Or the reverse might have been trhe f 
A. Yes, sir. · ! 
Q. Has it been your experience that it is very difficult to 
view automobiles involved in a wreck and then tell accurately 
and positively as to how that accident :occurred, when you 
did not see it Y 
A. You cannot be accurate about it. ; 
Q. It is in the realm of speculation, isn't it, you simply 
speculate on what occurred? ; 
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A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. A man who is there and sees it would be more apt to be 
correct than a man who was not there, wouldn't heY 
A. I would say so, yes, sir. 
By Mr. ·Coleman: 
Q. It is no speculation on your part, is it, as to the skid 
marks on the street and as to the position of the cars. Is that 
correct? - · 
A. Yes, sir. 
W~tness stands aside. 
page 122} L. 1\L WE·B~ER, 
Sworri for Defendant. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Caskie: 
Q. What are your initials! 
A. L. M. 
. ~., . 
Q. In December, 1928, .you were, I believe, driving for 
Mr. Hogan, were you not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. One of his for hire cars~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You received Mrs. Miller at the Southern Station 
and were taking her down to the Union Station Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you been driving cars t 
A. About 12 years. 
Q. How long have you been driving a public carY 
A. About 15 months. 
Q. Have you ever had any accident of any moment at all 
before! 
A. No, sir. 
·Q. It appears here that you came up Park Avenue and 
turned down Rth Street? 
Q. Just tell the jury what happ~ned as you went on up 
Clay Street. Begin back at Madison a.nd tell what happened 
· back there ~ · 
A. I came down 8th Street from Park A venue and a car 
had the right of way over me down there at Madi-
page 123 · t son Street, and I stopped down there, and I 
put my car in low gear and then got up a little 
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speed and put it in second gear and w~nt on to Clay Street, 
when I- got to Clay street I looked td my right and there 
wasn't anybody coming and I pulled up iJn the intersection and· 
I had gotten well up in the intersection before I looked to 
the left and saw this other car coming about 25 or 30 feet 
back, and naturally I thought it 'vas going to stop or come 
around me, so I kept on and the next thing I knew he hit me, 
.and I was under the car. : 
Q. What gear were you driving in [ a.t the time you en-
tered the intersection of Clay Streett 
A. .Second gear. 
Q. Are you sure of that Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You had started from Madison in Low! 
A. Yes, sir. . ! 
Q. How far i~ it from ~Iadison to ClayY 
A. One block, I guess 100 yards. · 
Q. I~ it. all up hill or down 1 
A. Uphill . 
. Q. What kind of a street is it ? 
A. Cobblestone. 1 
Q. You started out in low after you stopped, you came 
up the hill and put it in second ·and were still in second at the 
time you reached the inters~ction Y 
page 124 ~ A. Yes, sir. ' 
Q. Did yon remain in seriond until the time of 
the aooident Y · . I 
A. Yes, sir . 
. Q. What kind of a car were you drivtl"ngf 
A. An old Chrysler 50, 1925 model. 
Q. An old Chrysler 50, 1925 model? I 
A. Yes, sir. 1 • 
Q~ I-I ow long had you been driving ~hat car~ 
A. About three months. 1 
Q. It had. been driven before that, olf course? 
A. '¥: es, s1r. 
Q. Now, Mr. '\Vebber, you say you liad been driving that 
ear for thr~e months T I ~ 
A. Yes, s1r. i 
Q. What was the condition of it with reference to speedY 
A. It was a very slow car, it was a four cylinder car and 
you couldn't make over 15 or 18 miles an hour in second gear, 
it is not possible to make any more than that with it. 
Q. Even on a level? i 
A. No, sir. . I 
Q. You were coming upgradef .. _j__: 
I 
i 
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A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Have you any idea about how fast you were 
page 125 ~ going when you came in that intersection~ 
A. I think I was going about 15 miles an hour. 
Q. Could you have gotten your ca.r into high gear coming 
up that hill? . 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Your car would not have taken that hill after you 
stopped in high gear! 
A. No, sir. 
Q. How far was the Lanham car when you said you first 
looked to the left and saw it Y 
A. 25 or 30 feet. 
Q. Approaching the intersection Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Had you gotten in the intersection then Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How far had your oar gotten across Clay Street before 
the impact occurred~ 
A. It had passed the center of the street. 
Q. What part of your car had passed the center of the 
Street? 
A. The rear end. 
Q. Then your whole car had passed the center of the street? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And where did it knock your car when the impact 
occurred! 
. A. His right hand front fender hit my left hand 
page 126 ~ back wheel and knocked me over against the right 
hand curbing. 
Q. "\Vas there a sign post there Y 
A.· Yes, sir, a street sign post and it bent that down almost 
double. Q. Wha.t kind of a sign post is that? 
A. It was a two inch iron pipe. 
Q. And it had a street sign on top of it~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you say it bent that almost double 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you say anything to Mr. Lanham or he to you after 
the accident? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Had the cars been moved at all before Mr. 'Miles got 
there? 
A. No, sir. As soon as the accident happened, I called 
up for another car to come up and get her. She said she 
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wanted to go to the station and I told herr she could see a doc-
tor and I called another: car to come and ket her and I stayed 
by her until the other car came and we put her in the other 
~ I 
Q. And you don't know where she we~t after that Y 
A. No, sir, I stayed right there until Mr. Miles came. 
;Q • .She said she wanted to go ~own t6 the train Y 
A. Yes, sir. I . 
Q. And as you approached up 8th Street there, 
page 127 ~ on which side of you was the Lanham car ap-
proaching~ I 
A. On the left hand side. i 
Q. On your left hand side ~ I 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you were on the right hand side of the Lanham 
carY . 1[ • 
A. Y~s, sir .. 
Q. Your general direction up 8th .Street, that is, a northeast 
direction, isn't it, or do you kno'v Y ! 
A. I don't know the direetion. I · 
By Mr. Ca.skie: Gentlemen, I suppose we might admit that. 
By Mr. Barksdale.: 1Very well. I 
I By Mr. Caskie: , 
Q. Your cab was travelling towards · Main Street which 
would be in a northeast direction Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And Mr. Lanham's car was going down Clay towards 
12th? I 
A. Yes, sir. I 
Q. Which would be in a southeast direction~ 
A. Yes, sir. i • 
Q. When you first saw the Lanham c~r did yon pay par-
ticular attention to it, enough .to see anything about the speed 
of itY I 
A. No, sir. I 
Q. You did notf : I· 
. A. No, sir. 1 
page '128 ~ :Q. As you . came up 8th Street there wihch side 
of the street were you on Y I 
A. I was on my right ha.nd side. . 
Q. Which side were you on a.t the time the accident oc-
curred? I . 
. A. On my right hand side. 
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. Q. You continued to cross Clay Street on the right. hand 
side~ 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Did you examine the skid marks of the Lanham carY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you make an estimate of how long the skid marks 
'vere? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. About how long do you think they were? 
A. About 25 or 30 feet. _ 
Q. When the Lanham car hit you was the jar very severe? 
A .. It was jar enough to throw me against the door and 
break the door 'latch a.nd thow me out. 
Q. You fell out, and under the car~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was your car a heavier or lighter car than this Star car 
driven by Mr. Lanhamf 
A. I should think they were about the same weight. 
· Q. Which car reached the interse0tion first? 
page 129 ~ A. The Chrysler did. 
. Q. That is the cab? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Had you gotten in the intersection before the Lanham 
car reached you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
CROSS EXA·MINATION. 
By Mr. Barksdale: 
Q. I believe you began your testimony by stating that on the 
9th of December, you were driving this Chrysler car for Mr. 
Hogan as a public taxi~ 
A. Yes, sir, 
Q. You were at the Southern station for the purpose of 
Soliciting and obtaining business for your taxi? · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you did take 1\tirs. Miller as a paid passenger headed 
for the Union Station Y · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. She got off, I believe, the South bound Southern through 
train that arrived about 4:12. Is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And 'vhat destination did she give you 7 
A. The Union Sta.tion. 
Q. What train was she expecting to take thereY 
A. The Norfolk & Western. 
-.--------
---_ ---r 
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Q. Do you know what tifne that was due Y . 
page 130 ~ A. It used to leave at four o'clock but they al-
ways hold it for No. 35, tha.t Southern train. 
Q. And this was No. 35 So'uthern train that she had alighted 
from? .. 
A. Yes. 
Q. They do not hold it there indefinitely, do theyY _ 
A. So, sir, if the train is on time th~y used to hold it for 
passengers to make it in ample time fJr them to make it. 
Q. You knew that was the train that\ you were supposed to 
deliver her toT ~~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you knew they were only going to hold it a short 
space of timeT : · · 
A. I knew they would hold it long !enough for me to get 
down there. 
Q. You knew you had to get there pretty quick to catch it, 
didn't you Y i 
A. I knew I had plenty of time to get down there. 
Q. You knew you had plenty of time Y 
A. Not plenty of time but time enough for me to get there, · 
if I went right on. · I 
. Q. And that was YQUr intention, to go right on, wasn't it f 
A. Yes, sir. · I 
Q. And that is the reason you took 8th Street, isn't itT 
A. No, sir. I 
page 1•31 ~ Q. Why did you take 8th Street~ 
A. I came through 8th ·Street to miss the traf-
fie. i 
Q. Exactly, that is the fastest route y(ou can take, isn't it? 
A. I couldn't come any faster, but it ~s just a shorter route. 
Q. And there is less traffic on it? ; · 
A. Yes, sir. f 
Q. In fact, there is very little traffic
1 
across town on those 
:streets, Clay, ·Madison, &c., and across 8th Street, isn't there f 
A. Very little, yes, sir. [ 
Q. And you took that street for tha.t !reason, didn't you, be-
cause you 'vere in a. hurry to get to t~e Union Station~ 
A. I taken 8th Street to save time.: 
Q. And that is what you were taking ft for this time, to save 
time? , 
A. Yes, sir. i • 
Q. And also because you kne'v there ·was very little traf-
:fice and your progress would not be imPeded by cross-traffic! 
A. Yes, sir. I 
Q. Were your brakes in good shape Y 
I 
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A. Yes, sir. 
· Q. On a level in how much distance could you 
page 132 } stop that car~ 
A. The length of the car. 
Q. That is about 12 feet 7 
A. Yes. sir. 
Q. At what rate of speed are you referring to nowY 
A. At any rate the car would run. It had four wheel hy-
draulic brakes. 
Q. At any rate the car would run you could stop it in the 
length of it. Then if·you were only going 18 miles an hour, 
you could stop it in less space than that, couldn't you 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In what space could you stop it on the level going at 18 
miles? 
A. Half the length of the car? 
Q. Suppose you were going uphill, a 10% hill, or going up 
this very place you were going at the rate you said you were 
going, 15 miles a.n hour, going up a 10% grade, in what space 
could you stop that car in ~ 
A. I wouldn't say less than 5 or 6 feet. 
Q. You are sure you could stop it in five or six feet7 
A. I am positive I could stop it in five or six feet. 
Q. At the time of this collision there were not any other 
automobiles around that corner at all? 
A. I did not see any. 
page 133} Q. There was nothing to block Clay Street on 
your right at all, was there 7 
A. ·No, sir. 
· Q. Nothing to prevent you from turning into Clay Street 
whatever, was there? 
A. Nothing at all if I 'vanted to turn. 
Q. If yon wanted to turn, if you had turned into Clay Street 
there would have been no collision, would there 7 
By Mr. Caskie: We object to the question because there was 
no obligation for him to turn in there. 
Objection overruled. Defendant excepts. 
By Mr. Barksdale: Read the question. (Question read) 
A. No, sir: 
Q. Are you sure that you arrived at that street intersection 
first 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. And that your car was ill the intetseetion before you 
saw the Lanham carY I 
A. Yes, sir. I 
Q. How far into that intersection had you gotten. Of 
course I know you cannot remember the ~xact feet. 
A .. I don't know exactly, but I was in there far enough 
to have the right of way. ! 
· Q. That is a conclusion of law which will be argue<;l by your 
counsel.. I want you to tell me the best ~ou can, I know you 
did not measure it, but you have testifiedj and. reiterated that 
you were in that section before you saw the Lan-
page 134 ~ ham carY I 
A. Yes, sir. I 
Q. Now I want you to give me the best1
1
estimate you can as 
to how far in the intersection you were Y 1 
A. I was in there mighty near the length of the car. 
Q. You were almost the length of your car into Clay 
Street before you saw the Lanham car? 
A. Yes, sir. i 
Q. And at that time, if I understood you correctly, the Lan-
ham car was from 25 to 30 feet back up ICiay Street to your 
left. Is th~t correct Y I 
A. Yes, sir. 1 
Q. I believe you said your car is about 12 feet long~ 
A. I didn ''t say how long it was. I 
Q. I would 'like for you to say what it:is. 
A. I think it was 10 or 12 feet. I 
Q. And you were nearly that length into the intersection 
when you found the Lanham car 25 to 30 feet back up Clay 
Street to your left from the intersection Y 
A. Yes, sir. 1 
Q~ I just want to be perfectly positi~e that is your testi- · 
mony? , 
By Mr. Ca.skie: I 
Q. Mr. Barksdale asked you in reference to what would 
have happened, if you had done something else. 
page 185 ~ If Mr. Lanham had kept sttaight on across Clay 
Street without cutting to hi~ left, 'vould the acci-
dent have ~appened y r 
A. No, Sir. . • • 1 
Q. When you first saw th1s car I believ:e you stated that you 
did not notice particularly but you just! saw a car there an<;l 
you did not notice the speed of it Y I 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Why did yon keep on across Y 1 . 
I 
i 
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·A. Because I had the right of way and I thought I had am-
ple _time to get across. · 
Q. If he had checked his car or stopped it could you have 
gotten across all right~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You were in the intersection 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And he was to your leftY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And if he had kept on straight there :would· not· have 
been any accident Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. When the accident happened, I understand your whole 
car had gotten across the intersection Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you have any reason to believe the Lanham car was 
going to turn or cut to the left and come into you Y ' · 
A. No, sir. 
page 136 ~ Q. They asked you with reference to the fac,t 
of your hurrying to catch the train. Were you 
really hurrying~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You have been a driver for some time, haven't you f 
A. Yes,· sir. 
Q. Did you know whether they always allowed plenty of 
time for a car going at a reasonable speed to get there 1 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And what wa.s the speed .. at which you were actually 
going at that time Y 
A. About 15 miles an hour. 
Q. Do you recall at what time the .Southern train No. 35 
coming into the Southern Station last December at the time 
o~ this accident, do you remember what time it was due there1 
A. It 'vas due there at 4:07. 
Q. What is it now, do you recall? 
· A. It still comes in at 4:07 and leaves at 4 :la. 
Q. Anyone wishing to catch that train or to go from the 
Southern Station to the Norfolk & Western, is there any rea-
son for putting on undue speed at all~ 
.A. No, sir. 
By Mr. Barksdale: 
Q. You said the Southern tr~in was due at 4 :07 a.nd the 
Norfolk & Western train was due to leave at 
page 137 ~ what? 
A. It did leave at four o'c-lock. 
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: Q. In other words, it was due to ;I have left before you 
started from the Southeri1 Station but yet you say now you 
were in no hurry to get there? , 
A. So, sir, I "rasn 't in any hurry to I get there. 
Q. Did Mr. Lanham put on his brakes coming into that in-
tersection? 1' 
A. He must have, he slid his wheels. 
Q. You could see that? ! 
A. Yes, sir. I 
. Q. ·No question about that~ . 
A.N~~~ I Q. He put them on hard. 
A. Yes, sir. 
1
1 
Witness stands aside. 
page 138 } GEORGE WOO~, 
Sworn for defendant. 
i 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Frost: I 
Q. What is ·your occupation? ! 
~ ! ! 
A. I drive for Mr. Hogan for the Lynchburg· Auto Com-
pan~ I 
Q. Do you recall on the night of December 9th, 1928, that 
you and Mr. Hogan went to the home ~f Mr. A. T. Lanham 1 
A. Yes, sir. i 
Q. Do you recall what conversation t!ook place at that time¥ 
I 
By Mr. Barksdale: We object to the question. I don't Imo·w 
what this evidence is meant for, but this is the :first time that 
anything has been said about this wit~ess .. No question was 
asked Mr. Lanham about conversations in the presence of this 
witness and I submit that he cannot fntroduce it now. 
By Mr. Frost: On cross-examination !:Mr. Lanham was a~ ked 
if he said certain things the night df the accident to ~Ir. 
Hogan. We think we laid the found~.tion for it. 
By the Court: I 
Q. Was ]tir. Hogan present at this conversation Y 
A. Yes, sir. I 
By the Oourt: .Answer the questioJ 
! 
Plaintiff excepts·. 
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By Mr. Abbot: If Your Honor please, the only purpose for 
which this can be introduced is to contradict ~­
page 139} Lanham, but what Mr .. Lanham says in no way 
binds us. 
By the Court: That is true, only for the purpose of con-
tradicting Mr. Lanham. 
By Mr. Frost: Read the quest~on. (Question read.) 
A. I went over there with Mr. Hogan in the car and . Mr. 
Hogan went inside the house and talked to Mr .. Lanham a. 
w·hile and I did not hear what was going on in there, but when 
they came outside ·Mr .. Hogan kept talking to him-
By Mr. Abbot: One minute. No question was asked Mr. 
Lanham about what took place outside of his house .. The 
record will show that. 
By Mr. Caskie: Nothing was said about inside or outside 
of the house. He was asked if it took place at his home. 
By the Court: As I recollect the matter Mr. Lanham was 
asked if he had made this statement or any statement at Mr. 
Lanham's house- and he denied tha.t he had. If this refers to 
that I think the foundation is sufficient. 
By Mr. Abbot: vVe deSire to except. 
By ·Mr. Frost: 
Q. Go head. 
A. And ~fr. Hogan was telling how it happened, and Mr. 
Hogan· said ''Mr. Lanham, how come you did not keep on 
Clay Street instead of cutting up into 8th Street", and he 
said ''I just lost my head I reckon, and just jammed into 
him", he cut up 8th Street instead of keeping on up Clay 
to,vards 12th, and the officer at the accident asked him the 
same thing and he made the same remark. 
page 140 ~ Q. I will ask you if you were in Mr. Hogan's 
office the following Monday night when Mr. and 
}.{rs. Lanham came in? 
A. I was. 
Q. Did you at that time hear a conversation with Mr. Ho-
gan1 
A. Yes. sir, I was in there the whole time they were talk-
ing but I did not pay much attention to it, but they were saying 
something, him or her did not know much about the driving 
rules, and Mr. Hogan was trying to tell who had the right of 
way and she said she did not lmow that anybody approaching 
to your right got the right of way, she said she did not know 
that. 
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By Mr. Barksdale: We object to that. I 
~By the Court: Strike that out . 
• • I 
By Mr. Frost: 11 · 
Q. I will ask you if at that time Mr. Lanham made the 
same remark that he had made at his hotne on Sunday night 
to Mr. Hog~n f I · 
A. Yes, s1r. · 
By the Court : .I 
Q. What .remarkf i 
A. He said he just jammed into the man, lost his head and 
went into the car. Mr. Hogan asked him! how come- he didn't 
keep on down Clay Street intsea.d of tutning np 8th and he · 
said he just lost his head ahd jammed into the 
page 141 } car. i 
I 
·CROSS EXAMINATI(J>N. 
By Mr. Muse: 1· 
Q. For whom do vou work? . 
A. The Lynchburg Auto Company. I 
Q. Did yon ever \Vork for Mr. Hogan[f 
A. Yes, sir. I' Q. Is that Mr. Hogan's business? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. You are a friend of Mr. Webber who was driving the 
automobile~ · I 
A. Yes, sir. I 
Q. How long have you worked for Mr. Hoga.nY 
A. About a year the last time. ! 
Q. The day that you went out to the Ldnham home I believe 
was on Dec:ember 9th, the day of the I accident Y 
A. Yes, sir. : 
Q. What was the occasion of your g~ng with Mr. Hogan 
out to Mr. Lanham's house 1 I 
..&. I drive for Mr. Hogan, he don't I know how to drive 
and I taken him out there, I am the nig~t driver. 
Q. And you stayed in the automobile while Mr. Hogan 
went inside·? I 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When they came back put Mr. Lanham and 
page 142 ~ Mr. Hogan, did you still remain in the automobile 
or did yon get out Y ! 
A. No, sir, I got out a.nd went with ~hem to the car. 
Q. Wbat was the occasion of your g~tting out~ 
, 
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,j I' . . .. 
A. Because I wanted to see the ca.r. I didn't go over there 
un.til ~·ome~~dy -c~e ~ut and I wanted to go there and see 
the car. 
: ~ Q. Where was the car! 
A. ~n his driveway. . 
_Q. What time of. n~ght was this 7 
A. Maybe about eight o ~.clock. - : 
Q. Was it darkf . . 
A. About dark, yes, sir. · 
. Q. It is dar)r ~f that t.iJ;ne of the year, December 9th, isn't 
itt 
;. A. About d:i.rk. I came. to work at seven o'clock and went 
oyer there directly after. I got to work. 
c Q. What kind of a light did you: ~se to _inspect the car 1 
A. I didn't use no light at all I don't think. · 
Q. December 9th, in Lynchburg, Virginia, gets dark about 
ilio~~~ . 
, · A. I think so, but he had his front porch light oil. . 
Q. And you were over there about eight 
page ]43 ~ o'clock? 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where '~as the automobile vrith reference to the front 
light! . ~. 
A·. What front light? I said the front porch light. 
Q. What light did you all use to examine-the automobile? 
A. I didn't see,any light. . _ 
Q. Was -there any light at all reflecting on the ·automobile_? 
A. The- porch light whi~ ~as about as far RS .from m~: to 
you. 
Q. How far was the automobile from the porch light_? 
A. As. far as. from me to :you. , 
Q. And you all inspected the automobile? 
A. No; sir; we just glanced· over it. 
By the Court: 
~ Q. Is there .no street light on that corner Y 
A. Yes, sir, right. on the corner. .. 
- l 
.. _ \,_:. 
By 1\fr. Muse : . 
· Q. The automobile you were inspecting was the automo-
bile involved in the .wreck belonging to . Mr. Lanham Y 
;_ A. Yes, sir. . · 
Q. And you were inspecting it at his home? 
i A. Just looking at it. 
page 144 ~ Q. lt W8:5 t4ere ~d you heard this remark 
bade that you told the jury7 
; : \ . . ~ 
' 
I 
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.A. Yes, sir. . I . 
Q. What was the occasion of your ibeing in the office on 
the other occasion you have testified ~o when Mr. and Mrs. 
Lanham both were at his office ~ I 
A. I work down there. . l 
Q. Did you pay much attention to that conversation f 
A. Not very much, no, sir, just no~ and then I would be 
listening. I would be busy sometimes and sometimes I would 
not, and they stayed there for a right /good while. 
Q. And on that occasion you again Heard him make the re-
mark you have just testified to that he jammed on the brakes T. 
A. He didn't say that, he said he ja.rl:uned into the ca.r. 
Q: And Mr. Hogan was trying to cbnvince them that the 
accident was their faultY ,
1
' . 
A. I don't lmow about that. 
Q. Is not that the. purpose of your going to Mr. Lanham's 
home to convince him that it was his !faultY 
A. No, sir, I went with Mr. Hogan, I had no idea of seeing 
hl~ ! 
Witness stands aside. I 
I 




I By Mr. Caskie: , 
Q. You are Julius L. Hogan, the o-wher of the car involved 
in this accident? I 
A. Yes, sir. · 1 
Q. L. M. Webber was your driver on this occasion~ 
A. Yes, sir. I 
Q. What was the first' you heard of the accident? 
A. Abo~~ four o'clock some one called me up and told me 
that one of mv cars had an accident at the corner of 8th and 
Olay Streets and they said it wasn't able to proceed and there 
was a passenger in the car, and to sen~ a. car up there to get 
them, so I sent another driver up there with a car to get this 
lady and he brought· her down to the: taxi office. 
Q. What happened there Y I 
A. I went out to the car and talked[ to the lady just a mo-
ment and asked her what she wanted to do and she said she 
wanted to catch the next train to Rob.noke. I asked if she 
was hurt and she said no, I am all right now. I told her I 
thought it woufd be better to go on to the hospital to be ex-
1 
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amined and see about it as the next train to Roanoke would· 
he in about three· or four hours later than that. So I sent 
her over to the hospital and I called Dr. Rawlings and told 
him I had. sent a lady to the hospital and wanted him to go 
there and examine her to see about her injuries 
page 146 ~ and take care of her. . 
Q. Then you are the one who sent for Dr. Raw-
lings? ' ' 
A. Yes, sir. I don't recall whether I got him at his office or 
at his home, but I got him at one place or the other, I don't 
remember which it was. 
Q. But you are the one that sent him over there! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What kind· o_f an automobile was this car that was ll;l-
volved in this accident 7 
A. A Chrysler 58. 
Q. What is that~ 
A. That came out about the time that Chrysler took over the 
old Maxwell. It was an old Maxwell and they had put a Chrys-
ler radiator on it, it was a four cylinder car. 
Q. The Chrysler people bought out the· Maxwell people Y 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. And put Chrysler radiators on themY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You say it was a four c.ylinder car? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How old was it Y 
A. The car was three years old at that time and had been 
driven about 42,000 ·miles. 
Q. Was that a speedy ca.r at allY 
A. Not at that time, no, sir. It was a very 
page 147 ~ good car when it wa.s new but it was practically 
worn out at that time. 
Q. Did you ever drive it yourself~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You don't know anything about driving? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Now reference has been made here to a conversation 
"Thi~h occurred out at the house of Mr. Lanham on the night of 
this accident. Did you go out there to_ see Mr. LanhamY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Please state to the jury what, if anything, Mr. Lanham 
said in regard to the manner and happening of the accident Y 
· A. I went over there and asked him about the accident, I 
didn't know much about it myself and I asked him how it 
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, '•!- : • • '• • \ t ; .i, t • I •• 
time I saw the car it was right iri front of me, I reckon I lost 
mY. head, just turned up 8th .. S~reet to trbr. to mist? ~t and in-
stead of missing it I hit hini.". That_i_s apout t~e ~nly_excus~. 
h~ _could give for it. .. . . I . . . · 
... Q. Was he subsequently down at your office f ~- Yes, ~ir. . . . ~ '· J . 
Q. Did he make any statement there about the matt~rY 
A. The same thing exactly. He never ~d deny and tha~ is 
what he told me about the accident all the time. , 
page 148 ~ . Q. He didn't see it untirlie_ was .right on him 
. · and he lost his head~ ~ 
: A. Yes,· sir, that is what he · toid ·me ·about ·it: He said 
he _put on ;hi~ brakes and t!_lr_ned. up ~th St ee~ ~1\d tried ~o ~I?~ 
the car and instead ·Of missing it he hit ~t.. . . . 
Q. Did you go up there after the accident Y 
A. I was up there that evening betweep 7 :?0 and 8 o'clock. 
You mean to where the wreck. was 7 , 
· Q. Ye.s, sir. . . · J 
. A. Yes, sir, I was up there a little after :five o'clock. 
Q. Did Y~~u see any skid marks Y . 1 _ .. . 
. ~: ~~~--~![; were·th~ skid ·marks¥ [ 
A. I would say about 10 or 12 · or·15 feet before he got to 
the in~ersec~ion and .. they .. came o.n -ac~os~ the in~ersection. 
and showed In the rmddle of the street -qnhl they hit the ~.r 
or where the two cars came together. I · . 
. Q. And th~y began abo11t 10 Qr 1~ feet back of the intersec-
tion? . ~ .1 • • • • • 
A. Yes, sir. I 
Q. W4at was the total length of the spd marks 1 
A. It w~_~ard to ~ay but I imagine 20.or 25 feet; I did not 
measure them. . . · i . , . · ~ ' . 
. - Q. And those skid marks pegan where Y 
page 149 ~ A. I would say about 15 feet back of the inter-
. . ; section where -they started. \ . . 
Q. That is, on Clay before you come into 8th 1 
A. Y~~' sir. . . . . i . ; Q. Were the marks still there on t~e ground and could 
you s~e where the point of impact. occurred Y • . . : 
A. Yes, sir. I . 
Q. Where wa.s that wi·th reference to the central point of 
intersection 7 . . . : · . · 
. A. Say here is the center (indicating) it happened over 
on this corner and knocked my car ag~inst the corner. . . 
Q. You m~an this corner . he)."e .(indicating) f . . :~ .. 
A. Yes, sir.. . · .. · ·. ·1 ·· :' : ·-
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Q. Had your car gotten across the central point of the in.;. 
tersection before the impaet ~ 
A. It looked like it did, according to the marks in the street 
and where it landed. · 
No Cross Examination. 
Witness stands aside. 
Defendant Rests. 
page 150} REBUTrr.AL TESTIM:ONY OFFERED BY 
THE PLAINTIFF. 
A. T. LATHAM, 
Recalled. 
By Mr. Abbot: . 
Q. Mr. Lanham, a witness, George Wood, testifi_ed tha.t on 
the night of this accident that he drove Mr. Hogan to your 
house and that Mr. Hogan went in and talked to you and then 
you and Mr. Hogan came out of your house towards the car 
talking about the thing and you said that you lost your head 
and jammed into the car. Is, or is not that statement trueY 
A. I did not go to the car, I went to the front door. 
Q_. Confine yourself to that statement. Did you say that? 
A .. No, sir, I did not. 
Q. I believe you 'vent down to Mr. Hogan's place the next 
night?. 
A. At his request. yes, sir. 
Q. And George Wood has testified that down there you 
made the same statement in his presence. Did you or not 
make that statement Y 
A. No. sir. 
Q. Did you or not make a statement in the .presence of 
either George Wood or Mr. Hogan that you 1ost your headY 
A. No. sir: I never lost my head. 
Q. Did you make that statement~ 
A. No, sir, I wouldn't make any such statement as that. 
(Witness stands aside.) 
page 161} · 
By Mr. Abbot: 
MRS. A. T. LANHAM, 
Recalled. 
Q: Mrs. Lanham, a witness, George Wood, has made the 
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statement on the witness stand a moment ago that on the night 
o:f Monday, the lOth of December, that/you and Mr. Lanham 
were in Mr. Hogan's office, that Mr. Lanham stated that he 
lost his head and jammed on into the c~r. Did Mr. Lanham 
make that statement, or not? I 
A. No, I don't think so, I did not hear it if he did and 
~ was in the office. I 
Q. You were paying attention to what was going on f 
A. I ~ertainly was. 1 
Q. Would you have heard it if he Jaid itt · 
A. I am quite sure I would. i 
No Cross Examination. 
Witness stands aside. I 
r•age 152. ~ DR. W. R. WHITM!A.N, 
Recalled. I 
I 
By _].~Ir. Barksdale : 
1 Q. In regard to the unfortunate miscarriage of Mrs. Miller 
-do you recall approximately when SYmptoms premonitory 
to this occurrence first developed to J your knowledge Y 
A. As well as I remember, it 'vas {1hout the time of her 
admission to the hospital. : 
Q. Which I believe you said was thb 20th Y 
A. Yes, sir. [ 
Q. Did she complain ~ I 
A. .She complained on the day of her visit to my office, on 
the 18th, of backache. I 
Q. That was the 18th Y 
A. Yes. sir. , 
Q. Which was nine days after the collision took place on 
fue~hf I 
A. Yes, ·sir. . 
Q. I think you have testified this morning as to your opin-
ion of what caused the miscarriage fro~ your inspection and 
examination of her but I am not absoltttely sure that you did 
and I will ask you to state nowf : 
A. I did state that. · i 
Q. Yon gave your opinion as to wh¢ther the collision and 
shock caused it? 1 
A. Yes, sir. 1 
Q. Had she ever consulted you prior to this time about 
maternity or about becoming a moth~rt 
I 
Julius Hogan v. Susanne B. Miller~ 127' 
A. She had. Probably, I don't recall how long-, 
page 153} but several months, or she consulted me as to_ why 
she had never been able to bear a child . 
. Q. What was her attitude~ 
r;:i: 
..t·: By Mr. Caskie: We object to that. 
By Mr. Barksdale: I think it .is relevant. 
By Mr. Caskie: Something that happened a years before 
could not affect this case. 
By the Court: Objection sustained. 
By Mr. Barksdale: I want to show her attitude in the mat-
ter. 
By the Court: You mean her physical disposition or desire 
to become a mother? 
By Mr. Barksdale : Yes, sir. 
Witness stands aside. 
By J\.Ir. Frost : If Your ·Honor please, we would like to 
have a view and the jury can.go out to the scene of the acci-
dent while we are taking up the instructions. 
By tb e Court: \T ery well, we can do that. 
page 154} After the above evidence, which was all of the 
evidence introduced, was in and the jury had been 
instructed as set out in the bill of exceptions #2, and the 
jury had heard the argument, the jury retired and r~turned 
a verdict in the following words and figures, to-wit: 
"We, the jury,. find for the plaintiff and fix the damages 
$10,000:00. W. G. Burnsnall, Foreman." 
Thereupon the defendant, by counsel, moved the Court to 
set a·side the verdict on the following grounds : 
1. Tha.t it was contrary to the law and evidence. 
2. That the damages awarded were excessive. 
3. For error of the Court in the admission and exclusion of 
· the evidence and in granting, refusing and amending the ~n­
structions : 
Which motion the Court overruled and entered judgment 
against the defendant on the verdict. To which action of the 
Court the defendant, by Counsel, excepted and asks that his 
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bill of exceptions #1 may be signed, seal~d, and made a part 
of the record, which is a·ccordingly done this 13th day of No-
vember, 1929, it appearing in writing tha~ the attorney for the 
plaintiff has had reasonable notice of tlie time and place at 




DON P. HAL~E.Y, Judge. (Seal) 
.page 155 ~ BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 2. 
I Susanne B. Miller 
V. . I . 
_Julius Hogan. I - _ 
Be it remembered tha.t at the trial of the above entitled 
cause, after the evidence had been takenJ the Court on behalf 
of the plaintiff gave the following instructions: 
No. 1-Given. 
The Court instructs the jury that at the time of the injury 
here complained of, the. plaintiff was d. passenger in a ve-
hicle belonging to the defendant who w~ a common carrier, 
and that the said defendant owed the I plaintiff the utmost 
care, diligence and foresight in the operation and management 
of the vehicle in which the passenger waS riding, and that this 
. duty must be performed by the driver I of said taxi cab ; if, 
therefore, you believe from the evidence that at the time of 
this accident,. the driver of the taxi cab :in question failed in 
any respect to manage and operate the ~ame with the utmost 
care, diligence and foresight, and that such failure proxi-
mately contributed to the aooident, thenll1 you will find for the 
plaintiff. 
No. ·2-Given. I 
The Court instructs the jury that if -tinder all the evidence 
and instructions of. the Court they should find for the plain-
tiff, Mrs. Susanne B. Miller, they should allow her such sum 
tLS they believe from the evidence will! compensate her rea-
sonably for the injuries received, if any; land in estimating her 
damages, if any, may take into consideration the mental and 
physical pain and suffering, if any, c.o~sequent upon the in-
jury received, the reasonable value of ~he time already lost, 
if any consequent upon the injuries; the expenses incurred 
I 
I 
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.. 
. by her for hospital and medical treatment.; and 
·page 156 t they believe from a perponderance of the evidence 
that said injuries are of such character that they 
will with reasonable pro ba bill ty wholly or partially disable 
her to labor and earn money in the future, then they may, 
in addition to the above, find such sum as will, if paid now, 
be a fair compensation for her diminished capa.city, if any, 
to labor and earn wages in the future, and in this connection, 
they may take into ·consideration her age and physical condi-
tion; the damages, ho,vever, in no event, to exceed the sum of 
$10,000.00, that being the. amount claimed in plaintiff's notice 
of motion. 
And at the instance of the defendant the Court gave the 
following instructions: 
"A"-Given. 
"The Court instructs the jury that the burden is on the 
plaintiff to prove her case in every e~sential particular by a 
preponderance of the evidence. The mere happening of an ac-
cident places no responsibility on any one and the plaintiff 
can only recover by proving by a preponderanc.e of the evi-
dence tha.t the driver of the defendant's car was guilty of 
negligence and that such negligence was a proxi-
page 157 } mate cause of the accident and that injury fol-
lowed from such accident. \ 
"B' '-Given. 
The Court instructs the jury that under the law of Vir-
ginia, if two vehicles approach or enter an intersection at 
approximately the same time, it is the duty of the driver of 
the vehicle on the left to yield the right of way to the driver 
of the vehicle on the right, and if you believe from the evi-
dence that the car owned by J. L. Hogan and in which 'Mrs. 
1\Iiller was riding had entered the· intersection prior to the 
time the ca.r driven by A. T. Lanham entered the intersection, 
or that the hvo cars approached the intersection at approxi-
mately the same time, and that the car of the said J. L. Hogan 
·was to the right of the car· driven by A. T. Lanham, and 
was proceeding in a lawful manner, th~n the Hogan car had 
the right of 'vay, and it was the duty of. said Lanham t.o yield 
the right of way. 
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page 158 ~ "D"--Given. i 
The Court instructs the jury that ~he defendant in any 
circumstances 'vould not be liable, if /liable at all, for any-
thing other than damages actually eau~ed by the accident and 
it is hot sufficient to prove that the plaintiff has suffered from 
causes 'vhieh may possibly have resulted from the accident. 
She can only recover, if recovery be h~d, for damages which 
are shown by the evidence with reason~ble certainty to be the 
direct result of the accident. ! 
'' E ''-Given. 
The Court instructs the jury that i~ you believe from the 
evidence that the Hogan car in which ¥rs. Miller was riding 
was proceeding in a lawful manner and a.t a lawful rate of 
speed, and that the aooident was in no ~ay proximately caused 
or contributed to by any negligence of[ the driver of the said 
Hogan .car, then you must find for the 1defendant. · 
"G "-Given. 
I 
The Court instructs the jury that it jwas the duty of A. T. 
I.Aa.nham on approaching the. intersection at 8th and Clay 
Streets to keep to the right hand side of the drive,vay on Clay 
Street, a.s close to the rigHt hand curb a.s practi-
page 159 ~ ble, and to keep a careful lookout to his right hand 
for c.ars approaching from that direction in or-
der that he might gTant the right of w~y to such ears, if nec-
essary~ and likewise to keep his car under such control that 
he could, if necessary, stop the same i:n order to avoid a col- · 
lision with a car approac.hing from hi~s right and either en-
tering or approac.hing the intersection! a.t approximately the 
same time as the Lanham car, and ifj you believe from the 
evidence that the accident· involved in 1this action was proxi-
mately and solely caused by the failure of snjd Lanham to 
comply with these duties and that th~ driver of the Hogan 
car was proceeding in a lawful manner and was guilty of no 




The Court instructs the jury that there is in Virginia no 
specific speed limit at which a driver] may drive an autmo-
mobile, but the driver of said a.utomooile is held only to the 
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duty of driving his car at a careful and prudent speed, not 
greater or less than is reasonable and proper having due re-
gard to traffic, surface, and width of the street and of any 
other conditions then existing, and the Court ·further in-
structs the jury that any speed up to and includ-
page 160 r ing- twenty five miles an hour in a residence dis-
trict is presumed to be lawful. 
The defendant by counsel except~d to the giving of plain-
tiff's instruction No. 1 on the ground that there was no evi-
dence to support said instruction, in that there was nothing 
to show that the driver of the defendant's car had failed 
in any respect to exercise the cars, diligence and foresight 
required by him, 'vhich motion the Court overruled, to which 
action of the Court the defendant by counsel excepted and 
asked tha.t this his bill of exceptions No. 2 may be signed, 
sealed and made a part of the record,. which is accordingly 
done this 13th day of N ovembe·r, 1929, it appearing in writ-
ing that the attorney for the plaintiff has had reasonable no-
tice of the time and place at which the bills of exceptions were 
to be tendered to the Court. 
DON P. HALSEY, Judge. (Seal) 
page 161 } BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 3. 
Susanne· B. Miller 
v. 
Julius Hogan. 
Be it remembered that at the trial of this cause, after the 
evidence had been introduced and proceedings had been had, 
as set ou.t in bill of exceptions No. 1, the defendant offered 
instruction ''B", which is the same as instruction "B" given 
by the Court as set out in bill of exceptions No. 2, with the ad-
dition, however, at the end of the following words "and it 
was not negligence on the part of the driver of the Hogan 
car to continue across the intersection'',. which instruction 
as offered the Court refused to give, but struck out the words 
noted above, to which action of the Court in so striking out 
said words the defendant by counsel excepted on the· ground 
tha.t the party has a right to rely on the granting of the right 
of way and it is not negligence in acting on it, and there was 
no circumstance shoW'n to put him on notice that he should 
not proceed. 
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. . I 
At the said time and place the defenda~t offered the fol-
lowing instruction: · ! 
. INSTRUCTION c. I 
The· Court instructs the Jury that if *ou believe from the 
evidence that the Hogan car in which M~s. Miller was riding 
at the time of the accident involved in this case had entered 
the intersection prior and a~ead of the time that 
page.162 ~ the automobile driven by A. T. ·Lan4an entered 
. . said intersection and that th~ said Hogan ca.r was 
approaching from the right of said automobile, then it was 
the duty of the said Lanhan to grant th~ right of way to the 
said Hogan car and to check or stop his I ca.r, if necessary, in 
order that the said Hogan car might crqss the said intersec-
tion, and the driver of the said Hogan car was entitled to rely 
on the said Lahan to grant said right of lway. If you believe 
from the evidence tha.t the accident was: proximately caused 
by the failure of the said Lanhan to grant such right of way 
after the said Hogan car had entered s~id intersection, and 
that the said Hogan car was proceedingl1 in a lawful manner, 
then you must find for the defendant. 
Which said instruction '' C '' the court refused to iive, to 
which action of the Court the defendant/ by counsel excepted 
on the grounds that the said instruction !properly set out the 
law on the subject and th~re was no evidence to put any other 
duty on the driver of the I-Iogan car th~n tha.t set out in the 
instruction. I 
I 
And at the same time and place the defendant by counsel 




The Court instructs the Jury that wh!ere the paths of two 
approaching automobiles cross at intersections· of public 
streets, the driver at the left must givb way, unless so far 
in advance of the other as lto afford reasonable 
page 163 ~ time to clear the crossing. jit is the duty of the 
driver of the car on the left to have his car under 
such control that it can be promptly stopped, if necessary, to 
avoid contact with the· car crossing his !line of travel on the 
right, and he has no right to proceed bver the intersection 
unless the car at the right is so far away ]that the driver of ·the 
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car at the left would have been justified in believing that he 
could pass over the intersection ahead of the other car. 
The Court refused to give said instruction "F", to which 
ac.tion of the Court the defendant by counsel excepted on the 
ground that said instruction properly sets out the obligations 
of parties at intersection crossings and the respective rights 
of the parties, to which action of the court i'!l triking out the 
concluding paragraph of instruction '' B '' and in refusing to 
give instrutcions "C" and "F'" the defendant by counsel ex-
cepted and ·asks that this his bill of exceptions No. 3 may be 
· signed, sealed and made a -part of the record, which was ac-
cordingly done this 13th da.y of N ovembe·r, 1929, it appearing 
in writing that the attorney for the plaintiff has had reason-
able notice of the time and place at which the bills of excep-
tions were to be tendered to the Court. 
DON P. HALSEY, Judge. (Seal) 
Filed in clerk's office of circuit court of city of Lynchburg, 
Va., ,Nov. 13, 1929. · 
HUBERT H. J\!IARTIN, Clerk. 
page 164 ~ The following are certain instructions offered 
by the plaintiff, and refused by the court, to-
gether with the plaintiff's objections and exceptions '¢th 
reference thereto, identified by the initials of the ,Judge who 
heard the case, to-wit: . 
INSTR.TJCTION NO. 3. 
The court instructs the jury tha.t if they believe from the 
evidence that the collision in which Mrs. Susanne B. Miller 
was injured resulted from the negligence of both A. T. Lan-
ham and the driver of defendant, Julius Hogan's, taxi-cab, 
they should find for the plaintiff, notwithstanding the fac.t 
tha.t the jury might believe that the negligence of Lanham 
was greater than the negligence of the driver of the taxi-cab; 
and if you should find for the plaintiff~ your verdict should be 
for the damages sustained by Mrs. Miller, not exceeding, how-
ever, $10,000.00, the amount claimed in plaintiff's notice of 
motion. 
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INSTRUCTION Nd. 4. 
I 
The court instructs the jury that at the time of the injury 
here complained of, the plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle 
belonging to the defendant, who was a! cotnm.on carrier, and 
that the said defendant owed the plaintiff the utmost cate, dili..: 
gence and foresight in the operation, maintenance and man-
agement of the vehicle in which the pas~enger was riding, and 
that this duty must be performed by tlie driver of said taxi-
cab; if, therefore, you believes from th1e evidence that at the 
time of this accident, the taxi-cab in question was being driven 
at a. ra.te of speed which was not consonant wHh the utmost 
care, diligence and foresight, and tha~ the operation of the 
oor at such speed proximately contriButed to the accident; 
or if you believe from the evidence tllat at the time of the 
accident, an efficient application of the ibrakes by the defend.:. 
ant's driver would have a~oided it, and that a 
page 165 ~ person exercising the utmdst ca.re, diligence and 
foresight in the ope·ration and management of the 
taxi-cab under the surrounding facts a.nd circumstances would 
-have so applied the brakes, and that there was no efficient 
application of the brakes, and that th~ failure to apply the 
brakes as aforesaid proximately contr~buted to the accident, 
or if you believe. from the evidence that the driver of defend-
ant's car could have avoided the colli~ion by turning down 
Clay Stree~ and tha.t an ordinary pers01i exercising the utmost 
cat~, diligence and foresight under the surrounding facts and 
circumstances would have so avoided the collision and such 
failure to turn proximately contribut~d to the injury here 
complained of, then you will find for the plaintiff .. 
INSTRUCTION NOj 6. 
. I 
The court instructs the jury that if they believe from the 
evidence that the plaintiff, Mrs. Susan ;B. Miller, wtt.s injured 
in a collision to which the negligence of the driver of the de- · 
fendant, Julius Hogan's, taxi-cab pr9xima.tely contributed, 
they should find for the plaintiff; and if yon should find for the 
pain tiff, your verdict should be for thje amount of· damages 
sustained by ~Irs. Miller as a result of the accident, not ex-
ceeding, however, $10,000.00, the amohnt claimed in plain-
tiff's notice of motion. ; 
page 166 ~ Plaintiff's objections & elceptio~s to courts re..: 
fusal to give its instructio:ds & to its giving def's 
instructions. 
Julius Hogan "Y. Susanne B. Miller. 135 
B. Inst111cts_ as to . rt. of way ~thout stating the_ effect 
thereof. The in~truc.tion c~nsidered improper, but if given it 
should be amended by adduig thereto that the_ fact of rt. of 
way should be considered in determining ·whether or not the 
defendant exe·rcised the· care required of him. 
Objection made Defs. instructions embodying the statutory 
rules applicable behveen defendant & Lanham, who is not a 
party. 
The aotion is founded on defendant''s duty to exercise the 
utmost ca.re diligence & foresight to convey his passenger 
safety. The breaches relied on are set forth in instruction 2 
refused. 
The question l.s was defendant negligent on either qf the 
three particulars mentioned ~nd did such negligence efficiently 
contribute to the injury. If so, he is liable regardless of 
whether Lanham violated a. penal statute. 
His violation; if any, of such statute gives rise to a criminal 
liability or a civil' liability to any one injured thereby for 
whose protection the statute was enacted. But in this case it 
can have no application w4atever except that it 'vould seem 
proper that the jury should consider in determining whether 
or not the def. exercised proper care, what penal liabili-
tiee attached to Lanham's action as a basis for defendant's 
driver to act ort the assumption that Lanham would not vio-
late the statute. 
Assuming for sake of argument that Lanhan did violate 
penal statute, here it has no effect.. The question is did def 's 
driver have the right in the exercise of the utmost care to con-
duct himself as he did acting on that assumption. 
page 167 ~ Our instruc-tion, No. 3 should be give~, particu-
larly in view of the instructions the Court inti-
mates it will give for def. We are entitled to have the jury 
know, in no uncertain terms that if any negligence of the defs 
driver was a proximate cause of the injury that ·Lanham's 
action, however careless they might deem it, should not be 
considered in arriving at or fixing the amount of the verdict 
or in any other way, except in determining whether or not the 
defs driver exercised due care. 
Our instruction No. 4 should be given as defining the defs. 
I 
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duty & assigning the breaches it is thought that stating ''a 
proximate cause of" as "efficiency contributing to" the injury 
is not only proper but more understan~able. 
. I 
The Court uses the phrase ''by a prep$nderance of the evi-
dence'' so often that it is moved that tlie jury be instructed 
t "t • I as o 1 s meamng. 1 
The instructions for defendant as offe1ted & modified by the 
Court have the additional vice of singli~g out certain things 
particularly the requirements of n pen~ statute, that they 
will serve to confuse the jury. I 
I 
I 
Another objection is that although a !compliance with the 
dictates of the penal statute on the part of defendant's driver 
might be the exercise of ordinary care ~et it is no answer to 
the 'liability urged against him. . i . 
The plaintiff says you did not exercisJ the utmost care for 
my safety. The def. answers that he did:l1not violate the penal 
statute. 
I 
page 168 ~ Finally it is again submitted tha.t an instruc-
. tion in plain & certain terks should be given 
along the line hereinabove suggested sh that the confusion 
which is bound to result will be cured at ]east to some extent. 
For the reasons hereinabove given th~ plaintiff objects to 
the refusal of the Court to give each & every instruction of-
fered by it and to the Courts giving each & every instruction 
offered and for as modified on behalf df the defendant and 
excepts to the Courts rulings thereon for the same reasons 
& for the further reason that if the Cohrt insists on giving 
the instructions .about Lanham's violation of the sta.tute it 
_ should be required that ''they be pro~ed by a perponder-
ance of the evidence" in the favourite fwl ords of defendants 
counsel · · 1 
I ,1. L. ABBOT, 
o~ Counsel for Plf. 
Plaintiffs objections & exceptions rei instructions. 
Made filed and identified this 8th day of Oct., 1929. 
I D.P. H. 
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page 169 r I, Hubert H. Martin, clerk of the circuit court of 
the city of Lynchburg, certify that the foregoing 
is a true transcript of the record in the case of Susanne B. 
Miller vs. Julius Hogan, that the blueprint herewith desig-
nated exhibit Garland and identified by the certificate of the 
clerk of said court, is the blueprint used at the trial of said 
case, and that notice as required by Section 6339 of the Code 
and Chapter 68 of Acts of 1924, was duly given, as appears 
by paper writings filed with said .record. 
The clerk's fee for making this transcript is $16.00. 
Given under my hand this 20th day of November, 19~9. 
BUB.ERT H .. MARTIN, Clerk. 
A Copy-Teste: 
H. STEW ART JONES, c. c. I 
See manuscript for blueprint. 
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